On Point: 25. Jury

State v. Corey Stauner, 2019AP81-CR, District 3, 3/10/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This seems wrong. The State charged Stauner with resisting an officer and bail jumping for committing that crime. The jury acquitted him of resisting an officer but found him guilty of bail jumping. The court of appeals recognized that the 2 verdicts were inconsistent, but said that this result was permissible pursuant to State v. Rice, 2008 WI App 10, 307 Wis. 2d 335, 743 N.W.2d 517 (2007).

The Legal Profession Blog reports on an ugly murder case out of New Jersey. Click here. A prosecutor tried to remove a Black prospective juror, F.G., for cause. When the judge ruled against the State, the prosecutor ran a records check on F.G., found a warrant and told the judge. The judge and the prosecutor then decided to dismiss F.G., wish him a good day, and have him arrested outside the presence of the jury pool.

State v. Kaprisha E. Greer, 2019AP806-CR, District 1, 1/22/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Greer seeks a new trial in the interest of justice on the ground that the jury at her disorderly conduct trial should have been instructed about the meaning of “true threat” because the state elicited evidence about a threat during its case-in-chief. The court of appeals rejects her claim.

State v. N.M.A.-S., 2018AP2308-09, 12/17/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

This TPR case involves a mom with a substance abuse problem and her daughter  who had ingested morphine.  At the trial on grounds, defense counsel asked the jury pool: “Is there anyone that believes that someone who is struggling with an addiction currently is not fit to parent their children?”

Actually, the DA argued:  “My job is to show the truth. On the other hand, the defense attorneys’ jobs are to manipulate the truth. Their job is to shroud the truth. Their job is [to] confuse jurors. Their job is to do whatever they have to—without regard for the truth—to get a not guilty verdict.” The South Carolina Supreme Court had the good sense to overturn this defendant’s conviction for order and order a new trial.

State v. Kari E. Mravik, 2018AP2300-CR, District 4, 8/29/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At her OWI 2d trial, Mravik asked the judge to modify Wis. J.I.—Criminal 2663’s definition of “under the influence of an intoxicant.” The trial judge declined. The court of appeals finds no error because the instruction as a whole conveys the correct meaning of the phrase.

State v. Patrick D. Zolliecoffer, 2018AP1639-CR, 8/20/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Zolliecoffer challenged two of the State’s peremptory strikes as racially based. On appeal, the State conceded that the circuit court failed to apply the 3-step procedure for analyzing Batson claims, which On Point recently explained here.  Zolliecoffer urged the court of appeals to remand for a new trial. The State sought a remand to apply Batson. Surprise! The State won.

State v. Malcolm J. Sanders, 2019 WI App 52; case activity (including briefs)

Sanders is black, and the DA struck the only black jurors from serving on his case because, even though they said they could be fair, they had had prior bad experiences with police, including being the subjects of racial profiling. Judges Gundrum and Neubauer held that the DA did not discriminate. But in another “must read” dissent, Judge Reilly said:

It is a perversion of justice to accept the reasoning that because we have unfairly treated blacks (or any class of people), we can then use our wrongful acts to prevent blacks from serving on juries. Utilizing our unfair treatment of blacks as a valid “race neutral” reason to keep blacks off juries is itself discrimination. Dissent, ¶16.

State v. John E. Paul, 2018AP1496, 7/11/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paul had three prior OWIs and was on trial for a fourth, plus the associated PAC charge. During voir dire, the prosecutor told the jury that

the other thing is the prohibited alcohol concentration in this particular case is .02. Now, many of you may have heard of the .08, but in this instance, the prohibited alcohol concentration is .02. Now, is there any person here who thinks it’s unfair that somebody could be prosecuted or convicted of the offense of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration of .02 percent or .02 grams per 210—I forgot, but per deciliter of the  defendant’s breath? So it’s a .02 standard. Is there any person here who thinks that would be unfair?

State v. Marwan Mahajni, 2017AP1184-CR, 6/27/19, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mahajni moved for a new trial because, during deliberations in his case, the bailiff told the jury that they could not deadlock. They had to reach a unanimous verdict of guilty or not guilty. The circuit court denied Mahajni’s motion, so he moved for reconsideration and this time submitted 2 juror affidavits supporting his motion. He lost again. The court appeals here reverses and remands the case for an evidentiary hearing.