On Point: 25. Jury

State v. Michael D. Below, 2011 WI App 64 (recommended for publication); for Below: Joseph L. Sommers; case activity

Below indisputably caused massive injuries that resulted in the victim’s death, albeit after medical staff terminated life support. His reckless acts were therefore a “substantial factor” in, hence caused, her death. He was not entitled to a theory of defense instruction authorizing the jury to acquit him on the basis that the termination of life support was an intervening cause of death.

State v. Darron D. Jackson, 2011 WI App 63 (recommended for publication); for Jackson: Rebecca Lawnicki; case activity

Waiver – Lesser Offense Instruction

The jury convicted Jackson of recklessly endangering safety while armed, which was submitted as a lesser offense of the charged offense, attempted first-degree intentional homicide. Although Jackson did object to the endangering instruction on the ground that it wasn’t supported by the facts,

7th circuit decision

Habeas Review – Inadmissible Evidence – Harmless Error

Error in jury exposure, during deliberations, to inadmissible police report deemed harmless where the report contained merely cumulative information, the trial court gave a curative instruction, and the evidence against Brown was overwhelming.

The standard on direct appeal for measuring reversible error is the familiar Chapman test, whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Felkner v. Steven Frank Jackson, USSC No. 10-797, 3/31/11

On habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court of appeals failed to give sufficient deference to the state court determination that the prosecutor had race-neutral reasons for striking 2 of 3 black prospective jurors.

The prosecutor struck one juror because she had an MSW, and the prosecutor didn’t like having social workers on the jury;

7th circuit court of appeals decision

Batson Challenge

Scope of the remand inquiry for the government to proffer nonracial justification for striking a minority juror is limited to the original reason offered during voir dire, new post hoc justifications being inadmissible. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005), discussed and followed:

… Accordingly, Miller-El II instructs that when ruling on a Batson challenge,

State v. Kelly J. McCredie, 2010AP1179-CR, District 2, 3/2/11

court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); for McCredie: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity

For purposes of 3rd-degree sexual assault, § 940.225(3), the actor cannot obtain consent by deceiving the victim as to his true identity. McCredie misled the victim into thinking he was his brother (she was sleeping in a dark room when he suddenly appeared;

court of appeals decision; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

Issues (formulated by On Point):

Whether a trial judge has a sua sponte duty to strike a prosepctive juror who is an in-law of the judge.

Whether defense counsel’s use of a peremptory strike to remove the judge’s in-law renders harmless any error in the judge’s failure to remove that juror.

See prior post for further discussion.

State v. Bradley A. Brandsma, 2010AP1429-CR , District 4, 12/23/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Brandsma: Anthony J. Jurek; case activity; Brandsma BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Trial courts have “very broad discretion” under § 972.12 to allow a deliberating jury to separate overnight before returning to resume deliberations; court of appeals rejects argument under state and federal constitutions “a circuit court should presume that any separation of a jury renders that jury impartial in light of rapidly changing modes and content of publicly available information,”

State v. Sharon A. Sellhausen, 2010 WI App 175, reversed, 2012 WI 5; for Sellhausen: Byron C. Lichstein; case activity

¶1        Sharon Sellhausen appeals her jury conviction based on the presence of the presiding judge’s daughter-in-law on the panel of potential jurors.  The daughter-in-law was not seated on the jury because Sellhausen’s trial counsel used a peremptory challenge to remove her. 

State v. Patrick R. Patterson, 2010 WI 130, affirming 2009 WI App 181; for Patterson: David R. Karpe; Patterson BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Multiplicity – § 948.40(1) (4)(a) as Lesser Offense of § 940.02(2)(a)

Contributing to the delinquency of a minor with death as a result, § 948.40(1), (4)(a) is not a lesser offense of first-degree reckless homicide,