On Point blog, page 7 of 14
Jorge Luna Torres v. Loretta Lynch, USSC No. 14-1096, cert. granted 6/29/15
Whether a state offense constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), on the ground that the state offense is “described in” a specified federal statute, where the federal statute includes an interstate commerce element that the state offense lacks.
SCOW: Circuit court doesn’t have to give the state a chance to prove prior OWIs at sentencing
State v. Andre M. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, 6/12/15, reversing an unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals; opinion by Justice Crooks; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court unanimously holds that when the parties in an OWI prosecution are disputing the number of prior offenses, the circuit court can require the dispute to be resolved before it accepts the defendant’s plea; it doesn’t have to wait till sentencing to determine the number of prior offenses. And even if the court errs in denying the state the chance to prove an additional prior OWI conviction at sentencing, it violates due process to allow the circuit court to resentence the defendant on the basis of the additional conviction if the additional conviction would increase the penalty that could be imposed.
SCOTUS: State drug crime must relate to a drug on the federal controlled substances schedule to be basis for deportation
Mellouli v. Lynch, USSC No. 1034, 2015 WL 2464047 (June 1, 2015), reversing Mellouli v. Holder, 719 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2013); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Resolving a split between federal circuit courts of appeal, the Supreme Court holds that the statute providing for deportation based on a violation of a state drug crime “relating to a controlled substance” is limited to “controlled substance” listed in the federal controlled substances schedule under 21 U.S.C. § 802. Thus, the Eighth Circuit was wrong to hold that any drug offense triggers the removal statute, without regard to the appearance of the drug on a § 802 schedule.
State v. Stephen LeMere, 2013AP2433-CR, petition for review granted 3/16/15
Review of a court of appeals summary disposition; case activity
Issue (composed by On Point)
May a defendant seek to withdraw his guilty plea by claiming that his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to advise him that, as a consequence of his plea, he could be subject to lifetime commitment as a sexually violent person under ch. 980?
State v. Melisa Valadez, 2014AP678-680, certification granted 3/16/15
On certification by the court of appeals; review granted 11/26/13; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; click here for docket and briefs
Issue (composed by the court of appeals):
How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy? If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?
Court of appeals affirms plea though defendant misunderstood appellate rights; trips over law governing plea withdrawal and IAC
State v. Jeromy Miller, 2014AP1246-CR, 2/24/15, District 2 (not recommended for publication); click here for docket and briefs
This decision smells like SCOW bait. Miller pleaded guilty believing that he had the right to appeal the circuit court’s denial of his pre-trial motion to dismiss. Both the court and defense counsel told him so. The State concedes they were wrong. The court of appeals held the error harmless because the motion had no merit. In doing so it bungled case law re plea withdrawal and the “prejudice” prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Proceeding to sentencing despite misunderstanding about plea agreement defeats claims for plea withdrawal, resentencing
State v. Nelson Luis Fortes, 2015 WI App 25; case activity (including briefs)
A “misunderstanding” about what sentence the state could recommend under the plea agreement did not entitle Fortes to plea withdrawal or resentencing because after the misunderstanding became evident at the sentencing hearing, Fortes elected to proceed rather than seek an adjournment with a possible eye toward plea withdrawal.
Court of appeals certifies “imminent deportation” issues to SCOW
State v. Melisa Valadez, 2014AP678, 2014AP679, 2014AP680; District 2, 1/21/15, certification granted 3/16/15; circuit court reversed 1/29/16; case activity
Issue presented (from certification):
How definite or imminent must deportation be in order for it to be “likely,” such that a defendant may withdraw a guilty or no contest plea on the basis that he or she was not informed of the immigration consequences at the plea colloquy? If, in order to withdraw the plea, the defendant must show that deportation proceedings are underway, how does this standard fit in with the time limits for a motion to withdraw the plea?
State v. Shata, 2013AP1437-CR and State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2013AP2435-CR, petitions for review granted 12/18/14
Review of two court of appeals decisions (one published, one unpublished) that will be argued together. State v. Shata (case activity) and State v. Ortiz-Mondragon (case activity)
Issue in Shata (composed by On Point)
Whether the defendant, a foreign national, should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because his trial counsel failed to provide him with “complete and accurate” information about the deportation consequences of pleading guilty?
State v. Chamblis, 2012AP2782-CR, petition for review granted 11/18/14
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity
Issues (composed by SCOW). See order granting review.
1. Where a defendant seeks to plead guilty or no contest to a charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant (OWI), or with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC), do State v. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986) and due process principles require that the number of prior offenses that count for sentence enhancement be determined prior to entry of the defendant’s plea?
2. Is a court of appeals’ decision ordering remand to the circuit court with instructions to: (1) issue an amended judgment of conviction reflecting a conviction for operating with a PAC, as a seventh offense, and (2) hold a resentencing hearing, and impose a sentence consistent with the penalty ranges for a seventh offense, constitutionally impermissible under Bangert and due process principles where the defendant specifically entered a plea of guilty to PAC as a sixth offense, where the circuit court sentenced the defendant in accordance to proper penalties for PAC as a sixth offense, and where the defendant has already served the confinement portion of such sentence?