On Point: 11. Defense Wins

Stephen McFadden v. United States, USSC No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (June 18, 2015), reversing and remanding United States v. McFadden, 753 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2014); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

The Supreme Court holds that in order to convict a defendant of distribution a controlled substance analogue, the government must prove that the defendant knew the substance was controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act or the Analogue Act, or that the defendant knew the specific features of the substance that make it a controlled substance analogue.

Oscar C. Thomas v. Marc Clements, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2539, 6/16/15, petition for rehearing en banc denied, 8/7/15

Thomas is entitled to a new trial for the intentional homicide of Joyce Oliver-Thomas, his ex-wife, because his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to ask a pathology expert to review the conclusions of the state’s forensic pathologist—conclusions on which the prosecutor relied heavily in arguing that Thomas caused Oliver-Thomas’s death intentionally rather than accidentally, as Thomas claimed.

Kevin Scott Karsjens v. Lucinda Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015), reversed, Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).

After a lengthy trial in this class-action lawsuit brought by persons committed under Minnesota’s sexually violent person law, a federal district judge concluded that Minnesota’s sexually violent person commitment law does not pass constitutional scrutiny. The 8th Circuit reverses, holding the district court applied the wrong standards of scrutiny to the Minnesota law and that under the correct standards the statute passes muster.

State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.

State v. Arron A.-R., 2014AP142, District 1, 6/2/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

Arron delinquency adjudication for one count of first degree sexual assault is supported by the testimony of the victim, S.F., but the adjudication for a second count is reversed because the trial court erred in believing that the charge required only sexual contact, not sexual intercourse.

Elonis v. United States, USSC No. 13-983, 2015 WL 2464051 (June 1, 2015), reversing United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321 (3rd Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved a prosecution of Elonis for threats he made in postings on his Facebook page, and it was being widely watched for the First Amendment question it raised. But the Court sidestepped the constitutional question, and holds instead that 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), the federal statute he was prosecuted under, requires the government to prove some sort of mental state regarding the threatening nature of the communication.

Mellouli v. Lynch, USSC No. 1034, 2015 WL 2464047 (June 1, 2015), reversing Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the statute providing for deportation based on a violation of a state drug crime “relating to a controlled substance” is limited to “controlled substance” listed in the federal controlled substances schedule under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to hold that any drug offense triggers the removal statute, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule.

State v. Gregory Mark Radaj, 2015 WI App 50; case activity (including briefs)

A defendant who committed a felony before the effective date of the law mandating a $250 DNA surcharge for each felony conviction, but who is sentenced after that effective date, cannot be made to pay the surcharge on each felony conviction because that violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Instead, the defendant may only be subject to a single discretionary surcharge of $250.

State v. Garett T. Elward, 2015 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)

Defendants who committed a misdemeanor offense before April 1, 2015 January 1, 2014, cannot be made to pay the mandatory $200 DNA surcharge that is supposed to be imposed for each misdemeanor conviction beginning January 1, 2014, because imposition of the surcharge on that class of defendants violates the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. [See UPDATE below regarding the date change.]

State v. Roddee W. Daniel, 2015 WI 44, 4/29/15, affirming and modifying a published court of appeals decision; opinion by Justice Bradley; case activity (including briefs)

This opinion clarifies the procedure for determining the competency of a defendant during postconviction proceedings by holding that once the issue of a defendant’s competency has been raised, the state bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is competent to proceed.