On Point: 13. Due Process

Michael Damon Rippo v. Renee Baker, Warden, USSC No. 16-6316, 2017 WL 855913 (March 6, 2017) (per curiam), reversing and remanding Rippo v. State, 368 P.3d 729 (Nev. 2016); Scotusblog page

In this per curiam decision, the Supreme Court holds the lower court erred in demanding a defendant show actual bias to satisfy his claim that his due process right to an impartial judge was violated.

State v. Robert Mario Wheeler, 2016AP55-CR, 2/21/2017, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robert Wheeler was tried for reckless injury and being a felon in possession of a gun arising out of a single shooting incident. To keep the jury from hearing about his status as a felon, the parties stipulated that he was and agreed that the gun possession charge would be decided by the court. Wheeler’s counsel specifically noted the possibility that the two counts could be decided differently, given the different factfinders. (¶5).

Question presented:

Whether, when this court held in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), that an indigent defendant is entitled to meaningful expert assistance for the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” it clearly established that the expert should be independent of the prosecution.

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Issues (from the petition for review and petition for cross-review)

 1.  Whether the offense under § 343.44(2)(ar)4. can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony in order to resolve ambiguity in the statutory language when the legislature’s intent was to create a penalty scheme with increasing penalties for additional elements; or whether, instead, the doctrine of implied repeal should be employed to correct the obvious drafting error that created the ambiguity as to whether the offense is a misdemeanor or a felony.

2.  Whether § 343.44(2)(ar)4., having been interpreted to give discretion to the prosecution to charge an offense as a misdemeanor or a felony, can be constitutionally applied.

3.  Whether the provision in § 343.44(2)(b) stating that the circuit court “shall” consider certain sentencing factors is mandatory or directory.

State v. Michael L. Washington, 2017 WI App 6, petition for review granted 4/10/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 3; case activity (including briefs)

Michael Washington was set to go on trial for burglary and obstructing an officer. On the morning of the first day of trial, before voir dire, Washington began complaining about his attorney, engaged in a contentious dialogue with the judge, and then “semi was removed and semi left on his own.” Voir dire and trial went on without him; he was occasionally contacted in his jail cell and refused to come back to the courtroom. He was convicted, and on appeal argues that his statutory (as opposed to constitutional) right to presence was violated because the statutory conditions for waiving that right were not met.

Review of a published court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (from the petition):

I. Whether the circuit court properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s warrantless blood test because he was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the test when he was read the informing the accused form which incorrectly told him that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused chemical testing, when he was actually only facing a possible arrest?

II. Whether the circuit court below properly suppressed Mr. Blackman’s blood test where Mr. Blackman was unconstitutionally coerced into taking the blood test, under the totality of the circumstances, when he acquiesced to the unlawful assertion by the officer that they take blood samples in cases like his—in addition to being told that he faced a revocation and other penalties if he refused?

III. Whether section 343.305(3)(ar)2 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because it coerces consent to otherwise unconstitutional searches without due process of law?

Turner v. United States, USSC No. 15-1503, and Overton v. United States, USSC No. 15-1504, cert. granted, consolidated for argument and decision, 12/14/16

Question presented (as formulated by SCOTUS)

Whether the petitioners’ convictions must be set aside under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

State v. David Robert Brown, 2016AP83-CR, 12/14/2016, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

David Brown was arrested for OWI; the breathalyzer that he took about two hours later showed a .11 BAC. At trial he adduced expert testimony that, given what Brown told the expert he had drunk and when, his BAC would have been .078, just below the legal limit, at the time he was driving. He objects on due process grounds to the court’s instructing the jury, in accord with Wis JI-Criminal 2669, that it could find he was driving under the influence on the basis of the BAC reading alone.

State v. Travis J. Manteuffel, 2016AP96-CR, 12/6/16, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

State v. Elward, 2015 WI App 51, 363 Wis. 2d 628, 866 N.W.2d 756, held it an ex post facto violation to require misdemeanants to pay the $200 DNA surcharge where the law imposing it went into effect after they had committed their crimes.

State v. Brian Grandberry, 2016AP173-CR, District 1, 11/29/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 3/13/17; affirmed 4/10/18; case activity (including briefs)

Grandberry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon after police stopped the car he was driving and found a loaded pistol in the glove compartment. Citing § 167.31, which regulates the transportation of firearms, he argues he was not “carrying” a concealed weapon but was instead “transporting” it under § 167.31(2)(b)(intro.) and 1., which allow handguns to be transported in a car, even when loaded. (¶6). The court of appeals says this argument misses its mark.