On Point blog, page 29 of 142
Court of appeals again asks SCOW to decide whether “implied consent” is really consent
State v. Philip J. Hawley, 2015AP1113, District 4, 11/21/18; case activity (including briefs)
Our supreme court has, three times, set out to decide whether the implied-consent statute supplies “consent” in a Fourth Amendment sense, such that it constitutes an exception to the warrant requirement. Three times, it has failed to reach a binding majority on the question–or has it? The court of appeals, in this certification, suggests perhaps the supreme court has the answer already, depending how you count the votes.
Court of appeals asks SCOW to review another case involving extension of a traffic stop
State v. Courtney C. Brown, 2017AP774-CR, District 2, 11/21/18; case activity (including briefs)
Issue:
[A]fter a ticket has been written but before delivery [of the ticket to the motorist], and in the absence of reasonable suspicion, does asking a lawfully stopped motorist to exit the car, whether he or she possesses anything of concern, and to consent to a search unlawfully extend a traffic stop?
COA: Officers had consent to enter home
State v. Kathryn M. Cooper, 2018AP1154, 11/21/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Cooper’s vehicle was involved in an accident and was found, damaged, in her driveway. An officer saw a light on near the back door of her home and went around back and knocked. Cooper waved him in. The officer told her he was investigating an accident.
SCOW: GPS tracking is a “search,” but a GPS tracking warrant is not a “search warrant”
State v. Johnny K. Pinder, 2018 WI 106, 11/16/18, on certification from the court of appeals; 2017AP208; case activity (including briefs)
The police thought Pinder was probably the culprit in a string of burglaries, so they applied for, and got, a warrant to attach a GPS device to his car. They did not actually do the attaching, though, until 10 days after they got the warrant. This seems to run afoul of Wis. Stat. § 968.15, which together with surrounding provisions defines, authorizes and regulates the issuance of search warrants. Specifically, it says a warrant not executed within five days of issuance is “void.”
Another garage hot pursuit case
State v. Jonalle L. Ferraro, 2018AP498, 11/8/18, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity
As in Palmersheim just last week, here we have another successor to Weber from the 2016 term – an officer follows a driver (or recent driver) into his or her garage to arrest.
Being slumped over in driver’s seat in running car with odor of intoxicants on breath, red and glassy eyes, slurred speech, unexplained injuries, slow movements created probable cause to arrest
State v. Michael E. Hale, 2018AP812, 11/8/18, District 1 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication) case activity (including briefs)
Hale appeals the circuit court’s order that he unreasonably refused a chemical test; the only issue on appeal is whether the officer had probable cause.
Quasi-anonymous tip about drunk driving justified stop, despite lack of bad driving
State v. Emily J. Mays, 2018AP571-CR, District 2, 11/7/2018 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court found the stop of Mays’s car was unlawful because the officer’s testimony and the squad car video showed that, during the time the officer was following Mays, her driving didn’t provide sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe Mays was intoxicated. The court of appeals reverses, holding that the 911 call that led the officer to follow Mays provided reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Officer “briskly walking” up driveway was in hot pursuit
State v. Steven D. Palmersheim, 2018AP746, 10/31/18, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
This is the state’s appeal of the circuit court’s grant of a suppression motion. A motorist called the police saying another car on the road was wildly swerving; the caller stayed with the swerving vehicle until it stopped on a residential street. When a police officer arrived in response to the car, the caller told him the driver, Palmersheim, had gotten out of the car and urinated in the street.
Driver’s failure to yield on entering roundabout justified traffic stop
State v. Nicholas C. Wegner, 2017AP2236-CR, District 2, 10/23/18 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer testified he was proceeding through a traffic roundabout when Wegner, ignoring the yield signs posted for vehicles entering the roundabout, entered directly in front of the officer and caused the officer to have to brake to avoid hitting Wegner. (¶4). This conduct justified the officer’s stop of Wegner.
Radar was working, so speed reading provided reasonable suspicion for stop
City of Watertown v. Jeffrey Donald Perschke, 2018AP555, District 4, 10/18/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer stopped Perschke after the radar device the officer was using clocked Perschke going 38 in a 25-mile-per-hour zone. Perschke claims the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him because the radar wasn’t working properly, but the circuit court’s finding to the contrary dooms Perschke’s argument.