On Point blog, page 6 of 16
SCOW to take up transgender woman’s challenge to registry’s name-change ban
State v. C.G., 2018AP2205, review granted 4/27/21; case activity
Issues presented:
Does Wis. Stat. § 301.45, the statute governing juvenile sex offender registration, unconstitutionally infringe on Ella’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech by preventing her from legally changing her name to reflect her gender identity?
Does requiring Ella to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
COA: No First Amendment interest in legally changing name for transgender person
State v. C.G., 2021 WI App 11; petition for review granted 4/27; case activity
Ella–a pseudonym–was adjudicated delinquent for a sexual assault committed when she was 15. Ella’s legal name is masculine in association; during her juvenile disposition she was transitioning to a female identity. In this appeal she challenges the circuit court’s refusal to stay sex offender registration under Cesar G., and also submits that the registry’s prohibition on changing her legal name violates her First Amendment right to express her identity. The court of appeals upholds the circuit court’s discretionary decision on the former claim; on the latter it offers three blithe paragraphs of discussion before casually announcing–in a decision that is set to be published, and thus binding–that requiring a transgender woman to use a man’s name implicates no First Amendment concerns whatsoever.
COA: Judge who witnessed violation of sequestration order cured problem by striking witness
State v. M.E., 2019AP2228, 9/1/2020, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.E. was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial. During the trial, the judge overheard a conversation between a state’s witness and the prosecutor that led her to believe her sequestration order had been violated. M.E. argues the judge was disqualified because she was now a witness in her own case; the court of appeals concludes she cured any problem by striking the witness’s testimony.
What do Stalin, Wisconsin, and the Slenderman case have in common?
State v. Morgan E. Geyser, 2020 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)
Morgan Geyser, one of the two 12 year old defendants in the Slenderman case, was charged in adult court with attempted 1st degree intentional homicide. At her preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that she committed a crime for which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal, Geyser argued that the adult court had found the facts necessary to mitigate attempted 1st degree homicide to attempted 2nd degree homicide and thus it lost jurisdiction. She also argued that her custodial statements to police should have been suppressed because her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.
COA: Mother’s CHIPS petition properly granted
State v. M.A., 2019AP1089, 7/14/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
M.A.’s son J.A. was the subject of several delinquency petitions; each was converted to a JIPS proceeding because J.A. was not competent. See Wis. Stat. § 938.13(14). Eventually, M.A. filed a CHIPS petition in an apparent attempt to alter the constellation of services available to J.A. The state fought the petition and lost, and continued its fight on appeal. Per the court, though the state alleges five different errors, they all generally boil down to the same argument–that M.A. didn’t identify any particular services a CHIPS finding would provide that were not already available to her. The court rejects all five flavors of the state’s complaint and affirms the circuit court’s grant of the petition.
Defense win! Drawing child intended to keep private wasn’t true threat
State v. A.N.G., 2019AP1100, 5/21/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
A.N.G. and a middle-school classmate collaborated on a drawing depicting a “cartoon-style bomb,” a school, and a body on the ground. Two weeks later, a teacher caught them passing a note, which turned out to be the drawing. Naturally, the state initiated quasi-criminal proceedings alleging A.N.G. had committed disorderly conduct and made a “terrorist threat.” A.N.G. was found delinquent, but the court of appeals now reverses, saying the adjudications violate the First Amendment.
COA finds no violation of filing deadline in second juvenile petition
State v. A.M.J., 2019AP420, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is a juvenile case so pseudonyms abound. The state accused “Adam” of taking some vehicles from “the Morrisons” and also, in the same incident, damaging some property belonging to “the Olsons.” The district attorney filed a petition concerning the taking of the Morrisons’ vehicles, and Adam was eventually adjudicated delinquent. A few weeks after that adjudication, the DA filed a second petition regarding the criminal damage to the Olsons’ property. This is an appeal of Adam’s adjudication on that second petition; he argues it was not timely filed under the juvenile code. The court of appeals doubts the petition was untimely but holds that even if it was, the circuit court wasn’t statutorily obligated to dismiss it.
COA says no error in 6-month date range for commission of sexual assault
State v. T. E.-B., 2019AP309, 3/5/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
T. E.-B. appeals his juvenile adjudication for sexual assault of a four-year-old, arguing that the state failed to prove that the alleged assault happened when the petition said it did: “on or about June 21, 2017.” Everyone agrees that the possible range of dates for the assault doesn’t encompass that day, which was a few days after the child first reported an assault to family. Based on the child’s account, the assault actually would have to have occurred sometime between November 6, 2016 and mid-June of 2017.
Sanction for violation of juvenile disposition order limited to 10 calendar days
State v. A.A., 2020 WI App 11; case activity
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.355(6)(d)1. sets a maximum length of “not more than 10 days” for a custody sanction that a circuit court may impose on a juvenile who has violated a dispositional order. Is that 10 calendar days? Or, as the state argues, does “day” mean 24 consecutive hours, so that the maximum sanction is 10 consecutive 24-hour periods? It’s a calendar day, essentially, holds the court of appeals.
COA upholds decision to make juvenile register as sex offender
State v. D.I.G., 2019AP855, 2/5/2020, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
The juvenile here was found delinquent for sexual contact with his younger sister. He moved the court for a stay of registration under State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1. The court declined to stay registration, disagreeing with the expert assessment the juvenile presented. As you might expect, the court of appeals affirms this discretionary decision.