On Point: c. Counsel

Jacob Alan Powers v. Jon Noble, No. 24-2134, 3/25/25

The Seventh Circuit found that Jacob Powers was competent to stand trial in a Wisconsin court in 2006 for sexual assault of a child and child enticement.  Although Powers’ IQ was in the borderline/mild mental retardation range; his trial testimony, trial counsel’s decision not to challenge his competency, and two experts’ findings that he was competent convinced the Court that he reasonably understood the charges against him, trial procedures, and could assist his lawyer in his defense.  The Court therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying Powers’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

Nelson Garcia, Jr., v. Randall Hepp, No. 21-3268, 4/25/23, affirming Nelson Garcia, Jr. v. Brian Foster

A long line of Supreme Court cases holds that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel attaches when he or she becomes a criminal defendant: when he or she is formally accused of a crime. Most recently, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008), the Court applied this rule to conclude that the defendant had the right to counsel when a police officer brought him before a judge and the judge found probable cause, committed him to jail, and set bail. In Milwaukee County, though, when a person is arrested without a warrant, judges routinely find probable cause, order detention, and set bail without seeing the person. As happened in Garcia’s case, an officer presents a judge a form–the CR-215–detailing the basis for suspecting the person; the judge can then check a box indicating that probable cause exists and can also set bond. The form is then distributed to, among others, the person being held.

Nelson Garcia, Jr. v. Brian Foster, 20-CV-335 (E.D. Wis. 11/9/21).

Garcia challenged his robbery conviction on two grounds. (1) He was denied his right to counsel at a post-arrest police line up. (2) He was denied his right to go pro se at trial. While habeas wins are rare, what’s most remarkable is how blatantly the Wisconsin Court of Appeals violated SCOTUS precedent on both issues. To top that, SCOW granted review and then split 3-3 allowing the court of appeals decision to stand. Now, at long last, the Eastern District grants Garcia the relief SCOTUS requires.

Larry H. Dunn v. Cathy Jess, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 20-1168 (Nov. 24, 2020)

Dunn was charged with felony murder and other offenses based on the fact he had struck the victim, who was later found dead from a head injury. In a rare case that clears the high hurdles of both AEDPA and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Seventh Circuit holds his trial lawyer was ineffective for failing to call an expert witness to support his defense that his acts did not cause the victim’s death.

Michael Gilbreath v. Dan Winkleski, Case No. 19-cv-728-jdp (W.D. Wis. Aug. 4, 2020)

Witness credibility was the key issue at Gilbreath’s trial, and his counsel’s failure to present evidence that would have undermined [the complaining witness’s] credibility and bolstered Gilbreath’s defense deprived Gilbreath of a fair trial. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably concluded that the failure to present the credibility evidence was a matter of reasonable trial strategy and that the evidence was merely cumulative. Gilbreath is entitled to habeas relief.

Terez Cook v. Brian Foster, Warden, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-2214, 1/29/2020

Pursuing a federal writ of habeas corpus is always a long shot; in non-capital cases fewer than 1% of petitions are successful. Terez Cook gets it done here, convincing the Seventh Circuit his lawyer was ineffective at his trial for a home-invasion robbery (and that the Wisconsin court of appeals’ decision to the contrary was not just wrong, but unreasonable). The federal court is puzzled by a few aspects of our state court’s denial of Cook’s claims. But the thing that seems to push that denial over the line into unreasonableness–AEDPA‘s stringent requirement for habeas relief–is that it got a crucial fact wrong. The state court’s opinion relies on a confession by Cook–a confesssion for which there’s apparently no evidence. How did our court go astray? Well, the state described the (non-existent) confession in its brief, and then Cook’s direct-appeal counsel apparently didn’t check the facts, and neither did the court of appeals.

Scott Schmidt v. Brian Foster, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 17-1727, 5/29/18, reversing Schmidt v. Pollard, No. 13-CV-1150 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 20, 2017); reversed en banc 12/20/18

A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at all “critical stages” of the case. You probably think that a hearing, before a murder trial, that determines whether the accused will get to present his only defense counts as such a “critical stage.” The Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, “easily reject[ed]” that notion in this (published) case. The Seventh Circuit now disagrees, saying the Wisconsin decision “unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent and, frankly, ignored reality.”

Question presented:

Whether the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), that ineffective state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.

William Hinesley, III, v. Wendy Knight, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2122, 2016 WL 4758437, 9/13/16

Hinesley’s trial lawyer didn’t object to the state’s presentation of the inculpatory out-of-court statements of the two principal witnesses against him because he wanted all of the witnesses’ statements admitted to show how they had changed their stories and weren’t credible. The Seventh Circuit holds the state courts reasonably concluded trial counsel wasn’t ineffective for adopting and employing this strategy.

Roy L. Ward v. Ron Neal, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 16-1001, 8/26/16

Ward’s trial lawyers weren’t ineffective when they failed to adequately investigate and present readily available mitigating evidence and then, due to lack of preparation, instead presented evidence Ward was a dangerous psychopath.