On Point blog, page 2 of 2
Even if officer’s opening of vehicle door was an unreasonable search, evidence obtained would have inevitably been discovered
State v. Mitchell M. Treiber, 2013AP2684-CR, District 3, 3/11/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The inevitable discovery doctrine, which provides that “evidence obtained during a search which is tainted by some illegal act may be admissible if the tainted evidence would have been inevitably discovered by lawful means,” State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 427, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct.
Search Warrant: Execution Reasonableness – Inevitable Discovery; Evidence: Denny (Third-Party Liability); Juror: Removal, During Deliberations – Substitution of Alternate, After Deliberations Commence
State v. Steven A. Avery, 2011 WI App 124 (recommended for publication); for Avery: Martha K. Askins, Suzanne L. Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate; case activity
Search Warrant – Execution – Reasonableness
Warrant-based search of Avery’s property was a reasonable continuation of the original search 3 days earlier.
General statement:
¶18 Generally, searches are subject to the “one warrant, one search” rule.
Kenneth E. Gentry v. Sevier, 7th Circuit App. No. 08-3574, 2/26/10
Terry Stop / Frisk
1. Pulling up in a patrol car and telling Gentry to keep his hands up amounted to a stop for purposes of Terry analysis.
2. The stop, which was based on a report of a “suspicious person,” without reference to any specific facts concerning a crime, was not supported by reasonable suspicion to believe Gentry had either committed a crime or was armed.
State v. Sameeh J. Pickens, 2010 WI App 5, reconsideration denied
court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate
Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.