On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Quincy Lashawn Baker, 2013AP242-CR, District 1, 1/28/14; court of appeals decision (not recommended for publication); case activity

Baker was given a resentencing hearing based on inaccurate information about the maximum periods of confinement and supervision for the crime of conviction (felony murder). (¶¶4-5). At the resentencing hearing before a different judge, the state argued Baker’s profane outburst at the conclusion of his original sentencing hearing showed a lack of remorse.

State v. Torrey L. Smith-Iwer, 2013AP1426-CR, District 1, 12/27/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Smith-Iwer was convicted of four misdemeanors as a repeat offender under § 939.62(1)(a) and given four consecutive two-year sentences, each consisting of one year of confinement and one year of extended supervision. He moved for postconviction relief, arguing the sentences were illegal under State v. Volk,

State v. Scott J. Stelzer, 2013AP1555-CR, District 2, 12/27/13 (1-judge decision; ineligible for publication), case activity

After being convicted of his 3rd OWI offense, Stelzer moved to exclude his 2nd OWI (which occurred in 1996) from the calculation of his prior convictions on the grounds that he was not represented by counsel when he pled guilty to it.  Nor did he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel at that time. 

State v. Jeffery Polar, Jr., 2014 WI App 15; case activity

The court of appeals holds that the plain language of § 973.195(1r)(a) requires a defendant serving multiple sentences to file a separate sentence adjustment petition for each individual sentence the defendant is seeking to adjust.

Polar’s governing sentences consisted of two consecutive terms, one with 7 years of confinement, the second for 3 years of confinement.

Review of published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue (composed by On Point)

Does § 346.65(2)(am)6., which provides that “the confinement portion of a bifurcated sentence imposed under s. 973.01 [for an OWI 7th, 8th, or 9th] shall be not less than 3 years,” require that a bifurcated sentence be imposed?

The court of appeals held that the statute requires a minimum period of confinement if a bifurcated sentence is imposed,

Review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity

Issue:  Whether under § 973.015 the circuit court has the discretion to withhold its decision on expungement until after the defendant completes probation?

Wis. Stat. § 973.015 authorizes the circuit court to expunge the record of a defendant under the age of 25 in certain situations. Matasek says the statute gives the circuit court discretion to defer its expunction decision until after the offender successfully completes probation.

State v. Ericka S. Thomas, Appeal No. 2013AP341-CR; District 1; 11/13/13 (not recommended for publication); case activity

This is a split decision over the proper application of § 973.20, the restitution statute.  The circuit court convicted Thomas of Medicaid fraud, sentenced her to imprisonment, and ordered her to pay $356, 366.33 (the total amount she and accomplices stole) in restitution.  At sentencing, her lawyer described her “extremely limited earning ability,” a statement bolstered by her PSI. 

The Sentencing Law and Policy blog (an affiliate of the law professor blogs network) tees up the issue nicely.  Their post is pasted in below.

When and how will SCOTUS take up Miller retroactivity issues?

The question in the title of this post is promoted by this local piece reporting on reactions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision last week (reported here) that its state teens given mandatory LWOP before the US Supreme Court’s Miller ruling should not get any retroactive benefit from that decision.

State v. Earnest Lee Nicholson, 2013AP722-CR, District 1, 10/29/13; court of appeals decision (1-judge; ineligible for publication); case activity

Nicholson was arrested for felony battery of his girlfriend, Marnice Franklin, but the battery charge was dismissed after Franklin failed to appear to testify at trial; Nicholson was also charged with resisting an officer, and that charge proceeded to trial and a guilty verdict. (¶¶2-4). At sentencing on the resisting charge the judge made extensive remarks concerning the alleged battery,

Question presented:

Whether the Florida scheme for identifying mentally retarded defendants in capital cases violates Atkins v. Virginia.

Lower court opinion: Hall v. State, 109 So.3d 704 (Fla. 2012)

Docket

Scotusblog page

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), held that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute a person who is found to be mentally retarded.