On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

court of appeals decision; for Conaway: Philip J. Brehm; for Griffin: Michael S. Murphy

Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop, Excessive Window Tint, Generally

¶3    The window tint regulation at issue here is easily summarized. Rear window tinting is permitted only if the window allows at least 35% of light to pass through, except that the limitation does not apply to tinting done during the original manufacture of a vehicle. 

court of appeals decision; for Phillips: Michael J. Backes; case activity

Warrantless Entry – Exigent Circumstances 

¶8        There are four exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless search: “(1) an arrest made in ‘hot pursuit,’ (2) a threat to safety of a suspect or others, (3) a risk that evidence will be destroyed, and (4) a likelihood that the suspect will flee.” State v.

Warrantless entry of residence; protective sweep

Click here for court of appeals decision 

Defense counsel: Robert E. Haney

 Issue/Holding: Warrantless entry of residence is supported when the State demonstrates both probable cause and exigent circumstances, ¶7. Exigent circumstances include: (1) hot pursuit of suspect; (2) threat to someone’s safety; (3) risk of evidence destruction; and (4) likelihood suspect will flee, ¶9.

Analysis:  The court goes on to collapse the 2nd and 3rd categories of exigencies,

Custodian of Records for Legislative Technology Services Bureau v. State, 2004 WI 65, on reconsideration 2004 WI 149

Issue/Holding:

¶34. When we review a John Doe subpoena, a foundational issue may be constitutional in nature. For example, does the issuance of a subpoena in a John Doe proceeding, the sole purpose of such proceeding being to investigate alleged criminal activity, have the potential to affect Fourth Amendment rights?

State v. Kelly R. Ferguson, 2009 WI 50, reversing unpublished opinion

Issue/Holding: Support for warrantless entry of a residence to effectuate an arrest may be found where the offense is jailable, even if a misdemeanor; State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152 overruled:

¶27      Our review of the reasoning of Mikkelson, as compared with that of Welsh and Santana,

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue/Holding: Police had probable cause to believe Popke violated § 346.05, driving on right-side of highway:

¶16      In this case, the officer testified that he was sitting at a stop sign when the defendant turned left onto the road directly ahead of where the officer was sitting.

State v. Mitchell A. Lange, 2009 WI 49, reversing unpublished opinion
For Lange: Steven M. Cohen

Issue/Holding: Probable cause to arrest for OWI was based on the following factors:

¶24      First, the driving that Officer Hoffman and Officer Penly witnessed is relevant. The driving was not merely erratic and unlawful; it was the sort of wildly dangerous driving that suggests the absence of a sober decision maker behind the wheel.

State v. Todd Lee Kramer, 2009 WI 14, affirming 2008 WI App 62
For Kramer: Stephen J. Eisenberg, Marsha M. Lysen

Issue/Holding:

¶37      We conclude that Wagner had an objectively reasonable basis for deciding that a motorist may have been in need of assistance when he stopped behind Kramer’s vehicle. Kramer was parked on the side of a highway after dark with his hazard flashers operating.

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue / Holding:

¶26      In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Similar to the specific and articulable facts observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made the following observations over the course of approximately one block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road;

State v. Terion Lamar Robinson, 2009 WI App 97
For Robinson: Beth A. Eisendrath

Issue/Holding: Given the trial court finding that Robinson either lived or stayed at the apartment, the police were authorized to enter to effectuate his arrest under auspices of an arrest warrant:

¶16      In Blanco, the police, who had an arrest warrant for Blanco, entered an apartment where they believed Blanco was staying.