On Point: D. Search incident to arrest

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.

United States v. Gregorio Paniagua-Garcia, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-2540, 2/18/16

The stop of Paniagua-Garcia for texting while driving was unlawful because the officer had no basis for concluding Paniagua-Garcia was using his cellphone to send a text or email as opposed to using it in some way that isn’t prohibited.

The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three cases presenting identical questions in different factual permutations:

Question presented (Birchfield v. North Dakota); (Beylund v. Levi); (Bernard v. Minnesota):

Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood.

In Heien v. North Carolina, SCOTUS held that an officer’s “reasonable” mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion needed to justify a traffic.  And SCOW followed suit in State v. Houghton. If you are researching this issue, you might want to take a look at this new case note in Harvard Law Review. The last few paragraphs, in particular, highlight areas for future litigation.

City of Mequon v. Luke J. Chiarelli, 2015AP359, District 2, 10/14/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

There was reasonable suspicion to stop of Chiarell’s car based on two lane deviations during early morning hours and, based on observations the officer made after the stop, there was probable cause to arrest Chiarelli for OWI.

State v. Daniel Tawan Smith, 2015AP291-CR, District 4, 9/17/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police had probable cause to arrest Smith, who was seen driving away from his home just as police arrived to execute a search warrant to look for evidence that he was selling marijuana.

Winnebago County v. Kelli M. Kosmosky, 2015AP585, District 2, 8/5/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A reasonable officer would be led to believe there was more than a possibility Kosmosky had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated under the facts presented, even though he didn’t know exactly when she operated her vehicle.

State v. Richard E. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, 7/14/14, reversing an unpublished court of appeals opinion, 2013AP1581-CR; majority by Prosser, dissent by Abrahamson (joined by Bradley); case activity (including briefs)

You’ve seen this before. An officer makes a traffic stop based on a “misunderstanding” of the law, then conducts a search and finds incriminating evidence.  Last July, in State v. Antonio Brown, SCOW held that a seizure based on such a mistake violates the 4th Amendment. Six months later, SCOTUS reached the opposite result in Heien v. North Carolina. In this case, SCOW overturns Brown to hold that: (1) “pretextual stops . . . are not per se unreasonable under the 4th Amendment”; (2) probable cause is never required for a traffic stop; (3) the officer here “misunderstood” multiple provisions of Ch. 346, but his mistakes were “objectively reasonable”; and (4) Article I §11 of Wisconsin’s Constitution extends no further than the 4th Amendment. Slip op. ¶¶ 4, 5, 6, 50.

The 4th Amendment has been described by Conservative HQ as “one of the most important arrows in the quiver against bullying big government.” Because the government doesn’t just search and seize paper–it also goes after your cell phones, your Facebook account, your email (even when stored on Google’s server), your tweets, your DNA (by definition, your family’s DNA) etc.–we want a sturdy Fourth Amendment, right? Justice Scalia thinks so. He’s been called the 4th Amendment’s “