On Point blog, page 40 of 53
Vagrancy (Begging), § 947.02(4) – Vague and Overbroad
State v. Bradley S. Johnson, Outagamie Co. Circ. Ct. No. 12CM495
circuit court decision; case activity
Panhandling prosecution under § 947.02(4) is dismissed with prejudice because the vagrancy statute is unconstitutional under first amendment analysis: panhandling (“begging”) is a form of protected speech and its criminalization under § 947.02(4) is fatally vague and overbroad. State v. Starks, 51 Wis.2d 256, 186 N.W.2d 245 (1971) (loitering statute unconstitutional as providing insufficient notice of prohibited conduct,
Warrantless Entry – Curtilage – Attached Garage
State v. Michael C. Christofferson, 2012AP571-CR, District 3, 10/30/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The officer didn’t develop probable cause (for OWI arrest; Christofferson was getting out of his car when the officer first saw him) until after illegal entry of the attached garage, therefore the ensuing arrest was unlawful.
¶10 Under the Fourth Amendment, police are prohibited from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home absent probable cause and exigent circumstances.
Nicole Harris v. Sheryl Thompson, 7th Cir No. 12-1088, 10/18/12
seventh circuit decision (html) (90-page pdf download: here), granting habeas relief in 904 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. 2009)
A significant decision in several respects – not least, attorney performance – that a summary post cannot hope to capture, save broad highlights. Executive summary: Harris was convicted of killing her 4-year-old son Jaquari, against a defense of accidental death (self-strangulation with an elastic band). The defense had potential,
Extraneous Conduct
State v. Mark E. Johnson, 2011AP2673-CR, District 3, 9/25/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Cross-examination of Johnson, on trial for possession of marijuana and bail jumping, as to his marijuana use was proper, but as to his use of cocaine (eliciting an admission) was reversible error:
¶10 Johnson concedes that, after he testified he never possessed marijuana, the State was permitted to cross-examine him about a previous instance where he possessed marijuana.
Right to Counsel of Choice: Lawyer as Client’s Witness
State v. Jose O. Gonzalez-Villarreal, 2012 WI App 110 (recommended for publication); case activity
Counsel (Michael J. Knoeller) was present while the police interrogated, and elicited incriminating responses from, his client, Gonzalez-Villarreal. G-V didn’t speak English, and Knoeller doubled as interpreter. The state issued charges, and Knoeller continued to represent G-V. However, the state moved to disqualify Knoeller as counsel, arguing that his service as interpreter during the interrogation created a risk that Knoeller might have to testify.
OWI – PAC – Countable Convictions
State v. Frederick J. Scott, 2012AP533-CR, District 3, 9/11/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
The threshold for illegal alcohol concentration is reduced from .08 to .02 for drivers who have at least 3 prior qualifying convictions. Scott had three priors, thus was subject to arrest and prosecution for driving with a PAC of .03. However, prior convictions may be collaterally attacked if obtained in violation of the right to counsel,
Virgil Hall, III v. Zenk, 7th Cir No. 11-3911, 8/29/12
Habeas – Jury Exposure to Extraneous Information
Subsequent to trial, Hall discovered that a juror’s son was a fellow inmate of Hall who initially told the juror that Hall was likely innocent, but later indicated that he “and several co-inmates had changed their mind about Hall and thought him guilty.” The (Indiana) state court ruled that this extrinsic information wasn’t prejudicial: the burden to show actual prejudice from exposure to extraneous information is on the defendant and,
Delinquency Proceedings – Disposition
State v. Noah L., 2012AP348, District 2, 8/29/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
After finding the proof sufficient to support a delinquency allegation, the trial court nonetheless declined to enter adjudication of delinquency, pending a report and recommendation from the Department of Human Services. The report was prepared, which included information not admitted into evidence at the fact-finding hearing, and the court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent.
Sentencing – Bifurcated, Enhanced Misdemeanor
State v. Lavon J. Ash, Sr., 2012AP381-CR, District 2, 8/15/12
court of appeals decision (1-judge, ineligible for publication); case activity
Ash was sentenced to concurrent terms of one-year initial confinement, one-year extended supervision on two misdemeanor counts, a sentence structure he successfully challenges. Incompatible statutory mandates lie at the heart of the problem. In the first instance, § 973.01(1) requires bifurcated misdemeanor sentences, which simply isn’t possible for unenhanced misdemeanors: a bifurcated sentence must be served in prison,
Miranda-Edwards Interrogation Rule: Unequivocal Request for Counsel – Reinitiation of Interrogation
State v. Pierre R. Conner, 2012 WI App 105 (recommended for publication); case activity
Interrogations – Miranda-Edwards Rule – Unequivocal Request for Counsel
The issues on a request-for-counsel challenge to in-custody interrogation are whether the individual unequivocally invoked his right to counsel and, if so, whether he subsequently reinitiated questioning, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Although the trial court found that Conner’s requests for counsel were equivocal,