On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

State v. Brian L. Zieglmeier, 2016AP1815-CR, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity (including briefs)

What are the odds that a driver who had been drinking beer would get pulled over by an Officer Pilsner? That’s what happened to Zieglmeier, who had been going 42 in a 25 mph zone. While he didn’t seem disoriented when he spoke to Pilsner, he also didn’t pass the “smell test.”

County of Dodge v. Alexis N. Unser, 2016AP2172, 4/6/17, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Unser wasn’t unlawfully moved outside the “vicinity” of the traffic stop when the officer transported her six miles to conduct field sobriety tests.

State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.

County of Marathon v. Armin James Balzar, 2016AP1471, 3/14/17, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Balzar argues on appeal that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by reasonable suspicion because it was based on the “act of simply turning into a closed business parking lot, without more.” (¶8). The court disagrees.

State v. Randolph Arthur Mantie, 2015AP2443-CR, 3/7/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

As the court notes, the relevant events in this case took place at a “hard-to-describe intersection” so here’s a visual aid.

City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.

State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.

Oneida County v. Joseph A. Ravens, 2015AP2612, 2/22/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Raven was driving a pickup and towing a trailer when he entered an intersection as the light was changing. Unfortunately for him, Officer Young was watching and claimed the light turned red before Raven entered the intersection. He stopped Raven, smelled intoxicants, and observed slurred speech. After being charged with OWI, Raven moved for suppression and testified that the traffic light was yellow and turned red only after he was actually in the intersection. You can guess whom the trial court believed.

State v. Dane C. McKeel, 2016AP884-CR, District 4, 2/16/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

“Due to the extremely cold, windy, icy, and snowy conditions” police moved McKeel approximately 8 miles from where he was stopped to a local police department so that McKeel had the “best opportunity” to complete field sobriety tests. (¶¶4-5). Moving McKeel this far did not transform the stop into an arrest.

Village of Ashwaubenon v. Mark J. Bowe, 2016AP594, 2/14/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bowe argues that standard field sobriety tests constitute a 4th Amendment search. Thus, law enforcement needs probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, before asking a suspect to perform them. The court of appeals notes that it has twice rejected this argument based on County of Jefferson v. Renz.  It meets the same fate in this appeal.