On Point: c. Implied Consent

State v. Philip J. Hawley, 2015AP1113, District 4, 11/21/18; case activity (including briefs)

Our supreme court has, three times, set out to decide whether the  implied-consent statute supplies “consent” in a Fourth Amendment sense, such that it constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. Three times, it has failed to reach a binding majority on the question–or has it? The court of appeals, in this certification, suggests perhaps the supreme court has the answer already, depending how you count the votes.

State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2017AP1518-Cr, District 4, 6/14/18 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication), review granted 10/9/18, reversed, 2019 WI 80; case activity (including briefs)

Here’s a rare sighting! One district of the court of appeals has declared that it is not bound by a decision addressing the same set of facts issued by another district. This is what you call SCOW bait (sorry to say, given that this is a defense win). Randall was arrested for OWI, an officer read the “Informing the Accused” card, and she agreed to a blood test. A few days later, her lawyer sent the lab a letter withdrawing her consent. The court of appeals held that Randall had a right to withdraw her consent up to the time when blood was actually tested. But just 6 months ago, the court of appeals reached the opposite result in State v. Sumnicht. 

State v. Kaitlin C. Sumnicht, 2017AP280-CR, 12/20/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Sumnicht was convicted of OWI second. She sought suppression of her blood test results on two grounds. First, she argued that that State did not develop an adequate factual record of her interaction with the deputy who allegedly obtained her consent to a blood test. Second, assuming that she did consent, she argued that she revoked it when her lawyer sent a letter to the State Laboratory of Hygiene before any testing was done and asserted her right to privacy in her blood. The circuit court denied suppression, and the court of appeals affirmed but its reasoning is unsatisfying.

State v. Michael J. Mansfield, 2016AP2423-CR, 10/3/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Mansfield argued police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to detain him based on a tip from an anonymous Turtle Lake Casino employee. The court of appeals holds the tipster should be treated as a citizen informant and, under the standard for citizen informants, the tip provided reasonable suspicion.

State v. Joseph K. Larson, 2016AP1002-CR, 3/21/17, District III, (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Joseph Larson contends on appeal that the circuit court erred when it concluded he consented to a breath alcohol test after his arrest for OWI.

State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.

Review of an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs); petition for review

Issues (composed by On Point)

(1)  May a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test shows consciousness of guilt?

(2)  When a circuit court denies a postconviction motion based on arguably inapplicable case law, must the defendant ask the circuit court to reconsider its ruling in order to preserve for appeal the claim that the case law doesn’t apply?

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

State v. Gary F. Lemberger, 2015AP1452-CR, 4/14/2016, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 10/11/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 39; case activity (including briefs)

A breathalyzer test is a Fourth Amendment search, and state case law holds that the state may not invite a jury to view a defendant’s refusal to consent to a search as evidence of guilt. So, can a prosecutor argue that a defendant’s refusal to take a breathalyzer shows his guilt? Don’t look to this case for an answer.

The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three cases presenting identical questions in different factual permutations:

Question presented (Birchfield v. North Dakota); (Beylund v. Levi); (Bernard v. Minnesota):

Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood.