On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶15      An officer has the right to access objects in plain view while searching within the scope of the consent.  See State v. Johnson, 187 Wis. 2d 237, 242, 522 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1994). In order for the plain view doctrine to apply, three requirements must be met:

First,

State v. Reginald Jones / Maurice E. O’Neal, 2005 WI App 26, (AG’s) PFR filed 2/23/05
For Jones: John P. Tedesco, SPD, Madison Appellate
For O’Neal: Jess Martinez

Issue/Holding: Though the facts are almost indistinguishable from those in State v. Lawrence A. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834, consent to search a car immediately after conclusion of a routine traffic stop was (unlike Williams) the product of an illegal detention.

State v. Earnest Alexander, 2005 WI App 235
For Alexander: Steven D. Phillips, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether description of a shooting suspect as a black male wearing black skull cap, black jacket and dark pants, more than a day after the shooting permitted the stop of Alexander ten blocks east of the crime scene, wearing a black skull cap, black waist-length jacket, and black pants, along with his “perceived hesitation [and] aversion to eye contact.”

Holding: The court considers the six factors listed in State v.

State v. Damian Darnell Washington, 2005 WI App 123
For Washington: Diana M. Felsmann, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶17      … While the officer testified that he was going to cite Washington for loitering, he did not demonstrate a reasonable, articulable basis for doing so. Investigating a vague complaint of loitering and observing Washington in the area near a house that the officer believed to be vacant,

State v. George Toland Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249
For Ziedonis: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: Police, responding to a “loose animal” complaint became sufficiently alarmed by the possibility the dogs’ owner was in need of assistance that their warrantless entry was justified under the community caretaker doctrine:

¶27      Like in Ferguson, the police “utilized alternative methods of confirming whether anyone was in the [residence] before entering.” 244 Wis.

State v. George Toland Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249
For Ziedonis: Ellen Henak, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶14      One such exception is the community caretaker function, which arises when the actions of the police are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct.

State v. David J. Roberson, 2005 WI App 195, affirmed on other grounds, 2006 WI 80
For Roberson: Richard D. Martin, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue/Holding: “(E)vidence acquired outside of the home after an in-home arrest in violation of Payton is not a product of the illegal governmental activity, if officers had probable cause to arrest developed apart from the illegal entry,” ¶23;

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶13      Kelley also argues that the search violated the scope of consent. He contends that an accelerant and phone handset could not have been found under his bed and therefore that place should not have been searched. We disagree. …

¶14      Here, the police were searching for a telephone handset and an accelerant.

State v. Shaun E. Kelley, 2005 WI App 199
For Kelley: Gregory Bates

Issue/Holding:

¶12      Kelley contends that the police should have disclosed that they had reason to believe he had child pornography in his apartment. We are not persuaded that the detectives’ failure to disclose all their suspicions invalidated an otherwise validly obtained consent. This was not a case of deception or false pretext.

State v. Joshua O. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, affirming court of appeals’ unpublished decision
For Kyles: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶22 … The State’s principal position is two-fold: First, the State argues that an officer’s “subjective fear of the suspect” being searched, as the state poses the issue, is not a prerequisite to a valid frisk. Second, the State argues that this court should bar any questioning of an officer about his or her “subjective fear of the suspect”