On Point: C. Warrant unnecessary

State v. Gary A. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, affirming 2006 WI App 15
For Johnson: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶16      When the purported legality of a warrantless search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent must be freely and voluntarily given. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998) (citations omitted).

State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.

Issue/Holding:

¶12   The test for voluntariness asks whether consent was given in the “absence of actual coercive, improper police practices designed to overcome the resistance of a defendant.” State v. Clappes, 136 Wis.  2d 222, 245, 401 N.W.2d 759 (1987). In making this determination, no single factor is dispositive. 

State v. Jed A. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239
For Giebel: Robert E. Bellin, Jr.

Issue: Whether Giebel’s “consent” to a search of his computer, in response to a police claim of a subpoena and accompanied by an expression that Giebel assumed he had no choice, was voluntary or mere acquiescence to asserted police authority.

Holding:

¶17   Three considerations weigh heavily in our decision.

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶15      An officer has the right to access objects in plain view while searching within the scope of the consent.  See State v. Johnson, 187 Wis. 2d 237, 242, 522 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1994). In order for the plain view doctrine to apply, three requirements must be met:

First,

State v. George Toland Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249
For Ziedonis: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Police, responding to a “loose animal” complaint became sufficiently alarmed by the possibility the dogs’ owner was in need of assistance that their warrantless entry was justified under the community caretaker doctrine:

¶27      Like in Ferguson, the police “utilized alternative methods of confirming whether anyone was in the [residence] before entering.” 244 Wis.

State v. George Toland Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249
For Ziedonis: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14      One such exception is the community caretaker function, which arises when the actions of the police are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct.

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Kelley also argues that the search violated the scope of consent. He contends that an accelerant and phone handset could not have been found under his bed and therefore that place should not have been searched. We disagree. …

¶14      Here, the police were searching for a telephone handset and an accelerant.

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Kelley contends that the police should have disclosed that they had reason to believe he had child pornography in his apartment. We are not persuaded that the detectives’ failure to disclose all their suspicions invalidated an otherwise validly obtained consent. This was not a case of deception or false pretext.

State v. Walter Leutenegger, 2004 WI App 127
For Leutenegger: Bill Ginsberg

Issue/Holding:

¶12. A warrantless home entry is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Richter, 235 Wis. 2d 524, ¶28. The government bears the burden of establishing that a warrantless entry into a home occurred pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See State v.

State v. Robert A. Ragsdale, 2004 WI App 178, PFR filed 8/5/04For Ragsdale: Timothy T. Kay

Issue/Holding:

¶14. Moreover, the questioning of the boy here presents a situation analogous to the safety exceptions set forth in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654-60 (1984), and its progeny. Quarles set forth a public safety exception to the requirement for Mirandawarnings.