On Point blog, page 4 of 35
COA finds exigent circumstances based on screaming and a slap
State v. Jesse Rogalla, 2019AP1486-CR, 10/26/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication; case activity (including briefs)
Officer Klieforth was dispatched to a home after someone reported that Rogalla was yelling at a woman inside. Klieforth heard both parties screaming, peeked in a window, saw Rogalla yelling as a woman knelt before him crying “You don’t have to do this” and “Why?” After hearing a loud slap, Klieforth entered without a warrant based on fear for the woman’s safety.
COA: exigency supported decision to seize cell phone
State v. Jeremy J. Deen, 2020AP1399, 8/24/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Police received a tip that an IP address associated with Deen’s home had uploaded child pornography. They went to the home and Deen let them in. While inside, officers noted Deen was carrying a knife, so they frisked him, which turned up a cell phone. In response to officers’ questions about child porn, Deen made some equivocal statements about whether there might be any on the phone, and the officers took it. The court of appeals holds that the possibility that Deen would hide or destroy the phone or delete the images it might contain supplied sufficient exigent circumstances that the police could seize it without a warrant.
COA upholds stop on community-caretaker grounds
State v. Keith J. Dresser, 2020AP2017, 7/22/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A sheriff’s deputy saw Dresser apparently unconscious in his vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot at 5:00 a.m. The deputy pulled behind Dresser’s vehicle, turned on his emergency lights apparently based on departmental “procedures,” and knocked on the window. Dresser woke up, he and/or the deputy opened a car door, and ultimately Dresser was arrested for OWI.
SCOW: No “sufficiently deliberate and sufficiently culpable” police misconduct, so no exclusion of evidence
State v. George Steven Burch, 2021 WI 68, on certification from the court of appeals, affirming the judgment of conviction; case activity (including briefs)
We said in our post on the court of appeals’ certification that this case presented novel and important issues about searches of cell phones and their data. So we anticipated a decision addressing the parameters of police searches of digital devices. But the majority doesn’t address those issues or decide whether Burch’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Instead, the majority holds that, regardless of the lawfulness of the search of Burch’s cell phone data, “there was no police misconduct to trigger application of the exclusionary rule.” (¶26). The majority’s approach bodes ill for the future of Fourth Amendment litigation and the freedom the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect—as illustrated by this case, given that a majority of the justices (one concurring, three dissenting) concludes the search of Burch’s phone data violated the Fourth Amendment.
SCOTUS holds no per se rule allowing home entry in pursuit of a misdemeanant
Lange v. California, USSC No. 20-18, 141 S.Ct. 2011, 6/23/21, vacating People v. Lange
Lange was playing loud music with his car windows down and honking his horn when he happened past a California highway patrol officer. The officer turned on his lights to pull Lange over, but Lange was close to home: he continued 100 feet and pulled into his garage. The officer entered the garage and ultimately arrested Lange for misdemeanor drunk driving. The California Court of Appeal held that “hot pursuit” is always an exigency: that is, it excuses an officer from needing a warrant to enter the home, even when the officer is pursuing someone suspected of a misdemeanor. This is the position our state supreme court has adopted as well. State v. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, ¶¶20-30, 317 Wis. 2d 586, 767 N.W.2d 187. The Supreme Court now rejects this per se rule, holding that the usual “totality of the circumstances” test must govern whether warrantless intrusion of the home is justified.
SCOW strikes down unconscious-driver provision of implied-consent statute
State v. Dawn Prado, 2021 WI 65, 6/18/21, affirming a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Third try wasn’t a charm, and we’ve lost track of what try this is, but SCOW has finally achieved a majority decision on the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 343.305(3)(b), which permits the police to take the blood of an unconscious OWI suspect without a warrant. As the court of appeals held below, it’s unconstitutional.
SCOTUS disclaims “community caretaking” as a “standalone doctrine”; at least as to the home
Caniglia v. Strom, USSC No. 20-157, 2021 WL 1951784 , May 17, 2021; Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
In four quick pages, a unanimous Supreme Court rejects the notion that the police have a “caretaking” duty that “creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home.” This undoes a lot of law, in Wisconsin and elsewhere; at a minimum we can say that State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, 327 Wis. 2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592 and State v. Matalonis, 2016 WI 7, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567, both of which permitted entries to residences on “community caretaker” grounds, are no longer valid. But the brevity of the decision leaves a lot of questions unanswered; and its unanimity (as the concurrences show) obscures real disagreement about just what the Court has decided.
SCOTUS says there’s no such thing as the “community caretaker” exception
We’ll have a full analysis of this one in the coming days, but for anybody currently litigating a community caretaker case, be advised the doctrine doesn’t exist. Writing for a unanimous Court (there are two concurrences totaling four justices, so the 5-justice majority is law) Justice Thomas says that the reference in Cady v. Dombrowski to the “community caretaking” function of police was descriptive only: it’s not a stand-alone warrant exception.
Police entry into backyard didn’t violate Fourth Amendment
State v. Christopher D. Wilson, 2020AP1014-CR, District 1, 5/11/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); PfR granted 11/17/21; case activity (including briefs)
Police lawfully entered Wilson’s backyard under the “knock and talk” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Defense win! COA strikes down statute permitting the refusal of warrantless blood test to enhance OWI penalties
State v. Scott William Forrett, 2021 WI App 31, petition for review granted, 9/14/21, affirmed, 2022 WI 37; case activity (including briefs)
Wisconsin permits a driver’s prior refusal to submit to a warrantless blood test as a criminal penalty enhancer for a subsequent OWI. In an open and shut opinion that is recommended for publication, the court of appeals just declared that statutory scheme unconstitutional based on Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), and State v. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120.