On Point: B. Search warrants

State v. Jeffrey L. Loranger, 2002 WI App 5, PFR filed 1/22/02
For Loranger: Richard B. Jacobson, James C. Murray

Issue: Whether the search warrant was based on intentionally or recklessly false averments, Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

Holding:

¶23. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the issuing court commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

State v. Jeffrey L. Loranger, 2002 WI App 5, PFR filed 1/22/02For Loranger: Richard B. Jacobson, James C. Murray

Issue: Whether evidence illegally obtained through warrantless use of a thermal imaging device, in reliance on then-valid Wisconsin appellate court decision subsequently invalidated by a Supreme Court decision, must be suppressed.

Holding: Warrantless use of a thermal imaging device against Loranger must now clearly be regarded as a fourth amendment violation. 

State v. Glover B. Jones, 2002 WI App 196, PFR filed 8/22/02
For Jones: Mark D. Richards

Issue/Holding:

¶13. There are no longer specific prerequisites to a finding of confidential informant reliability. Rather, the current test simply requires courts to “consider all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information.” 

State v. Glover B. Jones, 2002 WI App 196, PFR filed 8/22/02
For Jones: Mark D. Richards

Issue/Holding: Although the age of the information in the warrant application – six months – gives pause, it isn’t sufficiently stale to defeat probable cause for drug trafficking.

¶22                        Jones argues that the key information in the warrant affidavit—the informant’s allegations—was over six months old.  

State v. Rayshun D. Eason, 2001 WI 98, reversing State v. Rayshun D. Eason, 2000 WI App 73, 234 Wis. 2d 396, 610 N.W.2d 208
For Eason: Suzanne Hagopian, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether evidence obtained after entry of a home in violation of the announcement rule, because authorization was provided by an invalid no-knock warrant, is nonetheless admissible under the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement.

State v. Wilton Tye, 2001 WI 124
For Tye: Mark D. Richards, Christy M. Hall

Issue: Whether evidence seized under a search warrant, invalid on its face because unsupported by oath or affirmation, is covered by the good faith exception.

Holding:

¶24. Fourth and finally, the State asks this court to allow admission of the seized evidence under a good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

State v. Wilton Tye, 2001 WI 124
For Tye: Mark D. Richards, Christy M. Hall

Issue: Whether evidence seized under a search warrant unsupported by oath or affirmation must be suppressed.

Holding: The requirement that a search warrant be supported by oath or affirmation is an explicit and long-standing feature of both state and federal constitutions, as well as legislation, and is essential to the warrant’s validity.

State v. Bill Paul Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, PFR filed 9/20/01
For Marquardt: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether evidence seized under a warrant defective because unsupported by probable cause may be admissible under the good-faith doctrine.

Holding: Given that, subsequent to trial-level litigation, the supreme court recognized the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, in State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98,

State v. Bill Paul Marquardt, 2001 WI App 219, PFR filed 9/20/01
For Marquardt: James B. Connell

Issue: Whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause.

Holding:

¶18. …. The State points to several facts in the affidavits: (1) Mary’s telephone was off the hook the day she was killed, suggesting “that the perpetrator had been inside the residence”; (2) Mary was shot and stabbed,

State v. Cherise A. Raflick, 2001 WI 129
For Raflik: Michael J. Fitzgerald, Dean A. Strang

Issue/Holding:

¶1. This case requires us to decide whether suppression is the proper remedy when a telephonic application for a search warrant is not recorded in accordance with Wis. Stat. § 968.12(3)(d)1, and when the factual basis for the warrant is reconstructed in an ex parte hearing after the warrant has been executed.