On Point: D. Search incident to arrest

State v. Marcus Norfleet, 2013AP2294-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Police had probable cause to arrest Norfleet for both eluding and operating while intoxicated under the totality of the facts and circumstances available to the officer at the time of arrest.

After an officer tried to stop a speeding car at around 1:00 a.m., the car accelerated,

State v. Michael J. Adrian, Jr., 2013AP1890-CR, District 4, 3/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Transporting Adrian from the site his vehicle was stopped to the nearest police station for the purpose of performing field sobriety tests did not convert a lawful Terry detention into an illegal custodial arrest.

A person temporarily detained under Terry may be moved “in the general vicinity of the stop without converting what would otherwise be a temporary seizure into an arrest.” State v.

State v. William A. Reese, 2014 WI App 27; case activity

The results of a driver’s blood test should not be suppressed even if they were obtained without a warrant and in the absence of exigent circumstances in violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), because the arresting officer acted in good faith reliance on established Wisconsin Supreme Court precedent at the time the blood draw was conducted.

State v. Lamont C., 2013AP1687, District 1, 2/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

¶14      We conclude under the facts in this case that [Officer] Hoffman did have reasonable suspicion … to stop … Lamont C. Hoffman, relying on information provided to him by a robbery victim, located Lamont C. within minutes of the robbery. In the limited time Hoffman was able to speak with the victim,

State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,

State v. Javier Teniente, 2013AP799-CR, District 4, 1/30/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Teniente was on his boat in the chamber of Madison’s Tenney Locks waiting for the water to rise. Piqued by Teniente’s boisterous behavior, an officer standing on the wall of the lock engaged Teniente in conversation. (¶¶3-4, 15). This interaction wasn’t a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes;

David L. Riley v. California, USSC 13-132

Question presented:

Whether evidence admitted at petitioner’s trial was obtained in a search of petitioner’s cell phone that violated petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights.

Lower court opinion: People v. Riley, No. D059840 (Cal. App. 4th Dist., Feb. 8, 2013) (unpublished)

Docket

Scotusblog page

United States v. Brima Wurie,

State v. Kari L. Schiewe, 2012AP2767-CR, District 4, 10/24/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Applying well-established principles the court of appeals holds that despite the lack of field sobriety tests or other additional investigatory steps there was probable cause to arrest Schiewe for OWI based on information from witnesses and the officer’s own observations of Schiewe at her home. (¶¶14-19). Further, the subsequent blood draw from Schiewe was not tainted by the fact that the police arrested Schiewe in her garage,

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue  (composed by the State’s petition for review)

In determining the legality of a vehicle stop under the Fourth Amendment, did the court of appeals properly conclude that a tail lamp that is sixty-six percent functional is in “good working order” as required under Wis. Stat. § 347.13(1) and thus cannot serve as a basis for an officer’s probable cause to stop the vehicle?

State v. Lewis Allen Stokes, 2012AP2621-CR, District 1, 10/15/13; court of appeals opinion (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Probable cause to arrest for OWI was established based on: police observations of Stokes speeding and weaving in and out of traffic without signaling at 11:00 p.m.; Stokes’s slurred speech and the strong odor of alcohol on his breath; and Stokes’s argumentative and combative attitude toward the police. (¶¶4-5, 10).