On Point: 35. Search & Seizure

State v. Larry Alexander Norton, 2019AP1796-CR, 4/14/20, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In which the occupant of a legally parked car becomes the object of police scrutiny, for very little apparent reason, and all is found to be copacetic under the Fourth Amendment.

Kansas v. Glover, USSC No. 18-556, 2020 WL 1668283, 4/6/20, reversing State v. Glover, 422 P.3d 64 (Kan. 2018); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

In a self-described “narrow” decision, the Supreme Court holds that, in the absence of information negating the inference that the owner was driving, a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a car based on the fact the registered owner of the car had a revoked driver’s license.

United States v. Terrill A. Rickmon, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals No. 19-2054, 3/11/20

Police stopped a vehicle because it was emerging from the source of a ShotSpotter alert. The 7th Circuit holds that the totality of the circumstances gave the officer responding to the scene reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop.

State v. Kelly C. Richardson, 2019AP1650-CR, District 2, 3/11/20, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police received a tip that Richardson appeared to be drunk while at a bank at 11:30 a.m. She left and drove to a Wal-Mart to shop. As she returned to her car, a sergeant approached and questioned her. He observed that she smelled of alcohol, slurred her speech, and had glassy eyes. He arrested her and she was charged with OWI 3rd and pleaded no contest.

State v. Rosalee M. Tremaine, 2016AP1963-CR, 2/27/20, District 4, (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Tremaine for a traffic violation and called another car to bring some warning forms. While the officer was filling them out, another officer arrived with a dog. The first officer handed Tremaine the forms, but did not allow her to leave. Then the third officer conducted a sniff, which led to a search of Tremaine’s purse revealing marijuana and a pipe. Defense counsel filed a suppression motion, but made the wrong argument. The court of appeals now finds him ineffective.

State v. Lois M. Bertrand, 2019AP1240-CR, 2/26/20, District 2, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs).

The 4th Amendment prohibits a warantless entry into the curtilage of a home unless it is supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, ¶19, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 N.W.2d 554. In this case, the officer lacked a warrant, probable cause and exigent circumstances when he seized Bertrand in the garage attached to her house. Thus, the circuit court should have granted the motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of her seizure.

State v. Bartosz Mika, 2019AP1488, District 2, 2/19/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion in continuing Mika’s refusal hearing so the state could call another witness, and the testimony of the additional witness established police had reasonable suspicion to stop Mika.

State v. Jacqueline A. Ziriax Anderson, 2018AP2410-CR, District 3, 2/11/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The state offered Anderson a deal: plead to OWI 2nd and it would recommend the minimum mandatory penalties. The state made that offer because the arresting officer had resigned from the department due to some “mental health issues” and the prosecutor apparently wasn’t eager to call him as a witness. Anderson’s lawyer found this out immediately before Anderson entered her plea—but didn’t tell Anderson. She learned about it afterward. (¶¶3-4, 8-11). While trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to tell Anderson that information before she pled, that doesn’t entitle her to plea withdrawal because she fails to show she would have insisted on going to trial if trial counsel would have told her, as required by State v. Bentley, 201 Wis. 2d 303, 312, 548 N.W.2d 50 (1996).

State v. Justin T. Kane, 2018AP1885-CR, District 4, 2/6/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Kane’s consent to a blood draw after his arrest for OWI was voluntary under all the circumstances.

State v. Anthony J. Madland, 2019AP146-CR, District 3, 1/28/20 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Madland asserted that he requested an alternative chemical test under § 343.305 and that the officer who read the “informing the accused” form to him misled him as to his right to request an alternative test. The court of appeals rejects the claims in light of the circuit court’s fact findings.