On Point blog, page 9 of 35
Defense win! SCOW holds closing door on officer wasn’t consent to enter
State v. Faith N. Reed, 2018 WI 109, reversing an unpublished court of appeals decision, 2016AP1609; case activity (including briefs)
Here’s something not seen in a while: our state supreme court suppressing evidence because the police violated the Fourth Amendment.
COA: Officers had consent to enter home
State v. Kathryn M. Cooper, 2018AP1154, 11/21/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Cooper’s vehicle was involved in an accident and was found, damaged, in her driveway. An officer saw a light on near the back door of her home and went around back and knocked. Cooper waved him in. The officer told her he was investigating an accident.
Another garage hot pursuit case
State v. Jonalle L. Ferraro, 2018AP498, 11/8/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
As in Palmersheim just last week, here we have another successor to Weber from the 2016 term – an officer follows a driver (or recent driver) into his or her garage to arrest.
Officer “briskly walking” up driveway was in hot pursuit
State v. Steven D. Palmersheim, 2018AP746, 10/31/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is the state’s appeal of the circuit court’s grant of a suppression motion. A motorist called the police saying another car on the road was wildly swerving; the caller stayed with the swerving vehicle until it stopped on a residential street. When a police officer arrived in response to the car, the caller told him the driver, Palmersheim, had gotten out of the car and urinated in the street.
Can a person withdraw consent to test their blood after it’s been drawn? SCOW will decide.
State v. Jessica M. Randall, 2017AP1518, petition for review of unpublished opinion granted 10/9/18; case activity
Issue:
Was Randall entitled to suppression of the results of a test of a blood sample that she voluntarily gave to police under the implied consent law because she informed the lab that she was withdrawing her consent before the lab had analyzed the blood to determine the presence and quantity of drugs and alcohol?
Concern about building owner intending to enter apartment justified warrantless entry by police
State v. Jodi J. Lux, 2018AP338-CR, District 2, 8/29/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer’s warrantless entry into the apartment Lux was in was justified by his concerns about the safety of the apartment building owner, who told the officer she was going to enter the apartment to figure out what was going on.
Bomb scare adjudication upheld, but restitution order reversed in part
State v. J.P., 2017AP1905, District 1, 9/5/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
J.P. was adjudicated delinquent for calling in two bomb scares to his high school. The court of appeals rejects his claims that the police lacked probable cause to arrest him and unlawfully searched his phone and that his confession was involuntary. However, the court agrees with J.P. that part of the restitution order is invalid.
Defendant consented to search and had no expectation of privacy in files put on P2P file sharing network
State v. Ronald Lee Baric, 2018 WI App 63; case activity (including briefs)
Police failed to read Baric his Miranda rights, but the court of appeals still found that he consented to a search of his computer. It also resolved a 4th Amendment issue of first impression for Wisconsin: a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in files he offers for download on a P2P file sharing network.
Blood draw from unconscious motorist again fractures SCOW
State v. Gerald P. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, 7/3/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2015AP304-CR, SCOTUS cert. granted, 1/11/19, vacated and remanded, 6/29/19; case activity (including briefs)
This is the supreme court’s third attempt to decide whether provisions of Wisconsin’s implied consent law comport with the Fourth Amendment. If you’ve been following along, you might have predicted the result: no majority opinion, no binding holding, and, as the lead opinion laments, a state of confusion going forward. Briefly: the lead, 3-justice opinion says “we overrule State v. Padley,” a court of appeals decision addressing a related (though not identical) issue, but it in fact does no such thing: it seems, in fact, to echo much of the discussion in Padley, and anyway, it’s a three-justice minority, and can’t overrule anything. A two-justice concurrence says the legislature can’t legislate away a motorist’s right to refuse consent to a search, but would hold that a blood draw of an unconscious OWI suspect doesn’t require a warrant anyway, despite a pretty clear statement to the contrary from SCOTUS. And a two-justice dissent also says the implied consent law doesn’t equal constitutional consent. So, just as in State v. Hager from this term, you have a result that favors the state, even though a majority of justices disagree with the state’s constitutional argument.
SCOW: Warrantless blood draw was okay; using refusal as aggravating sentencing factor was not
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2018 WI 85, 7/3/18, reversing in part and remanding an unpublished court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
The supreme court holds there were exigent circumstances that allowed police to draw blood from Dalton without a warrant after he refused to consent to a blood draw. But a majority of the court also holds that the sentencing judge erred by explicitly imposing a harsher sentence on Dalton because he refused to consent to the blood draw.