On Point blog, page 19 of 143
Court applied incorrect burden of proof in denying return of property motion
Village of Greendale v. Matthew R. Derzay, 2019AP2294, District 1, 3/30/31 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The burden of proof for a petitioner under § 968.20 is preponderance of the evidence, but the circuit court applied the clear and convincing standard and demanded Derzay provide certain kinds of proof to meet that burden. This was error.
SCOTUS says shooting can be Fourth Amendment seizure
Torres v. Madrid, USSC No. 19-292, 2021 WL 1132514, 3/25/21, reversing 769 Fed. Appx. 654 (10th Cir. 2019); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Fans of dueling citations to ancient cases will want to savor the entirety of the majority and the somewhat heated dissent in this case; the serjeants-at-mace shew their mace at one point. Everybody else just needs to know this: a police officer who applies physical force to the body of a person seizes that person if the objective circumstances show an intent to restrain. This seizure occurs during the application of that force even if the intended restraint doesn’t succeed; that is, if the person gets away. And that force can be communicated by means of a projectile, like a bullet.
Defense win: Search of car during traffic stop was unreasonable
State v. Kendell Marcel White, 2020AP588-CR, District 1, 2/2/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
In the course of a traffic stop based on a bad parking job, excessively tinted windows, and no visible plates, police searched the car and found a concealed weapon. The court of appeals holds the search was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Defense win: Police seized driver by restricting movement of his parked car, employing take down lights
State v. Shondrell R. Evans, 2020AP286-CR, District 4, 1/28/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Evans was seized under the Fourth Amendment when two police officers parked their marked squad cars in a way that restricted—though didn’t totally obstruct—his ability to drive away, shined their headlights and spotlights on his car, and exited their squad cars and approached Evans’s car. Because the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Evans, the resulting search of his car was unlawful.
Defense win: officer’s testimony about window tint not enough for reasonable suspicion
State v. Jalen F. Gillie, 2020AP372, 1/20/21, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Gillie’s car on a “dark night” because of “suspected illegal window tint.” An eventual search of the car turned up a gun and Gillie was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon without a permit. On appeal he renews his argument that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The court of appeals agrees with him on this, and so reverses his conviction (and declines to address his other Fourth Amendment claims connected to the encounter).
Defense win! COA schools State in math and 4th Amendment
State v. Frederick Jennings, 2019AP1539-CR, 12/22/20, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Three officers noticed Jennings either in or near the passenger side of a Toyota having dark tinted windows. They detained him, found marijuana and contraband in the car, arrested him, and found heroin in his pocket. Jennings moved to suppress arguing that officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the detention. Two officers testified at the suppression hearing. They contradicted each other and the body cam video, none of which supplied reasonable suspicion for the stop. While the circuit court denied suppression, the court of appeals reversed.
Weaving at bar time justified traffic stop
City of Oshkosh v. Brian D. Hamill, 2020AP867, District 2, 12/2/20 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The facts are just that simple. At 2:38 a.m. (bar closing time) an officer observed Hamill’s Jeep drifting to the right line of its lane, then to the center for 30-40 feet, then to the left centerline, and then to the right line of its lane. It was undisputed that Hamlin’s Jeep never crossed over either lane marker. And yet the circuit held that these facts gave the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigator traffic stop.
Reasonable suspicion for traffic stop amply demonstrated
City of New Berlin v. Eric John Dreher, 2020AP850, District 2, 11/25/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer testified he observed Dreher cut across lanes while turning, deviate from his lane, and travel at a high rate of speed. This led the officer to believe the driver was impaired, as “it was some of the worst driving that [he] observed in over 250 drink driv[ing] arrests.”
Defense win: Police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to detain driver to do field sobriety tests
State v. Michael Anthony Dotson, 2019AP1082-CR, District 3, 11/24/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Though this is a “close case” (¶28), the objectively reasonable inferences from the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer who stopped Dotson’s car did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe that Dotson’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limits or that his ability to operate his vehicle was impaired. Thus, the officer’s detention of Dotson to conduct field sobriety tests was unlawful.
SCOTUS will decide whether community caretaker exception can get police into the home
Caniglia v. Strom, USSC No. 20-157, cert granted 11/20/20
Whether the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extends to the home.