On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Paul J. Williquette, 2013AP2127-CR, District 4, 4/17/14; (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

What happens when a restitution award is twice the victim’s actual repair costs? In this case, not much. Williquette was ordered to pay restitution based upon State-submitted repair estimates.  Later, he moved for sentence modification claiming the actual (and lesser) amount the victim paid for repairs was a “new factor” justifying a reduced restitution award.  The COA held that by not challenging the estimates at sentencing, Williquette stipulated to their reasonableness and that the actual repair costs did not amount to a “new factor.”

State v. Dennis R. Armstrong, 2014 WI App 59; case activity

The fact that Armstrong was entitled to eight months rather than approximately two years of sentence credit is a “new factor” because the information was unknowingly overlooked at sentencing and the amount of sentence credit was highly relevant to the circuit court’s imposition of the sentence:

¶13      At the sentencing hearing,

State v. Akil C. Jackson, 2014 WI App 50; case activity

Under State v. Carter, 2010 WI 132, 330 Wis. 2d 1, 794 N.W.2d 213, Jackson’s statutory summary suspension in Illinois resulting from an OWI and PAC citation counts as a prior conviction under § 343.307(1) even though the citation was eventually dismissed.

Carter considered whether a prior suspension of operating privileges under the Illinois “zero tolerance” law should be counted as a prior conviction under § 343.307. 

State v. Anthony R. Giebel, 2013AP1874-CR, District 2, 4/9/14; c0urt of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Giebel challenged his misdemeanor repeater sentence based on the holding in State v. Gerondale, Nos. 2009AP1237/1238-CR, unpublished slip op. (WI App Nov. 3, 2009). While his appeal was pending, the court of appeals decided State v. Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26,

Issues Presented:

1.     Has the court of appeals effectively overturned this court’s precedent recognizing undue harshness as a ground for sentence modification?

2.   Is the time ripe for this court to put teeth in the McCleary-Gallion mandate that the appellate courts ensure that sentences – particularly sentences in the highest range – are rational and explainable?

Court of Appeals opinion: State v. Mark S. Rigdon,

State v. Andrew M. Obriecht, 2014 WI App 42, petition for review granted 11/14/14, reversed, 2015 WI 66; case activity

When sentence credit for time spent in custody before the defendant was sentenced is not granted until after the defendant has been revoked from parole and reincarcerated, the plain language of § 302.11(7)(am) and (b) requires DOC to apply the credit to the remaining period of parole,

State ex rel. Aman Singh v. Paul Kemper, 2014 WI App 43, petitions for review and cross review granted 11/4/15, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2016 WI 67; case activity

When Singh committed, or was convicted and sentenced for, his offenses, he was eligible for early release under statutes enacted by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28. But by the time he arrived at prison,

State v. Venceremos Crump, 2013AP2163-CR, District 1, 3/18/14; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

The circuit court articulated its reasons for the sentence imposed on Crump as required by State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197, in light of the court’s comments in its order denying Crump’s postconviction motion, where it explicitly addressed the three primary sentencing factors and applied those factors to the facts of Crump’s case.

State v. Daniel M. Hirsch, 2014 WI App 39; case activity

The equal protection clause isn’t violated by § 343.307(1)(d)‘s differing treatment of Wisconsin and out-of-state” zero tolerance” OWI offenses (which penalize drivers under the legal drinking age who drive with any alcohol concentration).

Hirsch had two prior driver’s license suspensions for violation Illinois’s zero tolerance law. Under § 343.307(1)(d),

State v. Lee Thomas Lasanske, 2014 WI App 26; case activity

In a decision that may finally settle the issue of how to bifurcate enhanced misdemeanor sentences, the court of appeals holds that § 973.01(2)(c)1.’s prohibition against using an enhancer to increase a period of extended supervision does not apply to enhanced misdemeanor sentences. Instead, enhanced misdemeanor sentences are subject to the basic rules that the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence may not exceed 75% of the total sentence,