On Point: G. Reasonable suspicion

supreme court decision; court of appeals decision; for Carroll: Michael K. Gould, SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Frisk – Demand that Suspect Drop Object
Frisk analysis applies to police demand that suspect drop object in hand, ¶22.

¶23      Here, Carroll led officers on a high-speed chase in a car that the officers had been observing in connection with an armed robbery investigation, and exited his car quickly while holding an unknown object. 

court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication)

Vehicle Stop – Rear Plate State Name Obscured
Stop OK where rear plate bracket obscured name of state.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not eligible for publication)

Traffic Stop
Reasonable suspicion to stop vehicle for violating § 346.31(2), right hand turns to be made close as practicable to right-hand edge curb or highway.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication)

Vehicle Stop – Rear Plate State Name Obscured
Stop proper where rear plate bracket obscured name of state, even though “America’s Dairyland” visible at bottom of plate;  pretextual nature of stop irrelevant.

court of appeals decision (1-judge; not for publication)

Vehicle Stop – Reasonable Suspicion – Anonymous Tip Insufficient
Anonymous tip “from an unknown informant calling from an unknown location” that driver in restaurant parking lot pouring out beer insufficiently reliable to support subsequent stop, where no traffic violations or erratic driving observed.

State v. Leneral Louis Williams, 2010 WI App 39; for Williams: Richard L. Zaffiro; Resp Br.; Reply Br.

Seizure – Some Restraint Necessary

¶16      The Fourth Amendment is not implicated until there has been a seizure. The Court in Terry described a seizure as “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his [or her] freedom to walk away.” Id.

court of appeals decision; for Pickens: Eileen A. Hirsch, SPD, Madison Appellate

Reasonable Suspicion for Detention and “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine
Although, “under the collective knowledge doctrine, an investigating officer with knowledge of facts amounting to reasonable suspicion may direct a second officer without such knowledge to stop and detain a suspect,” the state must prove those underlying facts. “Proof is not supplied by the mere testimony of one officer that he relied on the unspecified knowledge of another officer,” ¶¶12-13.

court of appeals decision; for Conaway: Philip J. Brehm; for Griffin: Michael S. Murphy

Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop, Excessive Window Tint, Generally

¶3    The window tint regulation at issue here is easily summarized. Rear window tinting is permitted only if the window allows at least 35% of light to pass through, except that the limitation does not apply to tinting done during the original manufacture of a vehicle. 

State v. Michael L. Popke, 2009 WI 37, reversing unpublished opinion
For Popke: John Miller Carroll, Aaron W. Schenk

Issue / Holding:

¶26      In the case at hand, the officer had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. Similar to the specific and articulable facts observed by the officer in Post, the officer in this case made the following observations over the course of approximately one block at 1:30 a.m.: The defendant was driving with three-quarters of the vehicle left of the center of the road;

State v. Melvin Bridges, 2009 WI 66, PFR filed 5/18/09
For Bridges: Michael S. Holzman

Issue/Holding: Frisk of Bridges during routine traffic stop (defective brake lights) upheld, where the early-evening stop was in an area “where the police had received numerous complaints of gunshots fired at night,” and Bridges when pulled over had made “a questionable movement”; State v. Gary A. Johnson,