On Point: c. Implied Consent

State v. Nicholas J. Nero, 2023AP543, District III, 6/10/25 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

The COA found that law enforcement had probable cause that Nicholas Nero was driving under the influence, independent from his compelled statement to his probation officer and un-Mirandized statement to a deputy sheriff, and therefore affirmed the circuit court’s order denying his motion to suppress the results of his blood draw.  The COA also found that Nero’s claims for ineffective assistance of counsel at trial were conclusory and undeveloped.

County of Dunn v. Kevin J. Cormican, 2020AP1895, 2/7/23, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

After being convicted of OWI 1st, Cormican appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the results of his blood test. He first argued that the arresting officer gave him information beyond what is on the Informing the Accused (ITA) card that was misleading and affected his decision to consent to the test. He also argued that due to the misleading information, his consent to the blood test was involuntary. The court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Kody R. Kohn, 2020AP2147-CR, District 2, 9/22/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kohn argues the circuit court erred in: 1) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the blood drawn from him after his arrest; 2) excluding exhibits he wanted to use to cross examine the state’s blood analyst; and 3) rejecting his motion to dismiss a bail jumping charge. The court of appeals affirms all the circuit court’s decisions.

State v. Charles L. Neevel, 2021AP36, 7/1/21, District 4 (one-judge decision ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

Neevel was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving. The officer read him the implied consent “informing the accused” form, and Neevel agreed to a blood draw. He moved to suppress, lost, and pleaded no contest to OWI. On appeal, he renews the argument he made in trial court: that the officer should instead have ordered a less intrusive test, such as a breath test. (The officer did, in reading the form, tell Neevel he could have an alternative in addition to the blood draw; Neevel’s contention is that he should have been offered a different test instead of the blood draw.)

State v. Dawn Prado, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Third try wasn’t a charm, and we’ve lost track of what try this is, but SCOW has finally achieved a majority decision on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b), which permits the police to take the blood of an unconscious OWI suspect without a warrant. As the court of appeals held below, it’s unconstitutional.

State v. Dawn M. Prado, 2020 WI App 42, cross petitions for review granted, 10/21/20, affirmed, 2021 WI 64; case activity (including briefs)

They must have gotten tired of waiting. After SCOW failed (or refused) to decide the question in Howes, Brar, Mitchell, and Hawley, and SCOTUS likewise punted in Mitchell v. Wisconsin, the court of appeals now does what those higher courts could or would not: it rules on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305‘s provisions that permit police to withdraw blood from an incapacitated or unconscious motorist on the theory that they’ve “consented” to this by driving. And, like the vast majority of jurisdictions to consider similar questions, our court holds this provision unconstitutional, rejecting the state’s argument that statutorily-imputed consent is the type of “consent” that provides an exception to the warrant requirement. But the court also says the statute was not, at the time of Prado’s arrest, so plainly unconstitutional that the officer could not rely on it in good faith. Thus the court declines to suppress the test results.

State v. Anthony J. Madland, 2019AP146-CR, District 3, 1/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Madland asserted that he requested an alternative chemical test under § 343.305 and that the officer who read the “informing the accused” form to him misled him as to his right to request an alternative test. The court of appeals rejects the claims in light of the circuit court’s fact findings.

State v. Justin W. Paull, 2017AP1210, 8/15/19, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mr. Paull was found bloody and semi-conscious after a motorcycle accident. He smelled of intoxicants and had slurred speech. Police arrested him, and he was taken to the hospital. An officer read the informing the accused form to the now-unconscious Mr. Paull, then drew his blood.

State v. Gerald J. Vanderhoef, 2016AP2052-CR, District 1, 4/30/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderhoef’s silence in response to the “Informing the Accused” form constituted a refusal to consent to a chemical test, so the subsequent blood draw was unlawful. However, the state subpoenaed the results of his urine test, and that evidence was admissible.

Gerald Mitchell v. Wisconsin, USSC No. 18-6210, certiorari granted 1/11/19

Question presented:

Whether a statute authorizing a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.