On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Marvin Frank Robinson, 2019AP105-106-CR; 9/24/19; District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Robinson pled to misdemeanor battery with domestic abuse assessements and to knowingly violating a temporary restraining order in one case. He also pled to misdemeanor bail jumping (violation of the TRO) and other crimes in a second case.  On appeal, he challenged trial court’s application of the domestic abuse modifier and its imposition of the domestic abuse surcharge, but the court of appeals affirmed.

State v. Larry C. Lokken, 2017AP2087-CR, 9/17/19, District 3 (unpublished), case activity (including briefs)

Lokken, a long-time Eau Claire County Treasurer, pled “no contest” to 3 counts of misconduct in office and 5 counts of theft in a business setting for stealing $625,758.22 from taxpayers.  The circuit court ordered $681,846.92 in restitution  and imposed an unusual condition of probation on one of the counts: if Lokken failed to pay restitution in 4 1/2 years, the 10-year probation period  on Count 2 would be revoked.

State v. Amy Joan Zahurones, 2019 WI App 57; case activity (including briefs)

Zahurones was charged with several drug-related counts along with resisting an officer and physical abuse of a child. All the counts arose out of a single encounter with the police. She ultimately pleaded to four counts. On three of those counts she got probation, but on Count 2–the felony child-abuse count–she entered a deferred-judgment agreement with the state. The court put her on a signature bond with respect to that last count, since she wouldn’t otherwise be supervised. Over the next couple of years, Zahurones spent a total of about 9 months in jail on probation holds. Ultimately both the probation and the deferred-judgment agreement were revoked. So, does she get credit for those probation holds against her sentence on Count 2, even though she was technically on a signature bond for that count when she was in jail?

State v. Sean N. Jones, 2018AP948-CR, District 3, 8/20/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Jones makes various challenges to his conviction and sentence for being to party to the crime of armed robbery. The court of appeals rejects all of his claims except the last one, involving sentence credit.

State v. Richard H. Harrison Jr., 2017AP2440 & 2441-CR, cross-petitions for review granted 8/14/19; case activity

We posted about the unpublished court of appeals decision; the basic scenario is that Mr. Harrison served his initial confinement on a couple of concurrent sentences, then began serving the initial confinement portion of some sentences that had been imposed consecutive to that first set of sentences. But, about three years into those later sentences, they were vacated. So what happens to the three years Harrison was in prison on sentences that no longer exist? Do they count toward satisfying the extended supervision of his still-extant, earlier-imposed sentences?

State v. James A. Culver, 2018AP799-CR, District 4, 7/25/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Back in 2008 Culver was convicted and sentenced for OWI, fifth offense, with a minor in the car, which doubles the minimum and maximum penalties, § 346.65(2)(f). Now that his extended supervision (ES) is being revoked he challenges the length of the ES term originally imposed. He argues the presence of a minor is a penalty enhancer, which lengthens the term of initial confinement but not the term of ES, see § 973.01(2)(c)1. and State v. Volk, 2002 WI App 274, 258 Wis. 2d 584, 654 N.W.2d 24. No, says the court of appeals, under State v. Jackson, 2004 WI 29, 270 Wis. 2d 113, 676 NW.2d 872, OWI with a minor passenger is an unclassified felony, so the term of ES is increased, too.

State v. Dominique M. Anwar, 2018AP2222-CR, 6/25/19, District 1 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The court of appeals rejects Anwar’s arguments that she’s entitled to resentencing because the State offered certain information at her sentencing hearing without first disclosing the information and giving her notice it would use the information.

State v. Jessy A. Rivard, 2018AP1070-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Rivard’s challenge to the use of a 2006 OWI conviction fails because the record supports the circuit court’s conclusion that Rivard’s waiver of counsel in that case was valid.

State v. Dustin M. Yanda, 2018AP412-CR, District 3, 6/18/19 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

In State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828, the supreme court held that a defendant seeking a “new factor” sentence modification doesn’t need to prove that the new factor “frustrates the purpose” of the original sentence. However, Harbor doesn’t preclude the sentencing court from considering whether the purpose of the sentence is frustrated in deciding whether to modify a sentence once the court has concluded the defendant has proven a new factor.

State v. Charles L. Neill, IV, petition for review granted 6/11/19; 2018AP75; case activity (including briefs)

This is a review of a published court of appeals decision. Here’s the issue, as stated in our prior post:

Neill pleaded to an OWI-3rd, which has a minimum fine of $600. Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(am)3. His plea came with two statutory enhancers: the one for having a BAC over .25 (Wis. Stat. § 346.65(2)(g)3.), and the one for having a child in a car (§ 346.65(2)(f)2.). The former quadruples the minimum fine, and the latter doubles it. So, what’s the minimum fine?