On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Java I. Orr, 2016AP2009, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Orr raises and loses 3 issues relating to the sentence credit that he received in this case. He argues that (1) he should have been allowed withdraw his plea because trial counsel gave him incorrect infromation regarding the sentence credit he would receive; (2) the actual amount of sentence credit he received is a new factor warranting modification of his sentence; and (3) the trial court sentenced based on inaccurate sentence credit information.

State v. Nathan J. Paape, 2015AP2462-CR, District 2, 6/28/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paape and a co-defendant, Antonio Barbeau, were convicted as adults for a first degree intentional homicide they committed when they were 13 years old. Both received the mandatory life sentence and both were granted eligibility under § 973.014(1g)(a)2. to petition for release to extended supervision under § 302.114(5), Paape after 30 years, Barbeau after about 35 years. Both argued their sentences were invalid under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The court of appeals rejected Barbeau’s arguments last year, State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, and it now rejects Paape’s arguments.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.

State v. Dimitri C. Boone, 2016AP918-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Boone sought a “new factor” sentence modification based on alleged inaccuracies in the report of the presentence investigation (PSI). The court of appeals holds that Boone failed to show the information in the PSI was inaccurate, failed to show new information, or failed to show any of the information was highly relevant to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.

State v. Steven F. Zastrow, 2015AP2182-CRAC, District 3, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Zastrow was serving a string of four consecutive prison sentences, the first imposed in June 2006 in Winnebago County, the other three imposed in October 2006 in Outagamie County. In 2008 the Winnebago sentence was vacated and Zastrow was resentenced to imposed and stayed prison time and placed on probation consecutive to the Outagamie sentences. DOC thereafter recalculated the release dates on the remaining three Outagamie sentences, and decided those sentences started running in 2008, when the Winnebago sentence was vacated. (¶¶2-4). Wrong, says the court of appeals. Those sentences began back in October 2006, on the date they were imposed.

State v. Lazaro Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, 6/22/17, affirming an unpublished court of appeals opinion; case activity (including briefs)

Lazaro Ozuna, a teenager, pled to two misdemeanors and got probation. The court also ordered that the convictions be expunged on successful completion of probation under Wis. Stat. § 973.015. Ozuna got through probation and was discharged, but he picked up an underage drinking ticket along the way–a violation of the no-drink condition of his probation but obviously not a terribly serious one. So, did he “successfully complete” his probation so as to be entitled to expunction?

Packingham v. North Carolina, USSC No. 15-1194, 2017 WL 2621313 (June 19, 2017); reversing State v. Packingham, 777 S.E.2d 738 (N.C. 2015); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Lester Packingham was convicted for having sex with a 13 year old when he was 21, and was thus required to register as a sex offender for 30 years or more. Eight years later, having completed his sentence, Packingham posted on Facebook to celebrate the dismissal of a traffic ticket. He was charged with, and eventually pled to, a felony under a North Carolina law that prohibits those on the registry from accessing “a commercial social networking Web site” if they know the site allows children to sign up.

Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)

Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”

State v. Jesse T. Riemer, 2017 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)

In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the court of appeals addresses the standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on a member of the Wisconsin National Guard after he was convicted of various offenses. Concluding it should apply the same standard as civilian criminal cases—erroneous exercise of discretion—it affirms the military judge’s sentence.