On Point: B. Selection process

State v. Joseph J. Johnson, 2011AP806-CR, District 4, 11/3/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Johnson: Rebecca J. Vahle; case activity

Trial counsel’s failure to move to strike several jurors for cause didn’t require Machner hearing:

¶12      In State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 399-400, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992), this court held that a defendant’s trial counsel was deficient for failing to ask appropriate follow-up questions of jurors who had admitted bias.  

State v. Edward Beck, 2010AP872-CR, District 4, 10/20/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); pro se; case activity

Circuit court is under no obligation to seek extension of the § 809.30(2) limitation period for its ruling on a postconviction motion.

¶6        Beck reads too much into the 2001 amendment to Wis. Stat. § 809.30(2)(i).  The amendment simply added language to § 809.30(2)(i) specifying the entities that may request an extension,

State v. Stephen R. Jones, 2011AP864-CR, District 3, 8/30/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication; for Jones: Brian P. Dimmer; case activity)

Failure to move to strike juror wasn’t deficient performance. Juror’s public support of election of the presiding judge and the district attorney (who was not herself prosecuting this case) didn’t establish a significant relationship with either individual to establish “objective bias.” State v.

MC Winston v. Boatwright, 7th Cir No. 10-1156, 8/19/11

seventh circuit court of appeals decision, denying habeas relief on review of unpublished decision in 2003AP3412 and 2005AP1255

Habeas – Jury Selection – Ineffective Assistance – Defense Counsel’s Discriminatory Use of Peremptories

In a nutshell, this case presents the question whether the constitutional rights of the petitioner, MC Winston,

On Point is very pleased to present this Guest Post discussion of State v. Funk and State v. Denson, by the Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz, Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Feel free to submit comments in the box at the end of the Post.

Trial judges monitor the flurry of end-of-term Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions for new rules of decision and new procedures to be followed in our courts. 

State v. David D. Funk, 2011 WI 62, reversing unpublished summary disposition; for Funk: Michele Anne Tjader; case activity

Juror Bias – Assessment, Generally

A claim of juror bias relies requires proof of the two-step test articulated by State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 726, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985): “(1) that the juror incorrectly or incompletely responded to a material question on voir dire;

Felkner v. Steven Frank Jackson, USSC No. 10-797, 3/31/11

On habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court of appeals failed to give sufficient deference to the state court determination that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking 2 of 3 black prospective jurors.

The prosecutor struck one juror because she had an MSW, and the prosecutor didn’t like having social workers on the jury;

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Batson Challenge

Scope of the remand inquiry for the government to proffer nonracial justification for striking a minority juror is limited to the original reason offered during voir dire, new post hoc justifications being inadmissible. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), discussed and followed:

… Accordingly, Miller-El II instructs that when ruling on a Batson challenge,

court of appeals decision; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether a trial judge has a sua sponte duty to strike a prosepctive juror who is an in-law of the judge.

Whether defense counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to remove the judge’s in-law renders harmless any error in the judge’s failure to remove that juror.

See prior post for further discussion.

State v. Sharon A. Sellhausen, 2010 WI App 175, reversed, 2012 WI 5; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

¶1        Sharon Sellhausen appeals her jury conviction based on the presence of the presiding judge’s daughter-in-law on the panel of potential jurors.  The daughter-in-law was not seated on the jury because Sellhausen’s trial counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove her.