On Point blog, page 12 of 36
Inferences drawn from squad car video support reasonable suspicion of traffic violation
State v. Terrence L. Perkins, 2016AP1427-CR,4/4/17, District 3, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
At Perkins’ suppression hearing, Officer Stetzer testified that he saw Perkins drive through a stop sign and part way through a cross walk into the middle of an intersection where he then backed up to allow a car to pass before proceeding. The squad car video did not capture Perkins’ stop sign violation; it only recorded him backing up. Perkins argued that the position of the squad car would have prevented the officer from seeing whether he complied with the stop sign before proceeding into the intersection. He thus argued that Stetzer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him.
Cop had reasonable suspicion to perform FSTs based on time of stop and smell of alcohol
City of Waukesha v. Derek R. Pike, 2016AP1720, 3/1/17, District 2 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
A police officer stopped Pike at 1:00 a.m. because his car lacked a front license plate. The officer smelled alcohol, and Pike admitted that he was coming from a nightclub where he had consumed 1 or 2 beers. The officer conducted FSTs, and the results caused him to request blood chemical tests, which Pike refused.
Lack of recent calibration of radar unit didn’t render stop for speeding unreasonable
State v. Thomas M. Gibson, 2016AP1933-CR, 2/22/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
An officer trained in visually estimating speed observed a car driven by Gibson going what he estimated to be 25 m.p.h. in a 15 m.p.h. speed zone. He trained a radar unit on the car, and that said the car was going 26 m.p.h. The officer stopped the car, and Gibson was ultimately arrested for OWI. It turns out the radar unit hadn’t been calibrated since the early years of the internet—1994. (¶¶3-5). No matter, says the court of appeals. The officer still had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Moving driver 8 miles to conduct field sobriety tests didn’t transform stop into arrest
State v. Dane C. McKeel, 2016AP884-CR, District 4, 2/16/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
“Due to the extremely cold, windy, icy, and snowy conditions” police moved McKeel approximately 8 miles from where he was stopped to a local police department so that McKeel had the “best opportunity” to complete field sobriety tests. (¶¶4-5). Moving McKeel this far did not transform the stop into an arrest.
Third time no charm for argument that cops need probable cause to perform FSTs
Village of Ashwaubenon v. Mark J. Bowe, 2016AP594, 2/14/17, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Bowe argues that standard field sobriety tests constitute a 4th Amendment search. Thus, law enforcement needs probable cause, not reasonable suspicion, before asking a suspect to perform them. The court of appeals notes that it has twice rejected this argument based on County of Jefferson v. Renz. It meets the same fate in this appeal.
Circuit court’s findings about driving not clearly erroneous
State v. Nicholas W. Stern, 2016AP1534, District 3, 2/7/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The circuit court implicitly credited the testimony of a police officer that Stern was in the wrong lane of travel as he drove toward the officer, and therefore held the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Stern for violating § 346.05(1). The circuit court’s finding is not clearly erroneous, despite Stern’s claim the officer’s testimony is contradicted by the squad car video, which he says shows Stern maintaining his lane as he approached and passed the officer.
State v. Frederick S. Smith, 2015AP756-CR, petition granted 1/9/2017
Review of a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from the petition for review):
1. When a police officer performs a lawful traffic stop, is it reasonable for the officer to make contact with the driver to ask for the driver’s name and identification and to explain the basis for the stop, even if the reasonable suspicion supporting the stop has dispelled by the time the officer does so?
2. When an officer is unable to request a driver’s name and identification and explain the basis for a traffic stop because, as in this case, the driver indicates that the driver’s side window and door are both broken, is the officer then permitted to open the passenger’s side door to achieve that goal?
Extension of initial seizure justified by totality of circumstances
State v. Joshua D. Winberg, 2016AP108-CR, District 3, 1/10/17 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
The police had reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop to investigate whether the driver was operating under the influence.
State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2015AP1294-CR, petition for review granted 1/9/2017
Review of a published court of appeals decision, 2016 WI App 64; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (from petition for review):
Whether an officer’s justification to search is objectively reasonable where the suspect is not observed doing or saying anything suspicious, but cooperating in circumstances that the officer believes are suspicious?
Whether counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present additional evidence to show Floyd did not provide valid consent to the search?
Defense win: possible driver lacking Wisconsin license not reasonable suspicion
State v. Brittanie Jo Palaia, 2016AP467-CR, 12/30/17, District 3 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case history (including briefs)
Here we have the latest twist on State v. Newer, 2007 WI App 236, 306 Wis. 2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923, which held that an officer who knows only that a moving vehicle is registered to a person with a revoked license has reasonable suspicion for a stop.