On Point: c. Implied Consent

The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three cases presenting identical questions in different factual permutations:

Question presented (Birchfield v. North Dakota); (Beylund v. Levi); (Bernard v. Minnesota):

Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood.

State v. Victor J. Godard, 2014AP396-CR, District 4, 8/28/14 (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer provided Godard with accurate information about the implied consent law and thus did not cause Godard to refuse to submit to the implied consent blood test or deny him his right to a second test.

State v. Lawrence A. Levasseur, Jr., 2013AP2369-CR, District 4, 2/6/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The arresting officer used an implied consent form that pre-dated the 2009 amendments to § 343.305, so it omitted language about accidents involving death or serious injury–language that did not apply to Levasseur’s situation. The use of the outdated form didn’t strip the resulting blood test result of its statutory presumption of admissibility and accuracy,

Town of Mukwonago v. John J. Uttke, 2011AP2021, District 2, 1/18/12

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Uttke: Michael C. Witt; case activity

Uttke’s driver’s license was revoked for refusal to submit to a blood test upon OWI arrest, and he requested a “refusal hearing,” unsuccessfully challenging the existence of probable cause to arrest, § 343.305(9). The court of appeals affirms:

¶9        We first address whether Officer Heckman had probable cause to arrest Uttke.  

State v. Luke T. Nirmaier, 2011AP1355-CR, District 3, 12/28/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Nirmaier: Michael M. Rajek; case activity

The odor of alcohol on Nirmaier following a traffic accident resulting in substantial bodily injury triggered the implied consent law, notwithstanding absence of probable cause to arrest at that point:

¶9        Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(3) outlines different scenarios in which an officer may invoke the implied consent law and request a chemical test of an individual’s breath,

City of Sun Prairie v. Michael H. Smith, 2010AP2607, District 4, 5/26/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Smith: Tracey A. Wood; case activity

¶9        Wisconsin Stat. § 343.305(5)(a) imposes the following obligations on law enforcement: “(1) to provide a primary test at no charge to the suspect; (2) to use reasonable diligence in offering and providing a second alternate test of its choice at no charge to the suspect;

State v. Joe R. Hechimovich, 2010AP2897-CR, District 4, 4/7/11

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Hechimovich: Corey C. Chirafisi; case activity

Compliance with implied consent law found. Although Hechimovich initially requested a breath test, after his blood was drawn at the hospital, the deputy “gave ample opportunity” during a 10-minute period for Hechimovich to renew the request for breath test. The deputy “conclud(ed) that when Hechimovich did not bring it up following his blood test,

court of appeals decision (recommended for publication); for Batt: Chad A. Lanning; BiC; Resp.; Reply

OWI – Implied Consent Law – § 343.305(5)(a) Testing

Construing State v. Stary, 187 Wis. 2d 266, 522 N.W.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1994), the court concludes that the Implied Consent law affords the driver the right to choose testing administered by the law enforcement agency at no expense to the driver,

State v. Javier Galvin, 2010AP863-CR, District 2, 10/6/10

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Galvin: John S. Schiro, Keith Llanas; BiC; Resp.

Galvan, who had minimal ability to understand English, didn’t understand the implied consent warnings given to him in English. Because the arresting officer knew of Galvan’s limitation, and had indeed obtained the translation services of another officer at the time of arrest,

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Sporle: Robert J. Jackson; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Implied Consent Procedure, § 343.305(2)

¶12 The officer complied with her obligations to provide the “Informing the Accused” information and to make an alternative test available. The officer informed Sporle that, if he took the requested test, he could have an alternative test free of charge,