On Point blog, page 8 of 29
It’s a fact—the defendant’s hair looked “marvelous”!
State v. Keith J. Eggum, 2016AP2036-CR, District 2, 11/8/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
And that factual finding dooms Eggum’s claim that his “noticeably disheveled” appearance made his trial unfair. Eggum’s complaint about the presence of extra officers for courtroom security fares no better. And topping it all off, Eggum’s First Amendment defense to the disorderly conduct charge makes no headway, either.
No error to empanel juror who had been on similar case week before
State v. Brad L. Conger, 2017AP860-CR, 10/18/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Brad Conger went on trial for an OWI and the associated PAC. His defense was an “alcohol curve” theory that the breath tests result did not reflect his true BAC at the time he was driving. His attorney moved to strike a juror who sat on another OWI/PAC case the preceding week–one featuring the same defense attorney, where the jury convicted on the PAC and apparently rejected the offered alcohol curve defense. The circuit court found the juror unbiased; the court of appeals now affirms.
Juror can’t be disqualified for believing criminal justice system is racially biased
Read this new opinion from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. It reversed a trial court decision to strike a potential juror for cause because she expressed a belief that the criminal justice system is biased against black men. According to the court of appeals, our justice system is biased, and jurors having this belief will likely try harder to be fair. Consider the possibilities for your next voir dire.
Wisconsin law governs “new crime” element of bail jumping, though “new crime” occurred in Illinois
State v. Andrei R. Byrd, 2014AP2721-CR, District 4 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Byrd was released on bond for 2 felonies that imposed 2 conditions: don’t leave Rock County and don’t commit any new crimes. He went to Illinois, drank too much, and started shouting at a 4th of July party. An officer saw him move toward a woman and raise his hand, causing her to move backward into a defensive posture. He was arrested for assault under Illinois law. Then the State of Wisconsin charged him with 4 counts of felony bail jumping for violating the 2 conditions of the bonds on his 2 felonies (2 x 2 = 4).
Defendant gets Machner hearing on boot-print and time-of-death evidence
State v. Alphonso Lamont Willis, 2016AP791-CR, 7/18/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Alphonso Willis appeals his jury-trial conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He raises several claims for a new trial and also asks for resentencing. The court of appeals rejects the resentencing claim and some of his complaints of trial error, but concludes that he is entitled to a Machner hearing on his trial counsel’s (1) failure to present testimony that his boots did not match the prints left at the scene and (2) failure to introduce evidence that the homicide occurred at a time when he had already left the vicinity.
Court of Appeals splits over mishmash approach to instructing jury, affirms homicide conviction
State v. Joseph T. Langlois, 2017 WI App 44, petition for review granted 12/13/17, affirmed, 2018 WI 73; case activity (including briefs)
We all know that an appellate court determines the accuracy of a trial court’s jury instructions by reviewing them as a whole, not in isolation. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 637-638, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). But surely this doesn’t mean that a “whole” that includes incomplete, inaccurate instructions for some charges is fine so long as it includes the correct instructions for other charges. Surely we don’t expect 12 people unfamiliar with the complex law of “self defense” and “accident” to determine which versions of these instructions are correct and whether the same version applies to three distinct charges. This split opinion says “sure we do.” Judge Reilly objects to the majority’s “as long as the correct words are in there somewhere” approach to instructing a jury. Hopefully, SCOW will too.
Court of appeals rejects numerous challenges to homicide conviction
State v. Ron Joseph Allen, 2016AP885, 6/13/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A jury convicted Ron Allen of first-degree intentional homicide as party to the crime. He raises various challenges to the conviction and sentence of life without extended supervision, but the court of appeals rejects them all.
No relief in TPR
Taylor County DHHS v. S.A.L., 2016AP2369, 6/7/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
S.A.L. appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two children. She alleges ineffective assistance of her trial counsel and that the court failed to properly exercise discretion during the dispositional phase. The court of appeals affirms.
SCOW rebuffs 7th Circuit, reaffirms Wisconsin’s test for juror bias
State v. Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 2017 WI 27, 3/31/17, affirming a per curiam court of appeals opinion, case activity (including briefs)
This appeal primarily concerns whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) object to the seating of biased jurors, and (b) ensure that the trial court properly administered the oath to the venire panel in Lepsch’s presence. SCOW holds that none of Lepsch’s jurors were biased, and the venire panel was properly sworn. Thus, no ineffective assistance of counsel occurred. Justice Abrahamson’s concurrence acknowledges Wisconsin law governing juror bias appears inconsistent both internally and with federal case law and strives to harmonize it for the bench and the bar.
SCOTUS: Constitution requires allowing juror testimony on racial bias
Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, USSC No. 15-606, 2017 WL 855760 (March 6, 2017), reversing Peña-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015); Scotusblog page
Every state and federal jurisdiction has some version of the “no-impeachment rule,” which, after a verdict is received, bars an aggrieved party from presenting testimony by jurors regarding the jury’s deliberations. SCOTUS has twice upheld such rules against constitutional challenge, while allowing that there could be certain cases in which refusing to permit such testimony would be too harmful to justice. The court now decides that the no-impeachment rule must give way to the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury where “a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant.”