On Point: 2. Traffic stops

You don’t need to click here to learn that the standards police apply when deciding to stop and search black and Hispanic drivers is considerably lower than the standards they apply to white and Asian driver. But you should click there if you want to read more about a new statistical method that several Stanford professors designed to prove that this form racial discrimination is real.

State v. Michael L. Joy, 2015AP960-CR, District 3, 7/26/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

An officer’s multiple good-faith factual mistakes didn’t invalidate his stop of a truck to investigate a possible registration violation.

State v. Cynthia J. Popp, 2016AP431-CR, District 4, 7/7/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

There was reasonable suspicion to continue detaining Popp for field sobriety testing even though the officer didn’t smell alcohol on her and told dispatch and a back-up officer he wasn’t sure what caused the poor driving he’d observed.

State v. Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 2016 WI App 64, petition for review granted 1/9/2017, affirmed, 2017 WI 78; case activity (including briefs)

Police found drugs on Floyd after they searched him during a traffic stop. Floyd claims the traffic stop was extended beyond what was necessary to issue the citations he was given and that he didn’t consent to the search. The court of appeals turns back both challenges.

State v. Joshua J. Hams, 2015AP2656-CR, 6/30/16, District 4; (1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Don’t look down! If you do–and stutter nervously in response to questioning–the police have reasonable suspicion to extend a stop of your car for a traffic violation. So says the court of appeals in a decision that veers across the constitutional line and runs into federal case law heading the opposite direction.

State v. Justin Carl Herman Hembel, 2015AP1220-CR, 5/10/16, District 3 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Police lacked probable cause to believe Hembel violated § 346.54, governing “How to park and stop on streets,” so the stop of Hembel was unlawful.

State v. Zachary W. Swan, 2015AP1718-CR, 5/5/16, District 4 (one-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity, including briefs

Swan was convicted of OWI 2nd with a prohibited alcohol content. On appeal he argued that the circuit court should have suppressed the results of a preliminary breath test and other evidence due to the absence of probable cause. The court of appeals initially rejected Swan’s argument on the ground of issue preclusion, but on reconsideration agreed with Swan that issue preclusion “could not apply as a matter of law.” (¶2, ¶13). It now rejects Swan’s argument on the merits and affirms.

State v. Tyler Q. Hayes,  2015AP314-CR, and State v. Tanner J. Crisp, 2015AP315-CR, 4/6/2016, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

A sheriff’s deputy, noticing a car parked outside the lines in a parking lot, pulled behind the car, walked up to the driver’s door, and perhaps (the testimony is not clear) asked that the window be rolled down. However the window came to be open, the deputy smelled marijuana and you know the rest. So were the vehicle’s occupants seized when the deputy asked them to roll down the window and they complied?

State v. James A. Webb, 2015AP1613-CR, 3/22/16, District 1 (-1-judge opinion; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals here reverses a suppression order and holds that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Webb’s SUV because its high-mount stop light was not working while the driver was braking. During the stop, officers discovered that Webb was carrying a concealed weapon without a permit.

Columbia County v. Stephen M. Kokesh, 2015AP1650, District 4, 3/10/16 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The totality of the circumstances—the driving observed by the officer and the time of the driving—provided reasonable suspicion stop Kobkesh’s car, despite Kokesh’s creative attempt to show otherwise.