On Point: F. Sentence credit

State of Wisconsin ex rel. Christopher P. Kawleski v. State, 2022AP1129, 7/3/25, District IV, (recommended for publication); case activity

COA recommends publication in a case addressing how to calculate the maximum discharge date for a defendant sentenced to a bifurcated sentence on a felony between 1999 and 2003 upon release from reconfinement after extended supervision was revoked.

State v. Scott R. Dachelet, 2023AP970, 6/25/25, District II (recommended for publication); case activity

Wisconsin’s seemingly straightforward sentence credit statute – Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) – is required to accommodate an infinite variety of scenarios.  Here, the COA addressed whether a defendant is entitled to sentence credit on a withheld sentence where probation was revoked while also receiving credit for an imposed and stayed sentence that was revoked.  Because lifting the stay on the imposed and stayed sentence severed the connection between the defendant’s custody and the case for which his sentence was withheld, the Court found that he was not entitled to dual sentence credit.

State v. Michael K. Fermanich, 2023 WI 48, 6/14/23, reversing a per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

The key takeaway here is that five justices reaffirm and apply State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, and hold that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days sentence credit for time he spent in custody in connection with Oneida County charges that were dismissed and read-in at his Langlade County sentencing. (Opinion, ¶2). A concurrence by Justice Dallet is worth reading as a preemptive response to the dissent’s answer to the question for which the court granted review: whether State v. Tuescher should be reexamined and limited to the unique circumstances present there. A dissent by Chief Justice Ziegler and R.G. Bradley would have overruled Floyd, denied Fermanich credit under Tuescher, and required him to return to custody for an additional 433 days. (See Op., ¶19, Dallet, concurring).

State v. Dominic A. Caldiero, 2021AP1163-CR, District 4, 4/28/22 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

When he drove in 2019, Caldiero was still “subject to” a 2015 court order under § 343.301 (2013-14) restricting his operating privilege to cars with an ignition interlock device (IID) because the time period on that restriction does not begin to run till DOT issues him a driver’s license, and that hadn’t happened as of the date he was driving.

State v. Tanya M. Liedke, 2020AP33-CR, Distirct 2, 12/29/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court correctly concluded that Liedke wasn’t in custody for sentence credit purposes while she was on GPS monitoring in connection with the case on which she was sentenced. But she’s entitled to some credit for other time when she was in custody, and the circuit court was wrong to deny her request on the grounds that it was DOC’s responsibility to address her request.

State v. Joseph L. Slater, 2021 WI App 88; case activity (including briefs)

Slater had a prison sentence imposed and then stayed in favor of probation. While on probation, he was arrested on three new charges. The department of corrections revoked his probation pretty quickly, but he didn’t get sent to prison: instead, he remained in the county jail for over three years while those new charges were pending. After a jury convicted him on on the new charges, he got three new concurrent prison sentences. The court of appeals now holds that Slater should be credited on those new sentences for the years he spent in jail awaiting trial.

State v. Avery B. Thomas, Jr., 2021 WI App 59; case activity (including briefs)

Thomas was arrested for and charged with criminal conduct while he was on federal supervision. He was held on cash bail till after his plea, when his bail was modified to a signature bond. He remained in custody, though, because the feds had put a revocation hold on him. He was eventually sentenced after revocation on the federal case, and about a month after that he was sentenced in the Wisconsin case. (¶¶2-4). The Wisconsin court erred in denying Thomas credit for the 48 days he was in custody between the date his bail was modified and the date of his federal sentencing.

State v. Cesar Antonio Lira, 2019AO691-CR, petition for review granted 1/20/21; case activity

Issues presented (from the State’s PFR):

1. Under §973.155, a convicted offender is entitled to sentence credit for “all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed.” And §973.15(5) provides that an offender lawfully made available to another jurisdiction is entitled to credit for custody time in that jurisdiction “under the terms of s. 973.155.”

The court of appeals awarded Lira over 11 years of credit for custody in Oklahoma under §973.15(5), despite the fact that the Oklahoma sentence was not “in connection with” the Wisconsin offenses for which he was sentenced. It relied on State v. Brown, 2006 WI App 41, 289 Wis. 2d 823, 711 N.W.2d 708, which holds that courts determining credit under section 973.15(5) may not consider “the terms of s. 973.155,” including whether the custody in the other jurisdiction is “in connection with” the Wisconsin offense.

State v. Wyatt William Kontny, 2020 WI App 30; case activity (including briefs)

You’d think all the sentence credit issues would’ve been settled by now, but it’s not so! This case settles two of them.

State v. Richard H. Harrison, Jr., 2020 WI 35, 4/17/20, reversing an unpublished decision of the court of appeals; case activity (including briefs)

Addressing an unusual issue that is now also effectively moot due to developments in the case since the cross petitions for review were granted, a majority of the supreme court holds that Harrison isn’t entitled to sentence credit or sentence “advancement” toward an earlier sentence for time spent in custody on a consecutive sentence that is later vacated.