On Point: 3. Exigent circumstances

State v. Kathryn M. Cooper, 2018AP1154, 11/21/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Cooper’s vehicle was involved in an accident and was found, damaged, in her driveway. An officer saw a light on near the back door of her home and went around back and knocked. Cooper waved him in. The officer told her he was investigating an accident.

State v. Jonalle L. Ferraro, 2018AP498, 11/8/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity

As in Palmersheim just last week, here we have another successor to Weber from the 2016 term – an officer follows a driver (or recent driver) into his or her garage to arrest.

State v. Steven D. Palmersheim, 2018AP746, 10/31/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

This is the state’s appeal of the circuit court’s grant of a suppression motion. A motorist called the police saying another car on the road was wildly swerving; the caller stayed with the swerving vehicle until it stopped on a residential street. When a police officer arrived in response to the car, the caller told him the driver, Palmersheim, had gotten out of the car and urinated in the street.

State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)

This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, 2018 WL 2402551, 5/29/18, reversing Collins v. Commonwealth, 790 S.E.2d 611 (Va. 2016); SCOTUSblog page (includes links to briefs and commentary)

Police learned a stolen motorcycle that had evaded them on two occasions was likely parked at a house where Collins stayed. When they got to the house, they saw a motorcycle parked in the driveway with a tarp over it. They walked up the driveway, lifted the tarp, and confirmed that it was the stolen bike. The Supreme Court now holds that, though the motorcycle was an automobile–and hence subject to the “automobile exception,” which dispenses with the warrant requirement where there’s probable cause to search a vehicle–this fact does not justify the officers’ invasion of the home’s curtilage to search it.

State v. Keith A. Wall, 2017AP2367-CR, District 4, 5/17/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Wall sought the suppression of the results of the test of his blood, which showed he had a BAC of 0.178 after his arrest for OWI. He argues the blood was seized unlawfully because police didn’t have a warrant and they used excessive force to draw the blood. The court of appeals rejects both claims.

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, petition for review 0f an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 11/13/17; case activity (including briefs)

Issues:

1. Under Missouri v. McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota, may a circuit court impose a harsher criminal punishment because a defendant exercised his constitutional right to refuse a warrantless blood draw?

2. Whether Dalton was denied the effective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to move to suppress blood evidence on grounds that police lacked exigent circumstances to forcibly draw his blood without a warrant?

Collins v. Virginia, USSC No. 16-1027, cert granted 9/28/17; lower court opinion; USSC docket; SCOTUSblog page

Question presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment’s automobile exception permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private property, approach a house and search a vehicle parked a few feet from the house.

State v. Robert Torres, 2017 WI App 60; case activity (including briefs)

It’s unclear why this opinion is recommended for publication–it seems to be a pretty straightforward application of the law to a particular fact situation.