On Point: 1. Consent

State v. Miguel A. Ayala, 2011 WI App 6; for Ayala: Martin E. Kohler, Craig S. Powell; case activity; Ayala BiC; State Resp.; Reply

Search & Seizure – Consent to Enter

Based on trial court findings on disputed facts, the resident of an apartment gave the police consent to enter a bedroom and look for Ayala (as to whom,

State v. Mark A. Miller, 2010AP352-CR, District 4, 12/9/10 

court of appeals decision (1-judge, not for publication); for Miller: Bill Ginsberg; Miller BiC; State Resp.

The court concludes that Miller voluntarily consented to police entreaties over an 11-minute period to enter his home so that they could perform field sobriety testing, notwithstanding his refusals during that time to allow entry:

¶7        The circuit court found that the officer spoke with Miller for approximately eleven minutes and,

seventh circuit decision

Milwaukee’s ordinance-created “winter rules” with respect to snow removal effectively establish an “easement” such that police could enter a yard and rifle through a homeowner’s garbage cart. Although the  cart is within what is normally considered “curtilage,” and thus protected by privacy concerns, the intrusion of the curtilage here is “lawful,” given this local law allowing garbage collectors to intrude on such areas.

But the fact that the defendant’s garbage carts were (we may assume) within the curtilage of his home does not conclude the constitutional analysis.

decision below: certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; court of appeals briefs: Resp.; Reply

Issue (from Table of Cases):

Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,

certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp.; Reply

Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph

The court of appeals certifies to the supreme court the following question:

Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,

State v. Robert L. Artic, Sr., 2010 WI 83, affirming 2009 WI App 12; for Artic: Keith A. Findley, James D. Cooley; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Notwithstanding an unlawful, forcible police entry into his residence, Artic voluntarily consented to the subsequent search of the house, which was also sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to purge the taint of the illegal entry.

State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

State v. Jordan A. Denk, 2008 WI 130, on certification
For Denk: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶20 n. 4:

… While Pickering could consent to a search of the vehicle, he could not consent to a search of his passenger. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis.  2d 52,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Johnson’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” made in response to an officer’s assertion that they were “going to search the vehicle” was voluntary consent or mere acquiescence.

Holding:

¶19      As the record indicates,