On Point blog, page 6 of 16
COA affirms waiver of juvenile into adult court
State v. T.G., 2021AP351, 6/23/21, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity
The State filed a delinquency petition against T.G., then 15, for stealing a car and causing an accident that left two passengers seriously injured. The State also petitioned for waiver of jurisdiction. Reviewing the petition de novo, the court of appeals held that Count 1 had “prosecutive merit.” Further, the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in waiving T.G. into adult court.
COA sets procedure for resuming juvenile cases suspended for incompetency to proceed
State v. M.D.M., 2021 WI App 42; case activity
In 2014, the State filed petitions charging M.D.M., a juvenile, with multiple counts of delinquency. He was found incompetent but likely to regain, so the court suspended these cases. In 2016, the State filed a new petition charging M.D.M. with 1 count of delinquency. This time M.D.M. was found competent to proceed, so the State wanted to resume prosecution of his 2014 case as well. This published opinion establishes the procedure for recalling a case after a juvenile regains competency.
Circuit court properly exercised discretion in order juvenile to register as sex offender
State v. G.R.H., 2020AP1638, District 1, 5/11/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A juvenile adjudged delinquent for certain sex offenses must register as a sex offender unless the court permanently stays the requirement under the standards established in §§ 301.45(1m)(e) and 938.34(15m) and State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1. The circuit court in this case properly applied those standards when it declined to stay the registration requirement for G.R.H.
SCOW to take up transgender woman’s challenge to registry’s name-change ban
State v. C.G., 2018AP2205, review granted 4/27/21; case activity
Issues presented:
Does Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the statute governing juvenile sex offender registration, unconstitutionally infringe on Ella’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech by preventing her from legally changing her name to reflect her gender identity?
Does requiring Ella to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
COA: No First Amendment interest in legally changing name for transgender person
State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11; petition for review granted 4/27; case activity
Ella–a pseudonym–was adjudicated delinquent for a sexual assault committed when she was 15. Ella’s legal name is masculine in association; during her juvenile disposition she was transitioning to a female identity. In this appeal she challenges the circuit court’s refusal to stay sex offender registration under Cesar G., and also submits that the registry’s prohibition on changing her legal name violates her First Amendment right to express her identity. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s discretionary decision on the former claim; on the latter it offers three blithe paragraphs of discussion before casually announcing–in a decision that is set to be published, and thus binding–that requiring a transgender woman to use a man’s name implicates no First Amendment concerns whatsoever.
COA: Judge who witnessed violation of sequestration order cured problem by striking witness
State v. M.E., 2019AP2228, 9/1/2020, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.E. was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial. During the trial, the judge overheard a conversation between a state’s witness and the prosecutor that led her to believe her sequestration order had been violated. M.E. argues the judge was disqualified because she was now a witness in her own case; the court of appeals concludes she cured any problem by striking the witness’s testimony.
What do Stalin, Wisconsin, and the Slenderman case have in common?
State v. Morgan E. Geyser, 2020 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Morgan Geyser, one of the two 12 year old defendants in the Slenderman case, was charged in adult court with attempted 1st degree intentional homicide. At her preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that she committed a crime for which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal, Geyser argued that the adult court had found the facts necessary to mitigate attempted 1st degree homicide to attempted 2nd degree homicide and thus it lost jurisdiction. She also argued that her custodial statements to police should have been suppressed because her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.
COA: Mother’s CHIPS petition properly granted
State v. M.A., 2019AP1089, 7/14/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.A.’s son J.A. was the subject of several delinquency petitions; each was converted to a JIPS proceeding because J.A. was not competent. See Wis. Stat. § 938.13(14). Eventually, M.A. filed a CHIPS petition in an apparent attempt to alter the constellation of services available to J.A. The state fought the petition and lost, and continued its fight on appeal. Per the court, though the state alleges five different errors, they all generally boil down to the same argument–that M.A. didn’t identify any particular services a CHIPS finding would provide that were not already available to her. The court rejects all five flavors of the state’s complaint and affirms the circuit court’s grant of the petition.
Defense win! Drawing child intended to keep private wasn’t true threat
State v. A.N.G., 2019AP1100, 5/21/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.N.G. and a middle-school classmate collaborated on a drawing depicting a “cartoon-style bomb,” a school, and a body on the ground. Two weeks later, a teacher caught them passing a note, which turned out to be the drawing. Naturally, the state initiated quasi-criminal proceedings alleging A.N.G. had committed disorderly conduct and made a “terrorist threat.” A.N.G. was found delinquent, but the court of appeals now reverses, saying the adjudications violate the First Amendment.
COA finds no violation of filing deadline in second juvenile petition
State v. A.M.J., 2019AP420, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is a juvenile case so pseudonyms abound. The state accused “Adam” of taking some vehicles from “the Morrisons” and also, in the same incident, damaging some property belonging to “the Olsons.” The district attorney filed a petition concerning the taking of the Morrisons’ vehicles, and Adam was eventually adjudicated delinquent. A few weeks after that adjudication, the DA filed a second petition regarding the criminal damage to the Olsons’ property. This is an appeal of Adam’s adjudication on that second petition; he argues it was not timely filed under the juvenile code. The court of appeals doubts the petition was untimely but holds that even if it was, the circuit court wasn’t statutorily obligated to dismiss it.