On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Brandon J. Matke, 2005 WI App 4, PFR filed 1/6/05
For Matke: James B. Connell

Issue/Holding:

¶17. Finally, Matke argues that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ordered, without explanation, that Matke’s present sentence be consecutive to any other sentences he was then serving. …

¶18. The sole infirmity that Matke cites is the court’s failure to specifically relate any of the sentencing factors it discussed to its decision to order the present sentence consecutive to,

State v. Ryan E. Baker, 2005 WI App 45, PFR filed 3/17/05
For Baker: William E. Schmaal, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding: The plain text of § 969.02(6) mandates that bail money be used to satisfy court costs, with no room for discretionary return to the depositor rather than payment of costs. ¶¶7-9.

This is a misdemeanor, but the relevant felony statute, § 969.03(4),

State v. James L. Montroy, 2005  WI App 230
For Montroy: Jay E. Heit; Stephanie L. Finn

Issue/Holding: The sentencing court properly exercised discretion in denying eligibility for Earned Release, § 302.05(3), despite misperceiving at one point that defendant was statutorily ineligible:

¶17 … [A]t the December 6, 2004, [postconviction] hearing … [t]he court stated:

Well, of course, the Court is very familiar with Mr. 

State v. Tony G. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90
For Longmire: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue/Holding:

¶13. Restitution awarded under Wis. Stat. § 973.20(5)(a) is limited in two ways relevant to our present analysis. First, before a trial court may order restitution “there must be a showing that the defendant’s criminal activity was a substantial factor in causing” pecuniary injury to the victim. 

State v. Tony G. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90
For Longmire: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether the defendant was entitled to set-off as a defense to restitution for theft by (home improvement) contractor, for work that was paid for by the contractor to a subcontractor.

Holding:

¶18. We conclude that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion by not allowing any offset whatsoever for Longmire’s undisputed expenditure of a portion of the deposit money in compliance with his contractual obligations.

State v. Tony G. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90
For Longmire: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether attorney fees, incurred by the victims in seeking damages under the contract underlying this theft by contractor case, are subject to restitution.

Holding:

¶29. Longmire contends the trial court erred because the “American Rule” requires litigants in a civil action to bear their own litigation costs,

State v. Tony G. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90
For Longmire: Charles B. Vetzner, SPD, Madison Appellate

Issue: Whether expenditures by victims to correct shoddy work done by defendant in theft by contractor case may be subject to restitution.

Holding:

¶23. We conclude that these costs, incurred by the homeowners and admittedly arising out of their dealings with Longmire, are not recoverable as a separate item of restitution under Wis.

State v. Franciollo L. Jones, 2004 WI App 212, PFR filed 11/11/04
For Jones: Syovata Edari; Ellen Henak (on PFR), SPD, Milwaukee Appellate

Issue: Whether the trial court properly ordered Jones to pay a DNA surcharge even though he had already provided a DNA sample in an earlier case.

Holding:

¶5 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.047 obligates the trial court to require anyone convicted of a felony to provide a DNA specimen.

State v. Miyosha White, 2004 WI App 237, PFR filed 12/1/04
For White: Leonard Kachinsky

Issue/Holding: A sentencing court exercising discretion on eligibility for the earned release program, § 973.01(3g), has authority to determine not only whether but also when the defendant is eligible for the program. The language and purpose of the earned release statute is “almost identical” to the “boot camp” statute, § 973.01(3m),

State v. David A. Lehman, 2004 WI App 59, PFR filed 3/4/04
For Lehman: Leonard D. Kachinsky

Issue/Holding: Sentencing court may impose 4-year waiting period for entry into Challenge Incarceration Program (“boot camp”), §§ 302.045, 973.01(3m):

¶17. The intent of the legislature is therefore advanced by an interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.01(3m) that allows a sentencing court to determine not only whether a defendant is eligible for the CIP,