On Point: b. Blood Draw

Mitchell v. Wisconsin, No. 18-6210, 6/29/19, vacating and remanding State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

This is the decision we’ve all been waiting for on whether a blood draw from an unconscious OWI suspect requires a warrant. Wouldn’t you know–the opinion is splintered. Alito, writing for 4 justices (a plurality, not a majority), concludes that when a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances doctrine generally permits a blood draw with out a warrant. The plurality vacates the judgment and remands the case for a hearing so that Mitchell has a chance to show that there were no exigent circumstances in his case. Way to go, Andy Hinkel, for fending off the State’s contention that implied consent is actual consent.

State v. Kathryn M. Cooper, 2018AP1154, 11/21/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Cooper’s vehicle was involved in an accident and was found, damaged, in her driveway. An officer saw a light on near the back door of her home and went around back and knocked. Cooper waved him in. The officer told her he was investigating an accident.

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)

This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, petition for review 0f an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 11/13/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Under Missouri v. McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota, may a circuit court impose a harsher criminal punishment because a defendant exercised his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw?

2. Whether Dalton was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to move to suppress blood evidence on grounds that police lacked exigent circumstances to forcibly draw his blood without a warrant?

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, 7/19/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/13/17, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2018 WI 85; case activity (including briefs)

Patrick Dalton was badly injured in a car crash. He argues on appeal that there was no exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw that revealed his intoxication; he also argues the circuit court erred when it considered his refusal to consent to the blood draw as an aggravating factor for sentencing.

Bill Tyroler, On Point’s original writer, has kept a low profile since he retired. But lucky for us he can’t contain himself regarding SCOW’s decision in State v. Howes and court of appeals recent certification in State v. Gerald Smith. He says SCOW’s Howes opinion allows defense counsel to argue that exigent circumstances are required for a warrantless blood draw of an unconscious motorist. See Bill’s comments here and here.

State v. David W. Howes, 2017 WI 18, on certification from the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court granted certification in this case to decide an important question: Does Wisconsin’s implied consent statute create a categorical “consent” exception to the warrant requirement as to unconscious drivers, thus allowing police to collect blood without having to get a warrant or establish exigent circumstances or some other exception? But the court doesn’t answer that question, leaving the law in a muddle. On top of that, the court reverses the circuit court’s suppression order, though without a majority agreement as to why the blood draw was legal, and with some justices invoking a theory the state didn’t argue in the circuit court.

County of Milwaukee v. Alpesh Shah, 2015AP1581, District 1, 8/16/16 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Shaw was convicted of operating a motor vehicle with a restricted controlled substance in his blood pre-McNeely. He challenged the warrantless draw of his blood because there were no exigent circumstances–THC doesn’t dissipate like alcohol, and the deputy had plenty of time to get a warrant. Moreover, the State did not charge him with operating while under the influence, so dissipation wasn’t even relevant. The State only need to show that THC was present in his blood, not that a particular amount of THC was in his blood.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP6-CR,7/20/16, Distrct 2 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here holds that Dalton is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing move to suppress the test results from a warrantless blood draw. The record contains no evidence that exigent circumstances existed a la Missouri v. McNeely, and the officer who ordered the draw gave no indication that he ever considered seeking a warrant.