On Point blog, page 43 of 95
Additional pre-sentence credit granted after revocation of parole isn’t applied to reincarceration time
State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, petition for review granted 11/14/14, reversed, 2015 WI 66; case activity
When sentence credit for time spent in custody before the defendant was sentenced is not granted until after the defendant has been revoked from parole and reincarcerated, the plain language of § 302.11(7)(am) and (b) requires DOC to apply the credit to the remaining period of parole,
Retroactive application of the law repealing the 2009 Act 28 early release statutes violates ex post facto clauses
State ex rel. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, petitions for review and cross review granted 11/4/15, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2016 WI 67; case activity
When Singh committed, or was convicted and sentenced for, his offenses, he was eligible for early release under statutes enacted by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28. But by the time he arrived at prison,
Trial court’s failure to explain reasons for sentence saved by postconviction remarks
State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.
Counting out-of-state “zero tolerance” OWI violations as prior offenses doesn’t violate Equal Protection Clause
State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity
The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).
Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),
Good-bye to Gerondale: Enhanced misdemeanor sentences are governed by the basic 75% and 25% rules
State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity
In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,
Sec. 973.015 expunction denied based on new, court-imposed deadline and filing requirements
State v. Kearney Hemp, 2014 WI App 34, petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed 2014 WI 129; case activity
Every so often there’s an opinion that makes you shake your head in disbelief. This is one of them.
Hemp was convicted with 1 count of possession with intent to deliver THC, aka hemp. A court granted conditional jail time,
Defendant can’t withdraw plea based on claim he wasn’t informed of the domestic abuse modifier, but there was no basis to assess the domestic abuse surcharge
State v. Ryan P. O’Boyle, 2013AP1004-CR, District 1, 2/4/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
O’Boyle’ claimed his lawyer was ineffective for failing to move to strike the references in the complaint to “domestic abuse” because that isn’t a separate, stand-alone charge. He also claimed counsel failed to explain that the disorderly conduct count to which O’Boyle entered a plea was charged as an act of domestic abuse under § 968.075(1)(a).
Ignition interlock must be ordered in first offense OWI when defendant has prior offense outside the 10 year counting period
Village of Grafton v. Eric L. Seatz, 2014 WI App 23; case activity
“The issue presented is straightforward: Must a court order the installation of an ignition interlock device when a defendant is convicted of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) and also has a prior conviction for an OWI offense? The answer is yes.” (¶1).
Seatz was arrested for OWI. His blood alcohol content was .13.
Court of appeals orders trial court to explain its restitution decision (again)
State v. Thomas G. Felski, 2013AP1796-CR, District 2, 1/29/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity
For a second time the court of appeals reverses a restitution order and remands the case for the circuit court to explain how it arrived at the restitution figure.
Felski was convicted of performing home improvement services without a contract. In his first appeal, the court of appeals upheld the determination that Felski was liable for restitution,
Resentencing required because PSI included defendant’s compelled statements to probation agent
State v. Danny Robert Alexander, 2013AP843-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication), petition for review granted 6/12/14, reversed, 2015 WI 6; case activity
Alexander was on probation when he was charged with forgery. He pled to the forgery and a PSI was prepared. (¶2). Attached to the PSI were statements the defendant made to his probation agent about two other forgeries.