On Point: D. Type of punishment

State v. Eric W. Poirier, 2017AP931-CR, District 3, 5/8/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Back in 2003, Poirier was fined $1,184 for an OWI conviction. He didn’t pay, so a judgment was entered against him. In 2017 the circuit court entered an order assigning income from his prison account to pay the judgment. He objects to the assignment order, but to no avail, due in large part to missteps common to pro se litigants.

State v. Robert P. Vesper, 2018 WI App 31; case activity (including briefs)

Vesper complains that when he was sentenced for his 7th OWI offense the judge didn’t give a separate explanation for why it was imposing a fine in addition to prison time. Over a dissent, the court of appeals concludes the judge said enough to satisfy the (not at all exacting) standard of review for exercise of sentencing discretion. The court also rejects Vesper’s claim that the judge didn’t assess his ability to pay the fine.

State v. Angela C. Nellen, 2017AP257-CR, District 4, 4/18/18 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Completely overlooking the victim’s own restitution hearing testimony that she was guessing about the number and value of the coins they believe were stolen by Nellen, the court of appeals blames Nellen for “fail[ing] to support [her] argument” that the record was insufficient to support the circuit court’s $90,000 restitution order for 30 coins at $3,000 each.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, petition for review of an unpublished court of appeals opinion granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs).

Issue (composed by On Point):

In State v. Queever, 2016 WI App 87, 372 Wis. 2d 388, 887 N.W.2d 912, the court of appeals required a defendant to pay restitution for a security system that the victim bought before the date of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.

Must Queever be overturned because it is impossible for a crime committed on a certain date to cause losses on an earlier date? If not, what are the limits of Queever and of the definition of “a crime considered at sentencing” for restitution purposes? Can the definition include alleged prior-committed crimes?

State v. Sara L. Steppke, 2017AP1683, 4/2/18, District 4 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Steppke was ordered to pay restitution for a security system her employer installed after she stole $3,000 worth of flea and tick product. The system cost over $16,000–or more than five times the value of what she took. Just a few months ago, a dissenting court of appeals judge lamented that the case law had gotten way, way ahead of the text of the restitution statute itself–giving rise to “entirely unjustifiable” results. One can hope this decision marks the beginning of a return to the plain language of the statute.

State v. Arthur Allen Freiboth, 2015AP2535-CR, District IV, 2/26/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

…[W]e certify the present appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether a defendant who was not advised at the time of the plea that he or she faced multiple mandatory DNA surcharges has grounds for plea withdrawal.

State v. Marquis T. Williams, 2018 WI App 20; case activity (including briefs)

Williams, a prison inmate, objected to DOC deducting funds from his prison account to pay the restitution ordered in his criminal case. He asked the sentencing judge to order DOC to stop but the sentencing judge declined. The court of appeals affirms, holding the sentencing court isn’t competent to address that issue. Instead, Williams has to exhaust his administrative remedies using the inmate complaint review system (ICRS) and, if that fails, he can bring a certiorari action in circuit court.

Who would’ve thunk? This is the subject of a hot new paper on the Social Science Research Network.  You can read it here.

State v. David M. Larson, 2017AP1610-CR, 12/27/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

David Larson was driving drunk when another driver, who was cited for failing to yield the right of way, collided with him in a roundabout. Larson drove away while police were investigating. After a contested hearing, the court awarded the other driver restitution for injuries to himself and damage to his car.

State v. Shawn T. Wiskerchen, 2016AP1541-CR, 11/1/17, District 2 (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 3/14/18; affirmed 1/4/19; case activity (including briefs)

“If you start off on the wrong foot, the footer you go, the wronger it gets.” So said Hank the Cowdog and so, essentially, argues the dissenting opinion in this case.  Section 973.20(1r) allows a sentencing court to order a defendant to make full or partial restitution to any victim of a “crime considered at sentencing,” which means “any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.” §973.20(1g)(a). Before ordering restitution, the court must first find a “causal nexus” between the “crime considered at sentencing” and the victim’s alleged damages. Here, the court of appeals finds a “causal nexus” between the lone burglary considered at sentencing and possible losses caused by possible, uncharged prior burglaries that were never considered or read in at sentencing. It does so based upon a series of restitution decisions that have incrementally produced a result the dissent finds absurd.