On Point: 1. Consent

decision below: certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; court of appeals briefs: Resp.; Reply

Issue (from Table of Cases):

Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,

certification; for St. Martin: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate; Resp.; Reply

Consent to Search – Georgia v. Randolph

The court of appeals certifies to the supreme court the following question:

Whether the rule regarding consent to search a shared dwelling in Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), which states that a warrantless search cannot be justified when a physically present resident expressly refuses consent,

State v. Robert L. Artic, Sr., 2010 WI 83, affirming 2009 WI App 12; for Artic: Keith A. Findley, James D. Cooley; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Notwithstanding an unlawful, forcible police entry into his residence, Artic voluntarily consented to the subsequent search of the house, which was also sufficiently attenuated from the illegal entry to purge the taint of the illegal entry.

State v. David D. Ramage, 2010 WI App 77; for Ramage: Jevin J. Mulrooney; BiC; Resp.; Reply

Co-tenant’s permissive use of Ramage’s computers conferred on her authority to consent to warrantless police removal of computer and search of their contents. Contrary authority, People v. Blair, 748 N.E.2d 318 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Lacey,

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

State v. Jordan A. Denk, 2008 WI 130, on certification
For Denk: Lora B. Cerone, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: ¶20 n. 4:

… While Pickering could consent to a search of the vehicle, he could not consent to a search of his passenger. See State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis.  2d 52,

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether Johnson’s statement, “I don’t have a problem with that,” made in response to an officer’s assertion that they were “going to search the vehicle” was voluntary consent or mere acquiescence.

Holding:

¶19      As the record indicates,

State v. Roemie T. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, PFR filed 9/27/07
For St. Germaine: Rex Anderegg

Issue: Whether the owner of the residence (Briseno) had apparent authority to consent to police search of renter St. Germaine’s room, at least where St. Germaine was present was consent was sought and never objected.

Holding:

¶17 St. Germaine argues that there was no reasonable basis for the officers to search his room because they knew it was rented and that Briseno could not consent.

State v. John J. Hartwig, 2007 WI App 160, PFR filed 5/22/07
For Hartwig: Wright C. Laufenberg

Issue/Holding: The trial court misread State v. Reginald Jones, 2005 WI App 26, to hold that consent to search is invalid whenever the person has been seized; rather, that case holds only that consent may be invalid when made following illegal seizure of the person.

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Issue/Holding:

¶18      The State has satisfied its burden to show the consent was voluntary. There is no suggestion of misrepresentation, deception, trickery or intimidation. The officers did not use weapons or force or otherwise take custody of Bons. Bons testified that Ramstack told him that he could be arrested,