On Point: 26. Juvenile proceedings

State v. M.E., 2019AP2228, 9/1/2020, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.E. was adjudicated delinquent after a bench trial. During the trial, the judge overheard a conversation between a state’s witness and the prosecutor that led her to believe her sequestration order had been violated. M.E. argues the judge was disqualified because she was now a witness in her own case; the court of appeals concludes she cured any problem by striking the witness’s testimony.

State v. Morgan E. Geyser, 2020 WI App 58; case activity (including briefs)

Morgan Geyser, one of the two 12 year old defendants in the Slenderman case, was charged in adult court with attempted 1st degree intentional homicide. At her preliminary hearing, the court found probable cause that she committed a crime for which it had exclusive jurisdiction. On appeal, Geyser argued that the adult court had found the facts necessary to mitigate attempted 1st degree homicide to attempted 2nd degree homicide and thus it lost jurisdiction. She also argued that her custodial statements to police should have been suppressed because her Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The court of appeals rejected both arguments.

State v. M.A., 2019AP1089, 7/14/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

M.A.’s son J.A. was the subject of several delinquency petitions; each was converted to a JIPS proceeding because J.A. was not competent. See Wis. Stat. § 938.13(14). Eventually, M.A. filed a CHIPS petition in an apparent attempt to alter the constellation of services available to J.A. The state fought the petition and lost, and continued its fight on appeal. Per the court, though the state alleges five different errors, they all generally boil down to the same argument–that M.A. didn’t identify any particular services a CHIPS finding would provide that were not already available to her. The court rejects all five flavors of the state’s complaint and affirms the circuit court’s grant of the petition.

State v. A.N.G., 2019AP1100, 5/21/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

A.N.G. and a middle-school classmate collaborated on a drawing depicting a “cartoon-style bomb,” a school, and a body on the ground. Two weeks later, a teacher caught them passing a note, which turned out to be the drawing. Naturally, the state initiated quasi-criminal proceedings alleging A.N.G. had committed disorderly conduct and made a “terrorist threat.” A.N.G. was found delinquent, but the court of appeals now reverses, saying the adjudications violate the First Amendment.

State v. A.M.J., 2019AP420, 4/14/20, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is a juvenile case so pseudonyms abound. The state accused “Adam” of taking some vehicles from “the Morrisons” and also, in the same incident, damaging some property belonging to “the Olsons.” The district attorney filed a petition concerning the taking of the Morrisons’ vehicles, and Adam was eventually adjudicated delinquent. A few weeks after that adjudication, the DA filed a second petition regarding the criminal damage to the Olsons’ property. This is an appeal of Adam’s adjudication on that second petition; he argues it was not timely filed under the juvenile code. The court of appeals doubts the petition was untimely but holds that even if it was, the circuit court wasn’t statutorily obligated to dismiss it.

State v. T. E.-B., 2019AP309, 3/5/20, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

T. E.-B. appeals his juvenile adjudication for sexual assault of a four-year-old, arguing that the state failed to prove that the alleged assault happened when the petition said it did: “on or about June 21, 2017.” Everyone agrees that the possible range of dates for the assault doesn’t encompass that day, which was a few days after the child first reported an assault to family. Based on the child’s account, the assault actually would have to have occurred sometime between November 6, 2016 and mid-June of 2017.

State v. A.A., 2020 WI App 11; case activity

Wisconsin Stat. § 938.355(6)(d)1. sets a maximum length of “not more than 10 days” for a custody sanction that a circuit court may impose on a juvenile who has violated a dispositional order. Is that 10 calendar days? Or, as the state argues, does “day” mean 24 consecutive hours, so that the maximum sanction is 10 consecutive 24-hour periods? It’s a calendar day, essentially, holds the court of appeals.

State v. D.I.G., 2019AP855, 2/5/2020, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The juvenile here was found delinquent for sexual contact with his younger sister. He moved the court for a stay of registration under State v. Cesar G., 2004 WI 61, 272 Wis. 2d 22, 682 N.W.2d 1. The court declined to stay registration, disagreeing with the expert assessment the juvenile presented. As you might expect, the court of appeals affirms this discretionary decision.

State v. S.E.M.T., 2019AP1004, 12/19/19, District 4 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

S.E.M.T., who is cognitively disabled, was accused of committing sexual assault and armed robbery (brandishing a stick) at age 16. The circuit court didn’t erroneously exercise its discretion when it waived him into adult court.

State v. Matthew Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, 11/12/19, affirming a published court of appeals decision, 2017AP1416, case activity (including briefs)

We’ve posted on this case twice before, first on the published court of appeals decision and then on the supreme court’s grant of the petition for review. The question is easily posed: the statute says that a juvenile is subject to automatic adult court jurisdiction if “the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under [chs. 48 and 948] has waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation” and the previous case is either pending or ended in conviction. Does “the court” in that phrase mean any juvenile court in the state (so that waiver in any county would forever precluded juvenile jurisdiction in every county), or does it mean the specific juvenile court in the county where criminal charges are contemplated (so that each county would have a chance to make the waiver decision in its own courts)?