On Point blog, page 9 of 37
COA: Warrantless blood draw constitutional; OK to punish defendant for not consenting
State v. Patrick H. Dalton, 2016AP2483-CR, 7/19/17, District 2 (one-judge decision; ineligible for publication), petition for review granted 11/13/17, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 2018 WI 85; case activity (including briefs)
Patrick Dalton was badly injured in a car crash. He argues on appeal that there was no exigency justifying the warrantless blood draw that revealed his intoxication; he also argues the circuit court erred when it considered his refusal to consent to the blood draw as an aggravating factor for sentencing.
Cecelia Klingele on Loomis and using COMPAS at sentencing
For latest on this subject, see today’s issue of Inside Track, which features comments by Wisconsin’s expert on evidence-based sentencing, Professor Cecelia Klingele.
Court of appeals rejects claim for duplicate sentence credit
State v. Java I. Orr, 2016AP2009, 7/5/17, District 1, (1-judge opinion, ineligible for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Orr raises and loses 3 issues relating to the sentence credit that he received in this case. He argues that (1) he should have been allowed withdraw his plea because trial counsel gave him incorrect infromation regarding the sentence credit he would receive; (2) the actual amount of sentence credit he received is a new factor warranting modification of his sentence; and (3) the trial court sentenced based on inaccurate sentence credit information.
Juvenile’s homicide sentence valid under Graham, Miller, and Montgomery
State v. Nathan J. Paape, 2015AP2462-CR, District 2, 6/28/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Paape and a co-defendant, Antonio Barbeau, were convicted as adults for a first degree intentional homicide they committed when they were 13 years old. Both received the mandatory life sentence and both were granted eligibility under § 973.014(1g)(a)2. to petition for release to extended supervision under § 302.114(5), Paape after 30 years, Barbeau after about 35 years. Both argued their sentences were invalid under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). The court of appeals rejected Barbeau’s arguments last year, State v. Barbeau, 2016 WI App 51, 370 Wis. 2d 736, 883 N.W.2d 520, and it now rejects Paape’s arguments.
Defense win: COA holds mandatory DNA surcharge violates ex post facto clause as applied in this case
State v. Jamal L. Williams, 2017 WI App 46, cross petitions for review granted 10/10/17, reversed in part and affirmed in part, 2018 WI 59; case activity (including briefs)
It’s looking like “DNA surcharge Day” in the District 2 court of appeals. Williams argued that because he had been ordered to provide a DNA sample and pay the $250 surcharge in a prior case, retroactive application of Wisconsin’s recent mandatory DNA surcharge statute in this case violated the ex post facto clauses of the state and federal constitutions. The court of appeals agreed.
Defendant fails to show new factor justifying sentencing modification
State v. Dimitri C. Boone, 2016AP918-CR, District 1, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Boone sought a “new factor” sentence modification based on alleged inaccuracies in the report of the presentence investigation (PSI). The court of appeals holds that Boone failed to show the information in the PSI was inaccurate, failed to show new information, or failed to show any of the information was highly relevant to the circuit court’s sentencing decision.
DOC erred in recalculating string of consecutive sentences after one was vacated
State v. Steven F. Zastrow, 2015AP2182-CRAC, District 3, 6/27/17 (not recommended for publication); case activity (including briefs)
Zastrow was serving a string of four consecutive prison sentences, the first imposed in June 2006 in Winnebago County, the other three imposed in October 2006 in Outagamie County. In 2008 the Winnebago sentence was vacated and Zastrow was resentenced to imposed and stayed prison time and placed on probation consecutive to the Outagamie sentences. DOC thereafter recalculated the release dates on the remaining three Outagamie sentences, and decided those sentences started running in 2008, when the Winnebago sentence was vacated. (¶¶2-4). Wrong, says the court of appeals. Those sentences began back in October 2006, on the date they were imposed.
SCOTUS suggests it might not take much to satisfy Graham’s “meaningful opportunity for release” standard for juveniles serving life
Virginia v. Dennis LeBlanc, USSC No. 16-1177, 2017 WL 2507375 (June 12, 2017), reversing LeBlanc v. Mathena, 841 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2016); Scotusblog page (including links to briefs and commentary)
Although this is a per curiam decision and it’s decided under the rubric of federal habeas review, the upshot of this opinion is that states won’t have to do too much to satisfy the requirement under Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010), that a state give a juvenile serving life without parole “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on a demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”
Court of Appeals reviews sentence of court-martialed national guard member
State v. Jesse T. Riemer, 2017 WI App 48; case activity (including briefs)
In what appears to be the first case of its kind, the court of appeals addresses the standard for reviewing the sentence imposed on a member of the Wisconsin National Guard after he was convicted of various offenses. Concluding it should apply the same standard as civilian criminal cases—erroneous exercise of discretion—it affirms the military judge’s sentence.
SCOW will address whether circuit court can revisit expungement if it overlooked eligibility at sentencing
State v. Diamond J. Arberry, 2016AP866-CR, 6/16/17, granting a petition for review of a published court of appeals decision; case activity (including briefs)
Issues (composed by On Point)
1. When a defendant is eligible for expungement under § 973.015 but expungement is not addressed the sentencing hearing, can the defendant raise the issue in a postconviction motion? If so, is a “new factor” motion the appropriate vehicle for bringing such a claim?
2. Did the circuit court err in its exercise of discretion when it denied Arberry expungement based on reasons that could apply in any case?