On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, 7/19/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/13/17, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2018 WI 85; case activity (including briefs)

Patrick Dalton was badly injured in a car crash. He argues on appeal that there was no exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw that revealed his intoxication; he also argues the circuit court erred when it considered his refusal to consent to the blood draw as an aggravating factor for sentencing.

State v. Marnie L. Coutino, 2016AP2386-CR, 7/19/2017, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for pubication); case activity (including briefs)

Marnie Coutino seeks resentencing on the ground that the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion when it imposed a 30-day jail sentence without considering whether probation was appropriate.

State v. Alphonso Lamont Willis, 2016AP791-CR, 7/18/17, District 1 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Alphonso Willis appeals his jury-trial conviction of first-degree intentional homicide and being a felon in possession of a firearm. He raises several claims for a new trial and also asks for resentencing. The court of appeals rejects the resentencing claim and some of his complaints of trial error, but concludes that he is entitled to a Machner hearing on his trial counsel’s (1) failure to present testimony that his boots did not match the prints left at the scene and (2) failure to introduce evidence that the homicide occurred at a time when he had already left the vicinity.

For latest on this subject, see today’s issue of Inside Track, which features comments by Wisconsin’s expert on evidence-based sentencing, Professor Cecelia Klingele.

State v. Larry Davis, 2017 WI App 55; case activity (including briefs)

Applying § 304.072(4) and State v. Presley, 2006 WI App 82, 292 Wis. 2d 734, 715 N.W.2d 713, the court of appeals holds that a person who is revoked from extended supervision resumes serving his sentence when he is received in the prison system, not when revocation occurs; he is therefore entitled to sentence credit up to the date he returns to prison.

State v. Java I. Orr, 2016AP2009, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Orr raises and loses 3 issues relating to the sentence credit that he received in this case. He argues that (1) he should have been allowed withdraw his plea because trial counsel gave him incorrect infromation regarding the sentence credit he would receive; (2) the actual amount of sentence credit he received is a new factor warranting modification of his sentence; and (3) the trial court sentenced based on inaccurate sentence credit information.

State v. Nathan J. Paape, 2015AP2462-CR, District 2, 6/28/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Paape and a co-defendant, Antonio Barbeau, were convicted as adults for a first degree intentional homicide they committed when they were 13 years old. Both received the mandatory life sentence and both were granted eligibility under § 973.014(1g)(a)2. to petition for release to extended supervision under § 302.114(5), Paape after 30 years, Barbeau after about 35 years. Both argued their sentences were invalid under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The court of appeals rejected Barbeau’s arguments last year, State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, and it now rejects Paape’s arguments.

State v. Tydis Trinard Odom, 2015AP2525-CR; District 2, 6/28/17, certification granted 9/12/17, appeal voluntarily dismissed 2/22/18; case activity (including briefs)

Issue:

In determining whether the imposition of multiple DNA surcharges constitutes “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a) so that a court must advise a defendant about the surcharges before a valid plea may be taken, is the “intent-effects” test, as applied in State v. Radaj, 2015 WI App 50, 363 Wis. 2d 633, 866 N.W.2d 758, and State v. Scruggs, 2017 WI 15, 373 Wis. 2d 312, 891 N.W.2d 786, to ex post facto claims, the same analysis that was applied in State v. Bollig, 2000 WI 6, ¶16, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199, to a plea withdrawal claim?

If the analysis is the same, should Radaj be overruled in light of the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs?

We note that we previously certified the issue of whether multiple DNA surcharges constituted “potential punishment” under WIS. STAT. § 971.08(1)(a), such that a court’s failure to advise a defendant about them before taking his or her plea establishes a prima facie showing that the defendant’s plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent. The supreme court declined to accept certification.

We certify again because, as explained below, the supreme court’s recent decision in Scruggs now suggests that the ex post facto analysis of Radaj, holding that multiple DNR surcharges are “punishment,” was incorrect.

State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)

It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.

State v. Dimitri C. Boone, 2016AP918-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Boone sought a “new factor” sentence modification based on alleged inaccuracies in the report of the presentence investigation (PSI). The court of appeals holds that Boone failed to show the information in the PSI was inaccurate, failed to show new information, or failed to show any of the information was highly relevant to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.