On Point blog, page 2 of 11
An interesting judicial bias claim
State v. O.G., 2021AP1642-CR, 1/25/22, District 1 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication; case activity
O.G. appealed a juvenile court order waiving him into adult court. He argued that the judge was objectively biased and requested a new waiver hearing before a different judge. His appendix included 3 affidavits alleging that during a break in the waiver hearing, the judge received a call about another child’s case, became upset, started swearing, and said he was “so done” and couldn’t “wait to get out of the juvenile system.” The judge showed a noticeable change in behavior. Then he waived O.G. into adult court.
Court didn’t rely on inaccurate info at sentencing and wasn’t biased
State v. Alexandrea C.E. Throndson, 2020AP1081-CR, District 4, 7/15/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Throndson raises two due process challenges to her sentencing: that the judge relied on inaccurate information and was objectively based. The court of appeals rejects both.
SCOW clarifies law regarding substitution of judges in civil cases
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2021 WI 42, reversing a published court of appeals opinion, 2020 WI App 33, 5/14/21, case activity (including briefs)
Section 801.58(1) allows a party to a civil case to request a new judge if, among other things, he files a written substitution request before “the hearing of any preliminary contested matter.” Matthews’ case concerns a substitution request made after the circuit court granted a motion to adjourn a Chapter 980 probable cause hearing regarding sexually violent persons. But since Chapter 980 commitments are civil proceedings, this unanimous SCOW opinion, which reverses a published court of appeals’ opinion, is an important clarification of the law governing all civil cases.
Judicial bias claim forfeited due to lack of postdisposition motion
State v. Benjamin J. Klapps, 2021 WI App 5; case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court granted the state’s petition to revoke Klapps’s conditional release under § 971.17(3)(e), citing in particular the report of a prior examiner who didn’t testify at the revocation hearing and whose report wasn’t entered into evidence. (¶¶2-13). Klapps argued the trial judge had prejudged his case based on the previously filed report,
COA: Judge who witnessed violation of sequestration order cured problem by striking witness
State v. M.E., 2019AP2228, 9/1/2020, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.E. was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial. During the trial, the judge overheard a conversation between a state’s witness and the prosecutor that led her to believe her sequestration order had been violated. M.E. argues the judge was disqualified because she was now a witness in her own case; the court of appeals concludes she cured any problem by striking the witness’s testimony.
Defense win! Judge’s statements during trial showed objective bias against defendant
State v. Darrin Stingle, 2019AP491, District 3, 7/28/20 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Stingle is not the typical subject of an On Point post. He owns farmland in Outagamie County, and the DNR cited him for discharging fill material into wetlands on it. At a 1-day bench the trial judge twice made comments suggesting that he had prejudged the case. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial before a different judge. It also admonished (but did not sanction) the State’s appellate lawyer for requesting an extension two weeks after its deadline for filing a response brief.
No harm where the defendant’s lawyer was also the judge who bound him over for trial
State v. Keith C. Henyard, 2020 WI App 51; case activity (including briefs)
The State charged Henyard with 8 crimes potentially leading to 157 years in prison. Commissioner Parise engaged Henyard in a colloquy, accepted his waiver of a preliminary hearing, and bound him over for trial. Parise left the bench and 5 months later sold his professional services to Henyard to get him a better deal. The majority denied Henyard’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim for lack of a prejudicial “actual conflict of interest.” Judge Reilly, in another Emperor’s New Clothes moment, dissented expressing concern about the integrity of a judiciary that obscures errors and shifts blame to defendants.
Judge’s Facebook friendship created serious risk of actual bias in custody case
Miller v. Carroll, 2020 WI 56, 6/16/20, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 2017AP2132, case activity (including briefs)
You’ve surely read about this case in NY Times, the Journal Sentinel, on Wisbar.org or on On Point here or here. A judge’s Facebook friendship with one of the litigants in a child custody case before him created a serious risk of actual bias and resulted in a due process violation. Justice A.W. Bradley filed an interesting concurrence arguing that this decision is at odds with State v. Henley, 2011 WI 67, 338 Wis. 2d 610, 802 N.W.2d 175, which readers may recall, concerned a motion to disqualify then Justice Roggensack.
Motion to adjourn a probable cause hearing is a “preliminary contested matter” under judicial substitution statute
State v. Tavodess Matthews, 2020 WI App 33; case activity (including briefs).
Section 801.58(1) states that if a party to a civil action files a judicial substitution request “preceding the hearing of any preliminary contested matter” and not later than 60 days after service of the summons and complaint then the request must be granted. A “preliminary contested matter” refers to a “substantive issue” going to”the merits of the case.” The court of appeals holds that a motion to adjourn a probable cause hearing in a Chapter 980 case fits that bill.
Defense win: Drug court judge turned sentencing judge was objectively biased
State v. Jason A. Marcotte, 2020 WI App 28; case activity (including briefs)
After Marcotte was terminated from drug court and his probation revoked, he was sentenced by the same judge who’d presided over his case in drug court. Under the facts in this case, both the judge’s comments during drug court and his dual role as drug court judge and sentencing judge demonstrate he was objectively biased and thus violated Marcotte’s right to an impartial judge.