On Point: j. Appeals

Buck v. Davis, USSC No. 15-8049, 2017 WL 685534 (February 22, 2017), reversing and remanding Buck v. Stephens, 623 Fed. Appx. 668 (5th Cir. 2015) (unpublished); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Buck was found guilty of capital murder. Under state law, the jury could impose a death sentence only if it found Buck was likely to commit acts of violence in the future. At sentencing Buck’s attorney called Walter Quijano, a psychologist, to give an opinion on that issue. Though the psychologist testified Buck probably would not engage in violent conduct, he also said that race is one factor in assessing a person’s propensity for violence and that Buck was statistically more likely to act violently because he is black. The jury sentenced Buck to death. The Supreme Court, by a 7-to-2 vote, holds Buck’s attorney was ineffective.

Question presented:

Did the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)—that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision—as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the Ylst presumption should continue to apply?

Eric T. Alston v. Judy P. Smith, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-1308, 2016 WL 6083982, 10/18/2016

Eric Alston was on probation when he came to the attention of Dane County’s “Special Investigation Unit,” a law enforcement initiative targeting “serious, assaultive offenders” that offered him resources aimed at preventing him from reoffending but “came with the admonition that any probation violation would result in the Department of Corrections vigorously seeking full revocation of probation.” (Slip op. at 2).

William Hinesley, III, v. Wendy Knight, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2122, 2016 WL 4758437, 9/13/16

Hinesley’s trial lawyer didn’t object to the state’s presentation of the inculpatory out-of-court statements of the two principal witnesses against him because he wanted all of the witnesses’ statements admitted to show how they had changed their stories and weren’t credible. The Seventh Circuit holds the state courts reasonably concluded trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for adopting and employing this strategy.

Roy L. Ward v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-1001, 8/26/16

Ward’s trial lawyers weren’t ineffective when they failed to adequately investigate and present readily available mitigating evidence and then, due to lack of preparation, instead presented evidence Ward was a dangerous psychopath.

Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 14-2534, 2016 WL 4269805, 8/15/16

The maximum penalty for Whatley’s drug possession conviction was dramatically increased—from 2-to-8 years to 20-to-50 years—under a now-repealed Indiana penalty enhancer for drug offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” defined as a “building or structure that on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs” for youth. (Sound familiar? Sure it does: see §§ 961.01(22) and 961.49(1m)(b)5.) On habeas review, the Seventh Circuit holds that the statute’s failure to provide an objective standard for determining what “regular” means makes the statute unconstitutionally vague, so Whatley is entitled to resentencing under the non-enhanced penalty scheme.

Kernan v. Hinojosa, USSC No. 15-833, 2016 WL 2842454 (May 16, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Hinjosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015); Scotusblog page

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the California courts hadn’t made a determination of Hinojosa’s claim on the merits and therefore applied de novo review rather than AEDPA’s highly deferential standard. The supreme court summarily holds the court of appeals’ conclusion was wrong, and that AEDPA does apply.

Michael Miller v. Dushan Zatecky, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1869, 4/26/2016

An Indiana state court sentenced Michael Miller to a total of 120 years in prison on three counts of child molestation. On direct appeal, his lawyer raised challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the admission of other-acts evidence, but did not contest the length of his sentence. Miller then filed a state collateral attack, alleging his original appellate counsel was ineffective for not attacking the sentence.

Woods v.  Etherton, USSC No. 15-723 (April 4, 2016) (per curiam), reversing Etherton v. Rivard, 800 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2015); SCOTUSblog page (including links to petition, response and reply)

This was a federal habeas action in which the petitioner claimed, among other things, that: (1) the state trial court’s admission of an anonymous tip violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the tip; and (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise claims (1) and (2).  The petitioner lost because, in SCOTUS’s view, his appellate counsel and the state habeas court deserved, but were not given, the benefit of the doubt.

Cesar Flores-Ramirez v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Case No. 15-1594, 1/22/16 (per curiam)

Flores-Ramirez is not entitled to a certificate of appealability in his challenge to the denial of his second federal habeas petition because two of his claims should have been brought in his first petition and the third claim doesn’t provide a basis for habeas relief.