On Point: 2. Traffic stops

Mike Tobin guest posts on State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2017 WI 78, 7/7/17, affirming a published court of appeals opinion, 371 Wis. 2d 404; case activity (including briefs)

The majority opinion affirms the rulings of the lower courts that the defendant voluntarily consented to a frisk of his person following a traffic stop. The majority reached its decision without discussing the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion of criminal activity-an issue emphasized in the dissenting opinion and previously analyzed by the court of appeals.

Marquette County v. Matthew J. Owens, 2016AP2176, District 4, 6/15/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Owens argues that a police officer’s driving was so careless or unlawful that it required Owens to react in a way that created reasonable suspicion to stop him. Not so, says the court of appeals.

City of Pewaukee v. John Jay Kennedy, 2016AP2383, 5/17/17, District II (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer stopped Kennedy’s vehicle after running the plates and seeing that its registered owner, Kennedy, had a warrant out for his arrest.  Kennedy was driving, and was eventually arrested for OWI.

State v. Brian L. Zieglmeier, 2016AP1815-CR, 4/25/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligble for publication); case activity (including briefs)

What are the odds that a driver who had been drinking beer would get pulled over by an Officer Pilsner? That’s what happened to Zieglmeier, who had been going 42 in a 25 mph zone. While he didn’t seem disoriented when he spoke to Pilsner, he also didn’t pass the “smell test.”

State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.

City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.

State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.

State v. Dane C. McKeel, 2016AP884-CR, District 4, 2/16/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

“Due to the extremely cold, windy, icy, and snowy conditions” police moved McKeel approximately 8 miles from where he was stopped to a local police department so that McKeel had the “best opportunity” to complete field sobriety tests. (¶¶4-5). Moving McKeel this far did not transform the stop into an arrest.

Village of Ashwaubenon v. Mark J. Bowe, 2016AP594, 2/14/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Bowe argues that standard field sobriety tests constitute a 4th Amendment search. Thus, law enforcement needs probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, before asking a suspect to perform them. The court of appeals notes that it has twice rejected this argument based on County of Jefferson v. Renz.  It meets the same fate in this appeal.

State v. Nicholas W. Stern, 2016AP1534, District 3, 2/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court implicitly credited the testimony of a police officer that Stern was in the wrong lane of travel as he drove toward the officer, and therefore held the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Stern for violating § 346.05(1). The circuit court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, despite Stern’s claim the officer’s testimony is contradicted by the squad car video, which he says shows Stern maintaining his lane as he approached and passed the officer.