On Point: B. Federal

Jones v. Hendrix, 143 S.Ct. 1857, 599 U.S. __ (June 22, 2023); Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

The Court, in a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Thomas, holds that the savings clause in 28 U.S.C.  2255(e) bars a prisoner from using an intervening change in the interpretation of a federal criminal statute to circumvent AEDPA’s restrictions on successive Section 2255 motions by filing a habeas petition under Section 2241.

Nelson Garcia, Jr., v. Randall Hepp, No. 21-3268, 4/25/23, affirming Nelson Garcia, Jr. v. Brian Foster

A long line of Supreme Court cases holds that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel attaches when he or she becomes a criminal defendant: when he or she is formally accused of a crime. Most recently, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191 (2008), the Court applied this rule to conclude that the defendant had the right to counsel when a police officer brought him before a judge and the judge found probable cause, committed him to jail, and set bail. In Milwaukee County, though, when a person is arrested without a warrant, judges routinely find probable cause, order detention, and set bail without seeing the person. As happened in Garcia’s case, an officer presents a judge a form–the CR-215–detailing the basis for suspecting the person; the judge can then check a box indicating that probable cause exists and can also set bond. The form is then distributed to, among others, the person being held.

Richard Shirley v. Lizzie Tegels, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 18-1713, 3/8/23

Shirley was shackled while he testified at his jury trial for 1st degree reckless homicide. In this federal habeas appeal, he argued that the shackling violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense. The 7th Circuit denied relief because no SCOTUS case clearly establishes that shackling a defendant while he is testifying violates that right.

State v. Graham L. Stowe, 2021AP431-CR, District 3, 02/17/23 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Graham Stowe was found NGI in 2005 and committed to the Department of Health and Family Services for 39 years and 6 months. Between 2007 and 2019, Stowe filed 10 petitions for conditional release. The same circuit court judge who committed Stowe in 2005 has presided over every subsequent proceeding. After five prior appeals, the court of appeals now agrees with Stowe that the circuit court was objectively biased at his 2019 conditional release hearing based on a totality of comments that demonstrate a “serious risk of actual bias.” As a result, the court reverses the circuit court and remands the case for a new conditional release hearing before a different judge. (Opinion, ¶2).

Shinn v. Ramirez, USSC No. 20-1009, 5/23/22, reversing Ramirez v. Ryan, 937 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

You can read at Scotusblog quite a bit of commentary on this most recent entry in the present Court’s war on habeas. At oral argument, the lawyer for the state told the court that “innocence isn’t enough” to merit relief for one of the death-row inmates in this case to gain relief. And the Court now agrees. The reason: the likely innocent inmate’s state-provided postconviction counsel didn’t make a good enough record that his trial counsel was ineffective.

Jones v. Hendrix, USSC No. 21-857; cert. granted 5/16/22; Scotusblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Question presented:

The question presented is whether federal inmates who did not—because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them—challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under § 2241 after this Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction

Shoop v. Twyford, USSC No. 21-511, cert granted 1/14/22; SCOTUSblog page (containing links to briefs and commentary)

Questions  presented:

1.  28 U.S.C. §2241(c) allows federal courts to issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering the transportation of a state prisoner only when necessary to bring the inmate into court to testify or for trial. May federal courts evade this prohibition by using the All Writs Act to order the transportation of state prisoners for reasons not enumerated in §2241(c)?

2.  Before a court grants an order allowing a habeas petitioner to develop new evidence, must it determine whether the evidence could aid the petitioner in proving his entitlement to habeas relief and whether the evidence may permissibly be considered by a habeas court?

Nelson Garcia, Jr. v. Brian Foster, 20-CV-335 (E.D. Wis. 11/9/21).

Garcia challenged his robbery conviction on two grounds. (1) He was denied his right to counsel at a post-arrest police line up. (2) He was denied his right to go pro se at trial. While habeas wins are rare, what’s most remarkable is how blatantly the Wisconsin Court of Appeals violated SCOTUS precedent on both issues. To top that, SCOW granted review and then split 3-3 allowing the court of appeals decision to stand. Now, at long last, the Eastern District grants Garcia the relief SCOTUS requires.

Danny Wilber v. Randall Hepp, 7th Cir. Nos. 20-2614 & 20-2703, decided 10/29/21

Danny Wilber was granted a writ of habeas corpus by a federal district judge due to the Wisconsin circuit court’s use of visible restraints during Wilber’s trial in violation of Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005). We wrote about that decision here. In a long, thorough opinion, the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court.

Edwards v. Vannoy, USSC No. 19-5807, 141 S.Ct. 1547 (May 17, 2021), affirming 2019 WL 8643258 (5th Cir. May 20, 2019) (denying certificate of appealability); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This decision alters the long-standing doctrine for deciding whether new rules of criminal procedure established by a decision of the Supreme Court apply retroactively to cases that are final and, therefore, require the defendant to seek collateral review of his or her conviction. The result is that new rules of criminal procedure will no more forever apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.