On Point: 1. Consent

State v. Navdeep S. Brar, 2015AP1261-CR, District 4, 7/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication),petition for review granted 12/19/2016, affirmed, 2017 WI 73 ; case activity (including briefs)

The record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Brar consented to a blood test after his arrest for OWI and that his consent was voluntary.

State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2016 WI App 64, petition for review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed, 2017 WI 78; case activity (including briefs)

Police found drugs on Floyd after they searched him during a traffic stop. Floyd claims the traffic stop was extended beyond what was necessary to issue the citations he was given and that he didn’t consent to the search. The court of appeals turns back both challenges.

Birchfield v. North Dakota, USSC No. 14-1468, 2016 WL 3434398 (June 23, 2016), reversing State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 2015); vacating and remanding State v. Beylund, 861 N.W.2d 172 (N.D. 2015); and affirming State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41 (Minn. 2014); Scotusblog pages: Birchfield, Beylund, Bernard (include links to briefs and commentary)

Three years ago, in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the Court rejected a bright-line rule that police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have probable cause to believe is driving drunk, pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception. In these three cases, the Court adopts a bright-line rule that the police may always conduct a warrantless alcohol test on a motorist they have arrested for driving drunk, pursuant to the search incident to arrest exception. But they can only Conduct a test of the motorist’s breath, and not the motorist’s blood. Make sense?

State v. David W. Howes, 2014AP1870-CR, 1/28/16, District 4; certification granted 4/7/16, reversed, 2017 WI 18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

This appeal presents a single recurring issue: whether provisions in Wisconsin’s implied consent law authorizing a warrantless blood draw from an unconscious suspect violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. More specifically, the issue is whether the “implied consent,” deemed to have occurred before a defendant is a suspect, is voluntary consent for purposes of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

State v. Bradley A. Anderson, 2015AP1573-CR, 12/23/15, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Anderson’s consent to a blood draw after his OWI arrest was not vitiated by being told that, if he refused the blood draw, his driving privileges would be revoked and the officer would get a warrant for a blood draw. In addition, the circuit court properly found that Anderson didn’t later withdraw his consent to the blood draw.

State v. Charles Ray Stewart, 2014AP276-CR, District 1, 12/22/15 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The warrantless search for and seizure of evidence from Stewart’s apartment was lawful because, after Stewart allowed police to enter the apartment and was arrested, the community caretaker doctrine allowed police to remain in the apartment to assure Stewart’s dog was cared for, and the office could seize evidence discovered in plain view.

The Court granted certiorari and consolidated three cases presenting identical questions in different factual permutations:

Question presented (Birchfield v. North Dakota); (Beylund v. Levi); (Bernard v. Minnesota):

Whether, in the absence of a warrant, a State may make it a crime for a person to refuse to take a chemical test to detect the presence of alcohol in the person’s blood.

United States v. Bodie B. Witzlib, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 15-1115, 8/7/15

The search of the basement of the home Witzlib was living in with his grandmother was valid because the area was shared and not Witzlib’s private space. Nor was the consent affected by the fact that after Witzlib answered the officers’ knock on the front door they asked him to come out of the house onto the driveway and, after he refused consent to search, they went back to ask for his grandmother’s consent to search.

State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.

State v. David M. Wagner, 2014AP842-CR, District 2, 2/25/15 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wagner voluntarily consented to a search of his person, and was not merely “[a]cquiesc[ing] to an unlawful assertion of police authority,” State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, 16, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182, when he agreed to the search on the heels of the officer’s assertion of authority to search Wagner’s car.