On Point: 36. Sentencing

State v. Michael Lee Muehl, 2021AP1755-CR & 2021AP1758-CR, District 4, 3/31/21 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court sentenced Muehl to prison and made him eligible for the earned release programs. Turns out Muehl was ineligible for those programs, so he filed a motion to modify his sentence on the grounds that his ineligibility was a “new factor”—that is, a fact highly relevant to the imposition of sentence that was not known to the judge at the time of sentencing because it wasn’t in existence or was unknowingly overlooked. State v. Harbor, 2011 WI 28, ¶35, 333 Wis. 2d 53, 797 N.W.2d 828. (¶¶2-10). Although a defendant’s ineligibility for earned release programming   might be a new factor in some cases, it isn’t here because Muehl hasn’t established his ineligibility was “highly relevant” to the sentencing decision.

Victor Ortiz, Jr. v. Kevin A. Carr, 2022 WI App 16; case activity (including briefs)

Attorneys Jason Luczak and Jorge Fragoso of Gimbel, Reilly, Geurin & Brown generously took this case pro bono. And now Jorge offers this guest post on their defense win:

Prison inmate (and hero to institutionalized persons) Victor Ortiz filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to limit the percentage of his income diverted for the payment of restitution. He won. The court of appeals ordered the Department of Corrections to limit its withholdings to 25% of Ortiz’s wages, half of what the Department sought.

On review of a court of appeals certification; affirmed 5/23/23; case activity (including briefs);

Issue:

Whether Wis. Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1, which mandates lifetime sex-offender registration where a person has been convicted of a sex offense “on 2 or more separate occasions,” applies when a person’s only eligible convictions are entered on multiple guilty pleas in the same case.

State v. Octavia W. Dodson, 2022 WI 5, 2018AP1476, 1/26/22, affirming an unpublished per curiam court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)

Dodson pleaded guilty to second-degree homicide. He’d shot and killed Freeman, who he (apparently erroneously) believed had earlier rear-ended his car. Dodson had pursued Freeman’s car and Freeman pulled over. Dodson said Freeman had run at him shouting racial epithets; that’s when Dodson shot him.

State v. Tanya M. Liedke, 2020AP33-CR, Distirct 2, 12/29/21 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

The circuit court correctly concluded that Liedke wasn’t in custody for sentence credit purposes while she was on GPS monitoring in connection with the case on which she was sentenced. But she’s entitled to some credit for other time when she was in custody, and the circuit court was wrong to deny her request on the grounds that it was DOC’s responsibility to address her request.

State v. T.A., 2020AP1350, 12/28/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

Tanner (16) had sex with a girl (16) after she told him to “stop.” The circuit court adjudicated him delinquent and imposed but stayed a requirement that he register as a sex offender. Subsequently, the court lifted the stay and ordered Tanner to register as a sex offender for 15 years.  The court of appeals here reverses the “lift of stay” and orders a new hearing because the circuit court relied on an inaccurate interpretation of Tanner’s J-SOAP-II score at the original hearing.

State v. Dallas R. Christel, 2020AP1127-1128-Cr, 12/8/21, District 2 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)

Christel argued that §940.235, which criminalizes strangulation and suffocation, (1) violates substantive due process on its face and as applied to him, (2) is overbroad, and (3) is void for vagueness. He also argued for a new-factor-based sentence modification on his bail-jumping convictions. The court of appeals torpedoed every claim.

State v. B.M., 2021AP501-FT, 12/14/21, District 3 (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity

A court found “Brandon” delinquent and placed him on juvenile supervision. It said that if the State wanted electronic monitoring it could “schedule further proceedings and we’ll take that up.” But then the written order directed that he “shall participate in the electronic monitoring program as deemed appropriate by the assigned juvenile worker for any violation of supervision.”

State v. Corey Rector, 2020AP1213, certification filed 11/24/21; granted 2/16/22; affirmed 5/23/23; District 2; case activity (including briefs)

Issue (from the certification):

Whether the plain meaning of “separate occasions” in the sex-offender-registration statute means that the two convictions must have occurred at different times in two separate proceedings so that the qualifying convictions occurred sometime before a defendant is convicted in the current case. Stated otherwise, can the qualifying convictions occur simultaneously, as they did in this case, and as Wittrock and Hopkins held?

State v. Sean B. Day, 2021AP1018, 11/24/21, District 4 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication); case activity (including brief)

Day was initially charged with repeated sexual assault of a child for sexual contact with a 14-year-old when he was 17. He ended up pleading to a single count of fourth-degree sexual assault and was put on probation. The circuit court failed to mention expunction at the sentencing hearing, but later–both in writing and at the postconviction motion hearing–it gave the reasons it did not find expunction appropriate.