On Point: 7. Nervousness

State v. Linsey Nichole Howard, 2022AP1608-CR, District 2, 03/08/2023, (one-judge decision, ineligible for publication) case activity

Prior to pleading guilty to operating a vehicle with a restricted, controlled substance as a second offense, Howard filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the arresting officer lacked probable cause. The court of appeals affirms the denial of Howard’s motion based on the following circumstances: (1) she was driving at 12:53 a.m. without headlights on, (2) she was confused about where she was coming from and where she was going, (3) she appeared nervous, (4) she avoided eye contact, and (5) she failed the HGN field sobriety test (4) . (Opinion, ¶11).

State v. Joshua J. Hams, 2015AP2656-CR, 6/30/16, District 4; (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Don’t look down! If you do–and stutter nervously in response to questioning–the police have reasonable suspicion to extend a stop of your car for a traffic violation. So says the court of appeals in a decision that veers across the constitutional line and runs into federal case law heading the opposite direction.

State v. Patrick Hogan, 2015 WI 76, 7/10/2015, affirming a court of appeals per curiam decision, 2013AP430-CR, majority opinion by Prosser; concurrence by Ziegler, dissent by Bradley (joined by Abrahamson); case activity (including briefs)

Sixteen seconds. It takes longer than that just to find your keys, get into your car, buckle up and start your engine. Keep that in mind as you read on. SCOW found that a traffic stop (due to a seatbelt violation) was unconstitutionally extended to perform field sobriety tests, but then upheld the subsequent vehicle search based on consent given 16 seconds after law enforcement told Hogan he was “free to leave.” SCOW saw no need to perform an attenuation analysis.

State v. Joshua O. Kyles, 2004 WI 15, affirming court of appeals’ unpublished decision
For Kyles: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The following factors did not add up to reasonable suspicion supporting the frisk of a passenger during a routine traffic stop (¶17):

(1) The officer testified that he “didn’t feel any particular threat before searching” the defendant.
(2) The defendant,

State v. Philip R. Bons, 2007 WI App 124, PFR filed 4/24/07
For Bons: Vladimir M. Gorokhovsky

Issue: Whether a concededly proper traffic stop (for speeding) was extended without sufficient cause when the officer, after issuing the ticket and returning the license, asked to search the car.

Holding:

¶15  We conclude that Ramstack could have formed a reasonable suspicion that Bons was engaged in illegal activity,

State v. Christopher Gammons, 2001 WI App 36
For Gammons: Keith A. Findley, LAIP

Issue/Holding: Police did not have reasonable suspicion to continued detention for a routine traffic problem after the purpose of the stop was fulfilled:

¶21 In evaluating reasonable suspicion, we must examine whether all the facts, when taken together, could constitute a reasonable suspicion. State v. Allen,

State v. Jose C. McGill, 2000 WI 38, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795, affirming unpublished decision
For McGill: Steven P. Weiss, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe McGill armed and dangerous, and therefore to frisk him, following a routine traffic stop.

Holding: Judged by the requisite objective test, the frisk was justified, given that: the driver didn’t stop immediately;

State v. Christopher E. Betow, 226 Wis.2d 90, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999)
For Betow: James C. Murray

Issue/Holding: The police didn’t have reasonable suspicion to extend a routine stop for speeding based on the following: the driver’s wallet was adorned with a picture of a mushroom, coupled with the officer’s experience that the depiction of mushrooms may signify hallucinogenic use; lateness of the hour; driver’s implausible explanation of itinerary;