On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. John William Lane, 2021AP327, 8/19/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer saw Lane departing a bar around 2:10 in the morning. He followed him in his squad car and eventually pulled him over, and eventually arrested him for OWI. The tailing and the stop were recorded on the squad car’s camera. The circuit court concluded the officer’s observations didn’t create reasonable suspicion for the stop, and the court of appeals now affirms.

State v. Caleb James Watson, 2021AP355-CR, District 2, 8/25/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Taking Watson to a local police station to perform field sobriety tests (FSTs) wasn’t unreasonable and thus didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Derek V. Schroth, 2021AP733, District 2, 8/25/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Schroth challenges the probable cause to arrest him for OWI and the finding that he refused a blood draw. There were ample facts for probable cause. (¶¶3-8, 13-15). And though the arresting officer couldn’t recall whether Schroth said “no” or “something else” when asked to submit to a blood draw,

State v. Jeremy J. Deen, 2020AP1399, 8/24/21, District 3 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police received a tip that an IP address associated with Deen’s home had uploaded child pornography. They went to the home and Deen let them in. While inside, officers noted Deen was carrying a knife, so they frisked him, which turned up a cell phone. In response to officers’ questions about child porn, Deen made some equivocal statements about whether there might be any on the phone, and the officers took it. The court of appeals holds that the possibility that Deen would hide or destroy the phone or delete the images it might contain supplied sufficient exigent circumstances that the police could seize it without a warrant.

Portage County v. Sean Michael Dugan, 2021AP454 & 2021AP455, District 4, 8/5/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Dugan was stopped in a snowstorm. The officer had him do field sobriety tests at the scene of the stop, in a rut in the snow crated by the squad’s tires. (¶¶3-4). Having Dugan do the FSTs in the snow didn’t make his detention unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Isaac D. Taylor, 2019AP797-CR, District 2, 7/30/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The majority sees specific and articulable facts providing reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. The dissent sees a change in the state’s justification for the stop that sandbags the defense and turns the court of appeals into a fact finder.

State v. Keith J. Dresser, 2020AP2017, 7/22/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A sheriff’s deputy saw Dresser apparently unconscious in his vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot at 5:00 a.m. The deputy pulled behind Dresser’s vehicle, turned on his emergency lights apparently based on departmental “procedures,” and knocked on the window. Dresser woke up, he and/or the deputy opened a car door, and ultimately Dresser was arrested for OWI.

State v. Anthony Francen Harris, 2019AP1908-CR, District 3, 7/30/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police stopped the car Harris was driving in part because Skenandore, an officer-in-training, misread the data on his in-squad computer screen and wrongly concluded that the car’s owner didn’t have a valid license. (¶¶2-3, 5-7). His mistake doesn’t matter because the officer’s other observations justified the stop.

State v. George Steven Burch, 2021 WI 68, on certification from the court of appeals, affirming the judgment of conviction; case activity (including briefs)

We said in our post on the court of appeals’ certification that this case presented novel and important issues about searches of cell phones and their data. So we anticipated a decision addressing the parameters of police searches of digital devices. But the majority doesn’t address those issues or decide whether Burch’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Instead, the majority holds that, regardless of the lawfulness of the search of Burch’s cell phone data, “there was no police misconduct to trigger application of the exclusionary rule.” (¶26). The majority’s approach bodes ill for the future of Fourth Amendment litigation and the freedom the Fourth Amendment is intended to protect—as illustrated by this case, given that a majority of the justices (one concurring, three dissenting) concludes the search of Burch’s phone data violated the Fourth Amendment.

State v. Charles L. Neevel, 2021AP36, 7/1/21, District 4 (one-judge decision ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)

Neevel was arrested on suspicion of drunk driving. The officer read him the implied consent “informing the accused” form, and Neevel agreed to a blood draw. He moved to suppress, lost, and pleaded no contest to OWI. On appeal, he renews the argument he made in trial court: that the officer should instead have ordered a less intrusive test, such as a breath test. (The officer did, in reading the form, tell Neevel he could have an alternative in addition to the blood draw; Neevel’s contention is that he should have been offered a different test instead of the blood draw.)