On Point blog, page 11 of 13
Consent – Acquiescence – Generally
State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue/Holding:
¶16 When the purported legality of a warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).
Consent — Acquiescence — Generally
State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.
Issue/Holding:
¶12 The test for voluntariness asks whether consent was given in the “absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of a defendant.” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis. 2d 222, 245, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). In making this determination, no single factor is dispositive.
Consent — Acquiescence — Assertion of Subpoena
State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.
Issue: Whether Giebel’s “consent” to a search of his computer, in response to a police claim of a subpoena and accompanied by an expression that Giebel assumed he had no choice, was voluntary or mere acquiescence to asserted police authority.
Holding:
¶17 Three considerations weigh heavily in our decision.
Consent – Coercion — Scope
State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates
Issue/Holding:
¶13 Kelley also argues that the search violated the scope of consent. He contends that an accelerant and phone handset could not have been found under his bed and therefore that place should not have been searched. We disagree. …
¶14 Here, the police were searching for a telephone handset and an accelerant.
Consent – Coercion — Police Failure to Inform of Real Purpose of Search
State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates
Issue/Holding:
¶12 Kelley contends that the police should have disclosed that they had reason to believe he had child pornography in his apartment. We are not persuaded that the detectives’ failure to disclose all their suspicions invalidated an otherwise validly obtained consent. This was not a case of deception or false pretext.
Consent: Scope – Authority to Question Young Child
State v. Robert A. Ragsdale, 2004 WI App 178, PFR filed 8/5/04
For Ragsdale: Timothy T. Kay
Issue: Whether an occupant’s consent to search his home “as long as he was present” limited an officer’s authority to question the occupant’s three-year-old son apart from his father, and thus inhibit the officer’s recovery of an illicit weapon based on information received from the child.
Holding:
¶10.
Consent — Authority — Common Authority over Premises
State v. Matthew J. Knapp, 2003 WI 121, on certification; vacated and remanded on other grounds (for further consideration in light of United States v. Patane, 542 U. S. ____ (2004), Wisconsin v. Knapp, No. 03-590)
For Knapp: Robert G. LeBell
Issue1: Whether the search of Knapp’s bedroom was properly consented to by his brother (George),
Arrest — Traffic Offense — Duration — Effect on Consent to Search
State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether an arrest for a traffic stop, lawful at inception, was unlawfully prolonged in order to obtain the driver’s consent to a strip search not reasonably related to the traffic violation.
Holding: This issue is “closely related” to one raised in State v. Gaulrapp,
Consent — Acquiescence — Strip Search
State v. Charles A. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
For Wallace: Martha K. Askins, SPD, Madison Appellate
Issue: Whether Wallace voluntarily consented, or merely acquiesced, to a strip search following arrest for a minor traffic violation.
Holding:
¶19. The police made their request during the booking process and before Wallace’s bond had been posted. We concur with the circuit court’s conclusion that thirty minutes,
Consent — Acquiescence — Entry to Residence
State v. John Tomlinson, Jr., 2002 WI 91, affirming 2002 WI App 212, 247 Wis. 2d 682, 635 N.W.2d 201
For Tomlinson: John J. Gray
Issue: Whether the actions of the defendant’s minor daughter, in opening the door to the police and then walking back into the house when they asked for permission to enter, amounted consent for the police to enter.