On Point: 2. Traffic stops

State v. Paul R. Vanderlinden, 2015AP901-CR, District 3, 8/30/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Vanderlinden was convicted of OWI 2nd and driving with a PAC 2nd. An officer had stopped Vanderlinden’s car because two witnesses had reported him drinking beer and leaving the theater with a beer in his pocket. According to the court of appeals, this did not amount to reasonable suspicion of OWI.

State v. Jeffrey Jacob Udelhofen, 2016AP385-CR, 8/4/16, District 4 91-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The defendant was convicted of driving with a PAC (3rd offense). He appealed the denial of his suppression motion and argued that the State: (a) waited too long–until closing arguments at the suppression hearing–to specify which traffic law he allegedly violated; and (b) lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his car. The court of appeals held:

State v. Thomas M. Ort, 2015AP1571-72-CR, 8/2/16; District 3 (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Ort did not challenge the circuit court’s findings that Officer Vosters observed a silver truck speeding and that speeding would be a reasonable basis to stop the truck. Ort’s objection was that after observing the speeding, Vosters lost sight of the truck briefly and then later simply stopped “the first silver truck he saw.”  The court of appeals disagreed:

You don’t need to click here to learn that the standards police apply when deciding to stop and search black and Hispanic drivers is considerably lower than the standards they apply to white and Asian driver. But you should click there if you want to read more about a new statistical method that several Stanford professors designed to prove that this form racial discrimination is real.

State v. Michael L. Joy, 2015AP960-CR, District 3, 7/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer’s multiple good-faith factual mistakes didn’t invalidate his stop of a truck to investigate a possible registration violation.

State v. Cynthia J. Popp, 2016AP431-CR, District 4, 7/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

There was reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Popp for field sobriety testing even though the officer didn’t smell alcohol on her and told dispatch and a back-up officer he wasn’t sure what caused the poor driving he’d observed.

State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2016 WI App 64, petition for review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed, 2017 WI 78; case activity (including briefs)

Police found drugs on Floyd after they searched him during a traffic stop. Floyd claims the traffic stop was extended beyond what was necessary to issue the citations he was given and that he didn’t consent to the search. The court of appeals turns back both challenges.

State v. Joshua J. Hams, 2015AP2656-CR, 6/30/16, District 4; (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Don’t look down! If you do–and stutter nervously in response to questioning–the police have reasonable suspicion to extend a stop of your car for a traffic violation. So says the court of appeals in a decision that veers across the constitutional line and runs into federal case law heading the opposite direction.

State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.

State v. Zachary W. Swan, 2015AP1718-CR, 5/5/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs

Swan was convicted of OWI 2nd with a prohibited alcohol content. On appeal he argued that the circuit court should have suppressed the results of a preliminary breath test and other evidence due to the absence of probable cause. The court of appeals initially rejected Swan’s argument on the ground of issue preclusion, but on reconsideration agreed with Swan that issue preclusion “could not apply as a matter of law.” (¶2, ¶13). It now rejects Swan’s argument on the merits and affirms.