On Point: A. Plea agreements

State v. Kevin L. Nash, 2020 WI 85, 11/19/20, affirming a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Before accepting a plea entered under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a circuit court must determine whether there is “strong proof of guilt” sufficient to “substantially negate” the defendant’s claims of innocence. State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 859-60, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); State ex rel. Warren v. Schwartz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 645, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998).  The supreme court declines to exercise its superintending authority to require circuit courts to employ a specific procedure to establish a sufficient factual basis for an Alford plea.

State v. Desmond Myers LaPean, 2019AP1448, 7/14/20, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

LaPean pleaded to a sexual assault of a child with an agreement that the state would cap its recommendation at 10 years of initial confinement and 10 of extended supervision. But at sentencing, the state first recommended 12 and 12. After defense counsel’s objection, the state instead requested 10 and 14. Counsel didn’t notice the second breach, but the prosecutor eventually did, telling the court the agreement was for 10 and 10. The court gave 12 and 10.

State v. Kevin L. Nash, 2018AP731-CR, petition for review of a per curiam opinion granted 12/10/19, case activity (including briefs)

Issue presented:

When accepting a guilty plea under Alford v. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a circuit court may find there is a factual basis for the plea only if there is “strong proof of guilt.” May a court find “strong proof of guilt” based only on the information contained in the criminal complaint, or must the court hear additional evidence before it can make that finding?

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

Garza v. Idaho, USSC No. 17-1026, reversing Garza v. State, 405 P.3d 576 (Idaho 2017);  Scotusblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

This case involved two plea agreements that included clauses stating that Garza waived his right to appeal. After sentencing, Garza told his lawyer that he wanted to appeal, but his lawyer refused due to the plea agreement. Garza filed claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Siding with Garza, SCOTUS held that counsel performed deficiently and that “prejudiced is presumed” because the failure to file a notice of appeal deprived Garza of an appeal altogether. Opinion at 1. 

State v. Pierre Deshawn Johnson, 2018AP595-CR, 2/12/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Johnson pled to operating a vehicle with a suspended license and injury by operating under the influence of a controlled substance. His lead issue–whether the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was a significant intervening factor that diminished his culpability and warranted a new sentence–failed based on State v. Turk, 154 Wis. 2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163.

State v. Lorenzo D. Kyles, 2018AP296-Cr, District 1, 11/20/18, (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appears to be Wisconsin’s second application of Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012), which modified the prejudice prong of  Strickland‘s ineffective assistance of counsel test for situations where defense counsel failed to convey a plea offer and thereby caused the defendant to accept  subsequent, potentially less favorable offer. 

State v. Gitan Mbugua, 2017AP967, District 1, 6/12/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This appeal concerns ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with 2 plea offers. Mbugua claimed that his 1st lawyer provided him incorrect information about option 2 of “plea offer 1” and this caused him to reject “plea offer 1” altogether. He also claims that during a second round of plea bargaining, option 2 of “plea offer 1” remained on the table, and his second lawyer incorrectly advised him to reject it in favor of an entirely new plea offer (we’ll call it “plea offer 2”), which proved to be bad deal. The court of appeals denied both claims for lack of prejudice based upon Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). A quick Westlaw search suggests that this is the first Wisconsin case to apply Lafler (and it’s unpublished).

State v. Derek Asunto, 2015AP50, 8/8/17, District 2 (recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Derek Asunto and the state agreed to resolve several charges by dismissing some and having him plead to others. At the hearing where the deal was announced to the court, he entered a plea to one criminal count. The parties and court agreed the other counts would be held open until the sentencing hearing, but that at that hearing, Asunto would plead to an OWI-4th and the rest would be dismissed.

If you missed the recent post on plea agreements as “constitutional contracts,” you might want to take a look at it now. In the comment section you’ll find the Bills bantering about how such an argument would play out in the trial courts AND ALSO a comment by Colin Miller, the professor who wrote the law review article at issue, reacting to the Bills’ banter. Click here for the post and comments.